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ABSTRACT
This thesis addresses the implementation of long-term public-private contracts for utility 
services. Long-term contracts are inevitably incomplete and need to be adjusted over 
time to take account of new information or changes in the operating environment. 
Institutional environments, especially in developing countries, are also very likely to be 
incomplete. The existing literature has tended to focus on one of these two types of 
incompleteness; this thesis takes the analysis a step further by integrating the two into a 
single approach.
Many contracts contain provisions for periodic adjustments to their terms, ‘contractually 
mandated renegotiations.’ Other adjustments will be necessary to rebalance a contract 
after a major shock, ‘shock-induced renegotiations.’ This research looks at both these 
types of adjustment in incomplete institutional environments and considers the 
behaviour o f government and firm actors.
The analysis proceeds in three steps. First, regression analysis of an original database of 
PSP projects, ‘WATSUP’, is used to test the relationship between institutions the 
number of PSP projects in each country. This confirms the significance of institutions. 
Second, a framework for the analysis of government and firm behaviour is developed 
which takes into account the two types of incompleteness, time inconsistency, actors’ 
time preferences and the role of multiple actors. Third, in-depth case studies of the 
implementation of PSP contracts for water services in Manila and Jakarta are presented, 
based on more than 50 personal interviews in the two locations.
The findings suggest that contractual incompleteness can be better managed if: the 
parties agree a set of principles and procedures for contract adjustment at the outset; set 
out clear lines of responsibility for contract renegotiation and approval; and establish 
contract-specific regulatory institutions with clearly defined implementation 
responsibilities.
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1 Economic Regulation, Institutions and Development: Issues for the 
Water Sector
Poor provision of basic services like water and sanitation characterises many developing 
countries. It is estimated that 1.1 billion people have no access to safe drinking water 
while 2.6 billion do not have adequate sanitation, most of whom live in low income 
countries (WHO/UNICEF 2004). The urgent need to improve this situation has been 
recognised in the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), but the goal, of course, does 
not show how it is to be achieved. For a developing country, improving water and 
sanitation and other utility services requires significant capital investment. The 
Camdessus Report estimated that spending on water infrastructure in developing 
countries would have to increase from roughly $80 billion a year to $180 billion over 
the next 20-25 years to achieve ‘water security’ by 2025 (Winpenny 2003).1 
Governments in developing countries may look to several different sources of funds to 
meet this investment need, including public funds, donor funds and user fees. Another 
option, which has been explored in many countries, is to involve private firms in the 
provision of services. Private sector participation also offers other potential advantages: 
greater efficiency, better management and less politicisation of tariff-setting.
However, these are only potential advantages. Private firms will only invest and 
improve efficiency if  they have the incentives to do so. Governments will only refrain 
from politically motivated intervention in the decisions o f the firm if they face a set of 
incentives or constraints that make it preferable to hold back. These incentives and 
constraints form the central focus of this thesis. Their absence helps to account for 
anecdotal evidence of the ‘failure’ of private sector participation (PSP) in the water and 
sanitation sector of developing countries, while developed countries have been able to 
achieve adequate outcomes in terms o f access and service quality through a range of 
different PSP models.
1 This figure from the Report o f  the World Panel on Financing Water Infrastructure (Chaired by Michel 
Camdessus), Winpenny (2003), includes expenditure on agricultural water and flood management, in 
addition to water and sanitation services. It may be considered an upper bound estimate o f  the level o f  
financing needed. Other estimates o f  the financing needed to meet the MDGs (which include only 
spending on water supply and sanitation services) are considerably lower. The UN Task Force on Water 
and Sanitation (2005) estimates an annual average o f  $6.7 billion for water and sanitation in 2001-15.
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1.1 Thesis Topic
In this research, I consider how the system of economic regulation of natural 
monopolies shapes the incentives and constraints of the firm and government and how 
this system interacts with the broader institutional framework at the national level in the 
specific context of developing countries.
The thesis uses new empirical evidence to show the role of institutions in the interaction 
between the public and private sectors for the provision of water services using both 
quantitative and qualitative methodologies. It also proposes a new theoretical 
framework for the analysis of the behaviour of public and private agents in this context 
which can inform future policy design.
I set out to answer the question, Do incomplete institutions hinder the successful 
implementation o f long-term contracts fo r  utility services?
From the point of view of the firm, ‘successful’ refers to whether the stream of returns 
from the project is above the firm’s hurdle rate; for the government, success relates to 
the stream of political and financial pay-offs from the contract and relates to the 
improvements in efficiency, investment, coverage and quality of service that the 
arrangement delivers.
Two issues pertaining to the (incompleteness of institutions emerge from the literature:
- Do multiple government actors make the institutional framework institutions more 
complete?
- Does a contract-based regulatory agency make the institutional framework more 
complete?
As I show below and in the following chapters, these questions are not comprehensively 
addressed by existing work. The most important gap is a comprehensive framework 
capable of addressing both incomplete contracts and the incomplete institutional context 
of a developing country, which can draw out the implications of this for the interaction 
of public (government) and private (firm) actors.
This thesis contributes to the field of regulatory theory and its relationship to 
development in two ways:
ll
- It demonstrates the impact of incomplete institutions on the agreement and 
implementation of public-private contracts;
- It extends our understanding of multiple government actors, including regulators, in 
the implementation of incomplete contracts.
It also contributes new quantitative and qualitative evidence documenting the 
interaction of governments and firms when negotiating and implementing long term 
contracts for the provision of water and sanitation services in the context of developing 
countries.
1.2 Definitions
At the outset, it will be helpful to clarify terms that will recur throughout the thesis. 
Firstly, I understand ‘institutions’ as the “fundamental political, social and legal rules 
that establish the basis for interaction between individuals and organisations,” North’s 
definition o f the institutional environment (North 1990). In keeping with North, I see 
institutions as structuring the incentives of agents, whether state, market or civil 
organisations or individuals. However, my focus is narrower than this definition, as I 
concentrate on formal institutions, rather than on customs and social mores.
The line between institutions and ‘organisations’ or ‘institutional arrangements’ is not 
hard and fast, but rather one that depends on the level o f analysis. As Saleth & Dinar 
write: “When considering water institutional arrangements, the overall economic, 
political, and resource-related institutions become part o f the institutional environment. 
Similarly, when the focus is on the institutional arrangements of a particular region or 
sub-sector, the institutional arrangements at the national and sectoral levels become part 
of the institutional environment.” (Saleth and Dinar 2004: 25-6). For the purposes of 
this research, national-level political, judicial and other institutions are considered as 
features of the institutional environment.
‘Regulation’ refers to rules enforced by a government agency to control economic 
activity. As such, it falls between indirect methods of control like taxes and subsidies 
and direct control through the ownership of market entities. Economic regulation -  
distinct from health regulation or environmental regulation — encompasses rules 
governing price, output, and industry structure and involves setting prices and 
monitoring performance. Its aim is to redress a particular market failure, when the
12
market does not deliver the most efficient outcome, which is associated with natural 
monopoly, without direct public ownership.
‘Natural monopolies’ are sectors in which costs are minimised by having a single firm 
providing a good or service. In the absence of economic regulation, private providers of 
network utility services would be likely to behave as monopolists, restricting output and 
raising prices above the welfare maximising level. Network industries are examples of 
natural monopolies as their most efficient industry structure is to have a single network. 
However, natural monopoly may only apply to one stage in service delivery, such as 
distribution, while generation or retailing may be most efficiently structured with 
multiple producers in competition. Network industries therefore include parts of water 
supply services, gas and electricity supply.
‘Regulation by contract’ refers to one of two basic structures for economic regulation, in 
which the process or formula for setting prices and requirements for the firm are set out 
in a formal agreement that takes the form of a legal contract. Regulation by contract is 
distinguished from regulation by agency, in which a public body sets prices and 
requirements following a process or procedures specified in primary legislation. In some 
cases, the regulator is given the scope to set its own objectives, which is known as 
discretionary regulation. Under regulation by contract, an agency may be set up to 
monitor and enforce the contract. If  the regulator does not have any decision-making 
powers, this would not constitute regulation by agency. Hybrid types of regulation, 
combining elements of regulation by contract and regulation by agency, are not only 
possible, but widespread.
The independence of the regulator is a separate question from the degree of regulatory 
discretion. Regulatory independence refers to the extent to which politicians can and do 
intervene in regulatory decisions.
‘Regulatory incentives’ refer to the principles for setting tariffs. The basic distinction is 
between rate-of-retum (ROR) regulation and price-cap or ‘incentive regulation,’ also 
sometimes known as ‘RPI-X’ regulation in reference to its application in the UK.2 In
2 RPl is the Retail Price Index measure o f  inflation, while X is an efficiency saving. RPI-X regulation was 
developed by Michael Beesley and Stephen Littlechild and introduced for telecommunications and power 
regulation in the UK in the 1980s. (Beesley and Littlechild 1983)
13
practice, these two types of regulation are not always clearly distinct and may instead be 
seen as the two ends of a spectrum.
‘Private Sector Participation’ (PSP) refers to a range of pubic-private arrangements for 
the delivery of services. Here, the public sector refers to the state, and the private sector 
refers to for-profit enterprises in which the state does not have majority ownership. PSP 
encompasses divestiture, concessions, leases, management and service contracts, each 
of which is described below. All these types of PSP are also sometimes referred to 
under the potentially emotive label of ‘privatisation.’ I also use the term public-private 
contracts to refer specifically to those PSP arrangements that are based on regulation by 
contract.
It is useful to set out here the differences between types o f PSP arrangement as they are 
associated with distinctive sets of incentives and constraints. The focus of the thesis is 
on those arrangements in which the firm carries out the bulk of capital investment -  
divestitures and concessions -  as these arrangements imply particular incentive 
problems, and here I show how these are different from other PSP forms. The 
definitions set out here allow us to distinguish between projects based on underlying 
economic characteristics -  ownership of assets, source of finance for capital and 
operational expenditure, source of revenue -  and the distribution of risks between the 
parties.
Divestiture refers to the sale of assets by the public sector to the private sector. It 
includes the sale of shares through a public share offer as well as the sale o f assets direct 
to a private company. Divestiture often takes place in the reform o f a utility sector and 
is accompanied by restructuring, vertical disintegration and the establishment of a new 
regulatory framework. However, there is no requirement that divestiture be 
accompanied by other sector reforms. Under a full divestiture, all risks are taken by the 
private party. The government may define a regulatory procedure in law to set prices 
and performance requirements for the firm. In cases of partial divestiture, the public and 
private parties may also sign a joint venture (JV) agreement clarifying management 
control and other conditions.
Concessions are PSP arrangements based on a contract granted to a private agent, the 
‘concessionaire’, by a public body, the ‘conceding authority’. Under a concession
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contract, the public sector retains ownership of the assets, but all capital investment is 
financed by the private sector and the firm’s revenues are at least in part dependent on 
tariffs paid by end-users.3 The firm takes on financing, management and revenue risks. 
These features of concessions imply a distinctive set of incentives for the government 
and the firm, and in particular emphasise the trade-off between capital investment by the 
concessionaire and tariffs paid by customers. The structure of a concession for the 
water sector is described in more detail in the following section.
Leases are PSP arrangements in which the public sector retains ownership of assets and 
retains responsibility for financing major capital works. The dividing line between 
leases and concessions is not precise, as the classification of operating and capital costs 
is itself disputable. However, under a lease, the public sector will always finance at least 
some capital investment. These contracts imply that the public and private parties share 
financing and revenue risks according to the specific provisions of the contract.
Under a management contract, capital expenditure is financed by the public sector while 
operating expenditure is financed by the private sector. Revenues to the private party 
will take the form of a management fee paid by the government or utility and will vary 
only indirectly, if at all, with tariff revenues from end-users. Tariff revenues may be 
shared between public and private parties according to a pre-established formula. In 
practice, the scope o f a management contract may vary depending on the classification 
of operating and capital expenditure, as noted above, and on the degree of influence that 
the private entity has in deciding the capital investment programme. Under these 
contracts, the firm takes on only the management risk associated with operating the 
utility while financing risk and most revenue risk remain with the public sector.
In service contracts, the role of the private entity is limited to the provision of specified 
services relating directly to the provision o f utility services, such as billing and customer 
management, in return for a fee from the public entity. Services relating to non-core 
activities such as cleaning or catering fall outside the definition of PSP as they do not 
imply the same challenges o f incentive design and monitoring.
3 In this research, concessions are distinguished from Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) projects in which the 
private firm receives revenue payments from a single public entity, or ‘off-taker,’ and the public utility 
provides services to end-users. BOT contracts often specify a minimum volume o f  water or wastewater 
and the tariff that w ill be paid for this, reducing the firm’s revenue risk. Under a ‘take-or-pay’ agreement, 
the firm does not take on any revenue risk.
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1.3 Concession Contract Structure
This research focuses on the most difficult privatisations to regulate -  divestitures and 
concessions -  in which most responsibility for capital investment and financing risk are 
transferred to the private sector. Concessions are of particular interest for two reasons: 
they are long-term contracts, and the questions that I wish to investigate are related to 
the incomplete nature of long-term contracts (Williamson 1985). Secondly, concessions 
bring the private sector into direct contact with the consumer, and the revenue of the 
company depends on how much these consumers purchase and how much they pay for 
it, which in turn raises political and social issues.
This section sets out a typical structure for a concession contract, showing the main 
legal and financial relationships. The contracting parties are a designated public 
contracting authority and the private firm, but other public and private actors will also 
be involved. The important points to note are the sources of revenue and the financial 
obligations of the concessionaire and the financial implications of the concession 
contract for the public sector. The private firm receives revenues from tariffs, which are 
set by the government or regulatory agency in accordance with the terms of the contract. 
The obligation for the bulk o f capital investment is shifted to the private sector, 
reducing the government’s requirement to invest.
In practical terms, the question of cooperation between government and firm for the 
provision of water services via a long term contract involves a fundamental trade-off 
between the level o f water tariffs for consumers and the level of capital investment in 
the water system by the private concessionaire. As water tariffs are often politicised, 
this in turn raises important issues of political economy.
The structure o f the contract will affect the incentives of the parties and thus the 
outcomes of the concession. For example, if  the local government receives a regular fee 
from the private concessionaire, it will have an incentive to support the private 
concessionaire’s ability to pay that fee. If  the government receives only a one-off 
payment from the private sector for the acquisition of an asset, the government may not 
have a strong incentive to ensure that the firm earns an appropriate return on its 
investment, unless it can extract a further payment.
16
Figure 1.1 illustrates the financial structure of a typical concession contract for a water 
utility. Although each contract has its own distinctive features, the main financial 
relationships are common to most concessions.
Usually, consumers will pay a tariff for each unit of water used, which will be collected 
by the concession company and either paid into an escrow account or received directly 
as revenue by the concession company. The concession company’s revenue is based on 
the volume of water actually sold, so demand, billing and collection risks lie with the 
concession company. In some cases, the operating expenses of the regulatory body and 
the concession fees will be paid out of the escrow account according to a formula 
established in the contract and will take precedence over payments to the firm. In other 
cases, the concession company will have closer control over these revenues. Not all 
contracts require the payment of a concession fee, but in cases where the fee is used to 
repay debts incurred by the public utility in the pre-privatisation period, it constitutes an 
important contribution to public revenues. In some contracts, the concessionaire is also 
required to post a performance bond which can be drawn down by the regulatory body 
or contracting party if  the firm fails to meet its performance targets.
The regulatory incentive structures of concession contracts differ. Under ROR 
regulation, tariffs are calculated on the basis o f (eligible) costs incurred plus a fixed 
return for the firm based on the asset base or ‘rate base.’ Under this type of contract, 
prices are often adjusted annually. Under price-cap systems, a tariff is set for each 
operating period, typically five years, based on the firm’s financial model and adjusted 
for any efficiency savings made by the firm. These periodic reviews are referred to in 
some contracts as ‘comprehensive tariff reviews’ or ‘rate rebasing.’ Hybrid systems 
combine annual or periodic adjustments for certain cost items with a periodic 
comprehensive review. Common cost pass-through items are inflation and adjustments 
for foreign exchange losses.
The concession company is responsible for securing its own financing, which will 
include a mix of debt and equity. In some contracts, there may be a minimum equity 
requirement. Where possible, equity investors will try to raise limited recourse finance 
(where the loan is secured on project assets and stream of revenues only) as this reduces 
the financing risk taken by the equity holder. However, where project risks are high, 
equity investors may have to raise commercial debt on their own balance sheet. Equity
17
investors earn returns from the concession company through dividends, management 
fees and intra-firm transfers. The central or municipal government may provide a 
minimum income guarantee to the concession company in order to ensure its financial 
viability and provide reassurance to lenders.
The government would normally receive corporation tax revenues from the concession 
company, unless the company is given a special exemption or a tax holiday.
Figure 1.1: F inancial Structure o f  a W ater C on cession
International & Local Banks
“1
Public DebtI 
Debt Service
Corporate DebtI 
Debt Service
Corporate DebtI 
Debt Service
Project finance/ 
Debt Service
Local equity 
investor
Dividends, management fees 
infra-firm transfers
*  [Debt & equity 
investment
Government 
(Ministry of Finance)
Corporation tax/
Minimum income guarantee^ Debt Service
t
Water Charge
Concession company Asset owner (former Regulator
public utility)
Concession Fee Regulator’s Operating 
Expenses(volumetric)
Escrow Account
Water Tariff (volumetric)
Consumers
Source: Compiled by the author
Figure 1.2 illustrates the legal structure of a concession. At the heart o f the structure is 
the concession contract, which will be signed by the concession company on the one 
hand and a public sector agency on the other hand. The public signatory may be the 
asset owner (which in turn may be the former public water company or the municipal 
government) or the regulatory body, an inter-ministerial panel, or the central 
government executive. This diagram illustrates a situation in which the asset owning
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and regulatory functions are separated, and the executive does not have a direct 
contractual relationship with the concessionaire.
A concession contract would normally have a term of 15-30 years, although some 
contracts are longer. The appropriate length of the contract relates to the amount of 
capital investment by the firm and the length of time needed to recoup this investment 
through project revenues.
Where more than one company is an equity investor in the concession, their relationship 
will be set out in a JV agreement that creates a concession company. Where there is 
only one equity investor, the investor will exercise direct control over the concession 
company as a wholly owned subsidiary.
The concession contract is usually monitored by a public agency, whether an 
autonomous regulatory agency or a department o f the bureaucracy. The identity and 
powers of this agency vary widely according to the particular contract and the 
institutional framework within which the contract has been signed.
Economic regulation will be carried out by a public agency. In some cases, this will be 
the former public utility, or a department o f the bureaucracy, often under the Ministry of 
Public Works, or equivalent; in others it will be an autonomous or semi-autonomous 
agency. The Ministries responsible for public health and environment will monitor the 
relevant aspects of the concession’s performance with regard to water quality and 
discharge standards, either at the central level or through their regional or municipal 
offices. The concessionaire will also interact with the public or private agencies 
responsible for development or protection of raw water resources, and may have a 
separate contract with these agencies. This could be the Environment Ministry, the 
Ministry of Natural Resources or the Water Ministry or a separate agency, to give a few 
examples. This will depend on the administrative structure of the country.
The concession company will have a further set o f contractual relationships with banks, 
lending either directly to the project company or lending to the equity investors. While 
the banks would not normally have any direct contractual relationship with any 
government agency, the government may provide financial guarantees to the concession 
company which function as security for the banks. An alternative not illustrated is for
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International Financial Institutions to provide loans to the project via the Ministry of 
Finance, governed by a loan covenant.
Figure 1.2: L egal Structure o f  a W ater C on cession
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may also 
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Sets and monitors 
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Sets tariffs;
Monitors performance targets; 
Comprehensive review
Concession contract Sets and 
monitors water 
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procedures
Raw water supply 
contract
Joint Venture Agreement
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Expert Panel
Local courts
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Arbitration Panel
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(e.g. former public utility or 
municipal government)
Executive
Environmental regulator 
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Source: Compiled by the author
Disputes may be resolved either through the system o f local courts and appeal courts or 
through a specific dispute settlement mechanism (DSM) defined in the concession 
contract. A DSM may involve convening an expert panel as a first step to review a 
regulatory decision. If the decision of the expert panel is not binding, and the parties fail 
to come to an agreement, then many contracts make provision for binding arbitration, 
often before an international arbitration panel. Although the arbitration decision is 
binding on the parties, it will still need to be enforced by local courts. The parties may 
pursue cases in local courts as an alternative to international arbitration, or prior to or 
subsequent to an international case.
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1.4 Issues
Under conditions of natural monopoly, economic regulation has the potential to redress 
market failure. However, the institutional structure of regulation and the design of 
regulatory incentives are both areas of controversy that have given rise to extensive 
analysis and debate. The effects of privatisation on efficiency, investment, coverage and 
quality of service have been assessed in the literature. These contributions are reviewed 
in Chapter 2. Relevant theoretical works are reviewed in Chapter 3. Here I draw 
attention to a few key issues raised in the literature on economic regulation, focusing on 
the ‘regulation by contract/regulation by agency’ debate, and the relationship between 
regulation and economic development.
1.4.1 Regulation by Contract and Regulation by Agency
Good regulation is generally recognised to be a necessary component in successful 
privatisation (Chisari, Estache et al. 1999; Chisari, Estache et al. 2003; Estache 2004 for 
a survey). But what constitutes good regulation?
One long-standing debate about the optimal structure of regulation contrasts regulation 
by contract and regulation by agency. The debate is sometimes construed in 
geographical terms, contrasting the ‘Anglo-Saxon’ tradition of independent, 
discretionary regulatory agencies, and the ‘French’ or ‘continental’ model of specifying 
regulatory provisions in a public-private contract, although in practice, many regulatory 
systems fall between these two poles. Developing countries have experimented with 
both these models and hybrid mixes when liberalising and restructuring utility sectors.
The early literature on regulators developed in the US, which has a long history of 
private ownership in network industries under regulation by agency. In the first half of 
the 20th Century, these regulatory agencies were seen as agents of the public interest 
(See McCraw 1975 for a review). Over time, however, critiques of regulation emerged, 
which showed how agencies were vulnerable to ‘capture’ by the regulated industry or 
by other powerful interest groups (Stigler 1971; Posner 1972). These critiques were 
formalised by Peltzman (1976). Concerns about the vulnerability of regulators to 
capture provided the background to Demsetz’s influential 1968 paper, which showed 
how natural monopoly market failures could be addressed through ‘regulation by 
contract,’ obviating the need for a regulatory agency (Demsetz 1968). He argued that 
‘competition for the market’ could be created by periodically re-bidding short-term
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monopoly contracts for service. Competitive tendering would ensure that prices were set 
at competitive levels.
Regulation by contract has, in turn, been criticised on two main grounds: competition 
for contracts may be ineffective because of collusion or incumbency advantages; and 
regular rebidding may lead to under-investment, depending on the observability and 
transferability of investment. Contracts are also vulnerable to opportunistic 
renegotiation (Guasch 2004). In any case, the government will have a continuing role in 
contract administration (monitoring, enforcing and bargaining over unspecified 
contingencies) (Vickers and Yarrow 1991). In network industries where significant 
capital investment is required in assets with no alternative uses (known as sunk assets), 
rebidding is rare.
Connected to the debate over the regulatory system is the question of the role and 
structure o f the regulatory agency, including the independence of the regulatory agency. 
An independent agency should be able to fulfil a mandate of balancing producer and 
consumer interests better than a body within the government that could be influenced by 
short-term political pressures (Levine, Stem et al. 2002). However, some empirical 
works have found that the independence of the regulator is either not significant or has a 
significant negative effect on private investment (Wallsten 2001; Pargal 2003). Their 
findings are discussed further in Chapter 2. There is now a general recognition of the 
need for balance between constraints on the discretion o f the regulator and the need for 
flexibility to adjust the regulatory arrangements to changing conditions, or as new 
information becomes available (Estache 2004). However, the actual role played by 
regulatory agencies in the implementation of concession contracts has not been 
systematically investigated, due in large part to the absence of cross-country 
comparative data.
1.4.2 Regulation, Institutions and Development
Theoretical and empirical analysis of economic regulation has developed in the context 
of developed countries, and tended to assume either that institutions play no role, for 
example in constraining the renegotiation of contracts, or it has assumed the existence 
o f ‘institutional completeness,’ implying that the institutions of rule of law, separation 
of powers, well functioning democracy and an independent and competent judiciary 
would be in place. Neither fits the reality of developing countries, where incomplete 
institutions are pervasive. As Laffont writes in his 2005 book, “The new economics of
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regulation has provided a useful normative framework for the reforms of public services 
in developed countries. However, this literature has paid no attention to the specific 
characteristics of developing countries.” (Laffont 2005: xix). Laffont’s work is highly 
relevant to this research as it brings together and extends several strands of research on 
the implications of development for economic regulation.
Laffont considers how a number of characteristics o f developing countries will affect 
the design o f regulatory incentives and institutions: the high cost of public funds; the 
quality o f auditing and accounting mechanisms; constitutional control of the 
government, implementation of contracts; quality of the judicial system; functioning of 
capital markets and the extent o f corruption. He finds that the optimal regulatory 
contract where the cost of public funds is high has lower-powered incentives (i.e. tends 
towards ROR regulation). There is a sacrifice in efficiency in order to decrease the rents 
earned by the firm. Similarly, lower credibility o f the regulatory regime implies lower- 
powered incentive schemes. But where accounting and auditing systems are particularly 
weak, the transactions costs of implementing ROR regulation will be very high and 
price-cap regulation will be optimal.
He also finds that there will be a U-shaped relationship between corruption and 
privatisation, with very low and very high levels o f corruption associated with low 
levels o f privatisation. In terms of the structure of regulatory agencies, Laffont considers 
whether integrated multi-sector regulators will be preferable to single sector regulators. 
He finds that there are complex trade-offs between the availability of resources and the 
advantages of specialisation and that the optimal structure will depend on specific 
conditions; on the other hand, having two regulators may reduce the chances of capture 
where political checks and balances are weak. This work suggests several avenues for 
further research on contract implementation: the significance of corruption, multiple 
government actors and poor credibility.
Estache sums up the contribution o f the body of literature on regulation and 
development: “The first main lesson o f this literature is that regulators must arbitrate 
between risk levels and their distribution, the efficiency levels that can be achieved in 
infrastructure, and the rents that remain with operators... This means, for instance, that 
when risk levels are perceived to be very high, rate of return regulation may be more 
effective at attracting private capital than a price cap regime. More generally, this
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literature argues that the characteristics of developing countries will often lead to 
recommendations quite different from those that would be given for infrastructure 
restructuring in industrial countries. Indeed, the limited enforcement capabilities in 
developing countries are significant in practice and, along with unusually high risk 
levels, are one of the main reasons one size does not fit all when reforming 
infrastructure.” (Estache 2004: 17-18)
Despite these advances in linking economic regulation with institutions, the complex 
nature of institutional attributes means that the significance of particular attributes and 
the mechanisms through which they operate are difficult to identify. These interactions 
between institutions, contracts and outcomes are addressed in Gomez-Ibanez’s 2003 
study of PSP which draws on experience from multiple regions and historical periods. 
This study demonstrates clearly the trade-offs between flexibility and credibility under 
both regulation by contract and regulation by agency associated with weak enforcement 
environments. As the author writes, “We can design regulatory strategies to compensate 
for weak institutions and political legitimacy, but our ability to do so is probably 
limited. Concession contracts are popular in many developing countries because they 
are thought to be less vulnerable to weak institutions than discretionary regulation, 
although how much this is true is the subject of debate.” (Gomez-Ibanez 2003: 345).
Other works have focused in on particular aspects of the relationship between economic 
regulation and institutional attributes, and have subjected these to empirical testing 
(Henisz and Zelner 2001; Henisz 2002). Again, these are discussed in more detail in 
Chapter 2. Here, I begin by introducing the argument of Levy & Spiller’s paper on the 
links between political and judicial institutions and economic regulation (Levy and 
Spiller 1994). This paper distinguishes between two basic types of political institutions, 
parliamentary and presidential, and their argument runs like this: in parliamentary 
systems with alternating majority governments, laws are easy to implement or reverse 
so the government will not be able to show commitment to a stable regulatory regime 
through primary law. In this case, governments should sign contracts with the private 
providers which can be enforced through ordinary commercial law. In presidential 
systems, laws are difficult to pass or repeal, so the government can show commitment to 
a stable regulatory system by passing a primary law to create a discretionary regulatory 
body. This article made an important contribution to the overall debate, but its narrow 
focus on one particular institutional dichotomy underestimated the manifold ways in
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which institutions impose constraints on public and private actors. Subsequent research 
has, for example, emphasised the prevalence of corruption as an the most relevant 
institutional attribute to utility service provision (Estache, Goicoechea et al. 2006).
The investigation of the importance of institutions in economic regulation is part of a 
much wider field of literature that connects institutions with economic development. 
Among the large number of papers on this topic, the following institutional attributes of 
developing countries have been found to be significant for economic outcomes: 
protection for property rights (Acemoglu and Johnson 2003); the rule of law (Rigobon 
and Rodrik 2004); political stability, policy credibility and the existence of a sound 
regulatory framework (Easterly and Serven 2003); bureaucratic quality and the timing 
of elections (Guasch, Laffont et al. 2003). These institutional attributes may also have 
implications for the implementation of economic regulation.
1.5 The Research Boundary and Contribution
The existing literature has not fully considered the implications o f institutional and 
contractual incompleteness on contract agreement and implementation. The decision to 
privatise and the award of contracts has been widely analysed, as has formal 
renegotiation of contracts, but less work has examined the firm’s decision to engage in 
the contract, or the behaviour of both parties after the contract has been signed. This 
thesis develops a framework of analysis for contract implementation that addresses: 
contractually mandated and shock-induced contract adjustments; 
multiple periods of implementation, taking into account changes in the parties’ 
discount rates;
the effect of multiple actors on contract implementation and adjustment;
- the role of contract-specific regulators.
The limitations in existing research are partly the result o f limitations in the data, both 
relating to the financial and operating performance of concessions and to the 
performance of regulators. These limitations are recognised by Estache et al (2006) in 
their analysis of institutional-performance links, and much o f their analysis cannot be 
carried out for the water sector as a result. I begin to address these gaps by developing 
and analysing a new dataset of public-private contracts in the water and sanitation 
sector.
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The existing literature has taken significant steps towards a systematic analysis of the 
implications of development on economic regulation. However, the complex interaction 
of institutions at the national or local level makes it extremely difficult to move from the 
theoretical findings of Laffont and others on optimal contract design or regulatory 
structure to ascertain how a particular set of regulatory choices will function in a 
particular institutional environment. This thesis approaches the problem with an 
inductive approach: it focuses on the rich detail o f the case studies to identify relevant 
institutions.
Finally, this thesis contributes to the debate on the relative advantages o f regulation by 
contract and regulation by agency through comparative case studies of different 
regulatory structures in developing countries, including hybrid structures which 
combine contracts with agencies responsible for monitoring and implementation. The 
approach is again based on rich qualitative material which makes it possible to go 
beyond the assumptions of existing literature on the vulnerability to capture or 
government intervention to reveal the multiple roles that regulatory agencies can play in 
a developing country institutional environment and to assess their relevance.
1.6 The Water Sector
This thesis considers these issues through a focus on the water and sanitation sector. 
The characteristics of this sector make it particularly suitable for an investigation of 
public and private interaction. This section presents a brief overview of these 
characteristics.
Water services are an archetypal natural monopoly, as the bulk of costs are incurred in 
the construction and maintenance of the distribution network. There is limited scope for 
the introduction of competition in the treatment o f water or sewage water, but water 
systems tend to be vertically integrated, reflecting the small proportion of costs incurred 
in treatment. The pipe network is a typical sunk asset -  an asset without alternative uses 
-  and its hidden nature raises the transactions costs of tendering short-term contracts. 
Slow technological change in the sector suggests that new opportunities for 
restructuring in the industry are not likely to open up in the near future. As a result, 
economic regulation is needed for water services over the long term.
The level of private investment in the water sector has been lower than in other 
infrastructure sectors (Izaguirre 2005) but the number of countries that have introduced
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PSP is comparable with other infrastructure sectors, including electricity distribution 
and rail transport: 35 percent of developing countries and 50 percent of lower middle 
income countries have private capital in the water sector (Estache and Goicoechea
2005), generating an adequate number of data points to pursue quantitative analysis.
Water and sanitation are mass consumption services, so water tariffs are susceptible to 
politicisation (Savedoff and Spiller 1999). Over time, this has led to low levels of cost 
recovery for water services (ADB 2004 for evidence from a sample of Asian cities). 
Yet, significant capital investment is needed to extend coverage to unserved 
communities in developing countries. This need for investment brings to the fore the 
difficult regulatory trade-off between affordability of water services and the need for 
private investors to receive an appropriate return on their investments. The political 
sensitivity of tariffs and the need for capital investment makes the task of the regulator 
particularly challenging for the water and sanitation sector. In terms of the research 
strategy, the water sector therefore provides an excellent example for the analysis of 
economic regulation in developing countries.
Within the water sector, the qualitative analysis focuses on concessions, which the 
World Bank describes as the most ‘challenging’ contract type. According to the World 
Bank’s Privatization Toolkit, these contract types “allow all the potential benefits [or 
PSP] to be realized,” referring to management and financing capacity brought by the 
firm under these contracts (World Bank and PPIAF 2006). From an analytical point of 
view, concessions are interesting not just because they are a common model for 
developing country PSP, but because they transfer most financing and revenue risk to 
the firm, necessitating a much more complex legal and financial structure and raising 
the need for regulation and because they are long-term contracts that are vulnerable to 
incompleteness.
1.7 Methodology
The thesis employs both quantitative and qualitative methodologies. Quantitative 
methods allow me to establish, first, the significance of institutional variables in the 
prevalence of PSP in the water sector for a large sample of developing countries. 
However, cross-country comparative data on institutions have considerable limitations 
when it comes to identifying the relevance of particular institutional features or 
combinations of features in an individual country, or clarifying the mechanisms through 
which institutions influence behaviour in public-private contracts. The comparative case
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study approach that I adopt in the latter part of the thesis provides for a rich 
understanding of the nature of these institutions and the mechanisms through which they 
affect outcomes. This section summarises the methodological approaches adopted.
1.7.1 Quantitative Analysis
First, I examine the factors influencing the number of PSP projects in a country, 
focusing on whether institutions are a significant factor. In order to do this, I build a 
new dataset of water PSP projects in developing countries, WATSUP (Water and 
Sanitation Urban Projects Database). This database improves on existing data sets in its 
coverage o f smaller projects and draws on private sources of information in addition to 
public ones to give better coverage in particular countries. I use this dataset to carry out 
a regression analysis using a count outcome model. The nature of the question allows 
for cross-country quantitative analysis, looking at the impact of institutions at the 
country level on frequency of PSP.
The assumption in this section of the analysis is that national level institutions are 
significant. This might seem surprising, as the water sector in most countries is the 
responsibility of local governments, and local governments have the power to engage in 
PSP contracts and to regulate them. However, many of the institutional attributes that 
have been identified as having an impact on economic regulation are generally 
measured at the national level and may be relatively consistent across a country, such as 
the rule of law or the quality of the judicial system. The use of national level 
institutional indicators is discussed further in Chapter 4.
1.7.2 Theoretical Framework
Secondly, I develop a theoretical framework for the analysis of implementation which 
takes into account the issues mentioned above:
Multiple time periods and shifts in discount rates 
Multiple government actors, including regulators 
Planned and unplanned contract incompleteness 
The framework offers a systematic way of considering the behaviour of the agents in 
complex contractual relationships. The framework generates hypotheses which are 
considered in the light of the case studies.
1.7.3 Qualitative Analysis
Chapters 6 and 7 present specific case histories of government and firm interaction 
under long-term contracts. These cases provided ample evidence of incomplete
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contracts -  contractually mandated and shock-induced -  and incomplete institutions and 
so provide rich material for the application of the analytical framework.
Chapter 6 focuses on the concession contracts awarded for water services in Manila 
(Philippines), and Chapter 7 on the concessions in Jakarta (Indonesia). These two cases 
share many attributes: they both concern large, high profile contracts for the capital 
cities of their respective countries. As such, they attracted considerable attention from 
the political leadership and the media. It also meant that they attracted the attention of 
foreign companies, and all four of the contracts that were awarded involved both local 
and foreign investors. Both countries have incomplete institutional environments and 
experienced political and macroeconomic shocks in the period in which the contracts 
have been implemented. Figure 1.3 shows how institutions in the two countries have 
deteriorated since the award of the contracts in 1997.
The countries have been running for the same length of time and have all been through 
one round of contractually mandated renegotiation, in addition to shock-induced 
renegotiation. In other respects, the concessions are rather different: the Manila 
contracts were held up by international institutions for their ‘best practice’ design and 
the successful competitive tender which reduced tariffs substantially. The Jakarta 
contracts were considered corrupt and badly drafted. In Manila, foreign institutions have 
played a role at two important junctures, initially in the design of the contract and later 
in an international arbitration case. In Jakarta, the advice of foreign experts on the rate 
rebasing was resoundingly ignored. Table 1.1 summarises some of the relevant 
contractual features.
29
Table 1.1: Attributes of Manila and Jakarta Contracts
Manila Jakarta
Timing Contracts agreed 1997
Structure Service area divided into two
Contract award Transparent competitive tender Bilateral negotiation
Contract Provisions Contain clear requirements for 
provision and verification o f 
financial and operating 
information by the firm
Require extensive reporting by 
firms but no mechanism for 
verification o f information
Rate rebasing Contains clear principles and 
procedures for RRB every 5 
years
Contains provision for RRB 
every 5 years but no clear 
principles or procedures to 
follow
Regulator Regulatory agency with powers 
to monitor and enforce the 
contract
Regulatory agency with weak 
m onitoring powers created in 
renegotiated contract
Figure 1.3: Institutional Indicators for Philippines and Indonesia
1.00
- 1.50
■  R eg u la to ry  Quality INDONESIA B  R eg u la to ry  Quality PHILIPPINES
■  C ontro l of C orruption  INDONESIA m Contro l of C o rru p tio n  PHILIPPINES
Source: World Bank Governance Data (H igher values indicate better regulatory quality and 
low er corruption levels)
These two case studies share a number o f  common attributes, many o f which also apply 
to other concession contracts in developing countries, allowing me to draw wider 
implications from the analysis. For example, capital cities are often the first (and only) 
places where water PSP contracts are awarded; m acroeconomic and political shocks are 
more likely than not over the course o f  a long-term contract; the majority o f  water 
contracts are renegotiated. Incomplete institutions, including low regulatory quality and 
pervasive corruption, are very widespread. Thus the findings o f the case study analysis 
have broad application.
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The decision to focus on case studies from East and South-East Asia was informed by 
the characteristics of the region, as well as by the relative paucity of research, 
particularly in comparison to Latin America. The region is distinctive because it has 
attracted large volumes of private capital into its water sector, and in recent years, a 
large majority of new contracts have been signed in the region (Izaguirre and Hunt
2005). Yet, compared to Latin America, which has also received significant private 
investment flows, the development of regulation in the region has been very slow.
Information for the case studies was collected over the course of nine months of field 
research in 2004 in Asia, and a further visit to the region in 2006.1 conducted more than 
100 personal semi-structured interviews in this period with managers of private firms 
engaged in water concessions, government officials, regulators, financiers, legal 
advisors and other stakeholders involved in the negotiation, implementation and 
renegotiation of the private sector contracts. I carried out more than 25 interviews each 
in Manila and Jakarta, and interviewed several individuals from each of the key parties 
-  the concession companies, government officials and the regulatory agencies -  to allow 
for the cross-referencing of information. A full list of the interviews conducted and the 
roles of the individuals concerned is given in the annexes.
I also collected financial and performance information for the periods before and after 
private sector involvement where available. In some cases, this information is 
confidential or not independently audited. In these cases, I sought to verify information 
through other sources, but note the concerns in the text. In addition, I draw on contracts 
and other legal documents, loan documents and reports from multilateral agencies, 
regulatory review documents and reports, papers and presentations by the private 
companies and extensive media searches.
The hypotheses developed in Chapter 5 are considered in the light of the case study 
evidence. While they provide interesting insights, the complexity of the cases means 
that inevitably the framework captures only some of the important elements in 
explaining the behaviour o f the parties.
1.8 Key Findings
The findings of this research deepen our understanding o f the link between institutions 
and economic regulation. The first step in the analysis demonstrates the significant 
effect of institutions on the likely number of PSP in the water sector.
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(1) Incomplete Institutions 
Institutions play a significant role in many aspects of government and firm behaviour
under public-private contracts. They influence the decision of governments and firms to
choose to engage in a PSP contract, as well as the decisions of the parties to cooperate -
or not -  in the implementation o f the contract. The quantitative analysis shows that
institutions have a significant affect on the extent of water PSP in a country.4 The
institutional indicators that emerge as most significant are those that reflect the quality
of administration, including government effectiveness and regulatory quality. More
general institutional indicators like the rule of law have a lower level of significance.
The nature of institutional indicators raises challenges for refining the interpretation, but
the results of the regression show a convincing link between institutions and the amount
ofPSP.
The impact of incomplete institutions on contract implementation is also significant, 
particularly during renegotiations -  either contractually mandated or shock-induced. 
Uncertainty about whether the contract will be enforced creates incentives for the 
parties to engage in strategic behaviour and low regulatory quality will make it easier 
for parties to disguise opportunistic behaviour under contractually mandated 
adjustments. In the absence of principles and procedures on which to base contract 
amendments, contracting parties will engage in long, often acrimonious negotiations, 
characterised by strategic behaviour, with deleterious effects on the operations o f the 
concessions.
Multiple government actors tend to be involved in the negotiation and renegotiation of 
contracts. This offers advantages, as it constrains the ability of any one actor to make 
arbitrary decisions; however, multiple actors are more likely to initiate renegotiations, 
and it will be more time-consuming and difficult to conclude these renegotiations. The 
case studies provide strong evidence of delay or failure to agree a contract amendment 
due to the competing interests of government parties.
The time preference or discount rates of governments and firms fluctuate over time, 
creating shifts in the set of mutually acceptable contract agreements. For governments, 
the main drivers of discount rates are the electoral cycle and macroeconomic conditions.
4 This part o f  the thesis was published by the World Bank as part o f  its Policy Working Paper Series 
(Jensen and Blanc-Brude 2006).
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For concessionaires, discount rates will be influenced by the performance of the parent 
companies and their corporate strategies. Strong institutions help to dampen the effect 
of shifting discount rates, but some volatility is probably inevitable in the 
implementation of long-term contracts.
Close links between politicians and businesses and other forms of corruption undermine 
successful contract implementation in several ways. Corruption during contract award 
can lead to a backlash from the public or a new government, casting into doubt the 
legitimacy o f the contract and possibly justifying the amendment of the contract. The 
case studies provide ample evidence that companies which rely on links with politicians 
as a form of security in a weak institutional environment may face higher risks in the 
long-term. Corruption in the public utility before privatisation creates other problems, as 
the public sector managers, employees and contractors can form a strong bloc of 
resistance to the success of the PSP contract.
(2) Role o f the Regulator 
The regulatory agency can play a significant role in constraining the opportunism of the
parties in situations in which contracts are not enforced by the parties themselves. A
regulator with a statutory responsibility to monitor the implementation of the contract
can monitor the behaviour of both government and firm, not in terms of its direct
benefits to the parties at any one time, but in terms of compliance with the original
contract. Stronger regulators may have powers to bring legal actions or impose penalties
on the parties in the event of non-compliance. A regulator with this responsibility will
also have an interest in ensuring that any renegotiations are concluded efficiently and
unambiguously.
Even a regulatory agency with few powers can contribute to cooperative outcomes. An 
agency o f this kind may have an incentive to encourage public participation through 
information dissemination, public hearings etc, to increase its own effective powers in 
relation to other branches of government or the regulated firms. The regulator can also 
play a role in adjudicating between the parties in the case o f a dispute or a change in the 
operating environment requiring the amendment o f the contract. In countries where 
judicial remedies for disputes are not effective, the regulator offers an alternative 
dispute resolution mechanism and is an intermediary step before going to international 
arbitration. Finally, the regulator can enhance the legitimacy of a contract signed by one
33
government, after a change in the political leadership. This is particularly important in 
countries where corruption levels and political turnover levels are high.
The implications of the research for policy include:
Ensure agreement between the parties on financial and operating data and 
financial models used in contract reviews;
Include clear processes and procedures for the review of tariffs and performance 
requirements in contracts;
Define principles and procedures to amend the contract in the event of shocks, 
allocating responsibility for negotiating and approving any amendments to 
named government bodies;
Create and strengthen contract-based regulatory agencies, matching their 
responsibilities with oversight and a process of appeal.
1.9 Thesis Outline
The next chapter provides a review of the empirical literature on private sector 
involvement in infrastructure, public-private contracts and regulation, with particular 
reference to the water sector. The review covers both large sample quantitative analyses 
and case studies which contribute to our knowledge of the sector. The literature points 
to the importance of institutions, regulation and factors like reputation in influencing the 
behaviour of governments and firms.
Chapter 3 introduces the relevant branches of theoretical literature. It reviews the 
contributions of agency theory, law and economics and contract theory to our 
understanding of public-private contracting.
Chapter 4 presents descriptive statistics and the results of the count outcome regression 
analysis of factors influencing the number of PSP projects in the water sector. Chapter 5 
presents the framework and the hypotheses that emerge. The following two chapters are 
devoted to the qualitative research. Chapters 6 and 7 present the stories and analysis of 
the concession contracts in Manila and Jakarta. In each case, I present the history o f the 
concession from its award, and consider the hypotheses in light of this evidence.
The final chapter summarises the conclusions of the research and identifies policy 
recommendations and directions for future research.
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2 Water Sector Reforms: Review of the Empirical Literature
2.1 Overview of the Chapter
This chapter reviews the empirical literature on water privatisation and the privatisation 
of other utilities and addresses four inter-related questions: Firstly, what are the 
motivating factors behind liberalising the water sector to PSP, and what drives firms to 
engage in a PP contract? Second, is PSP a significant phenomenon within the water and 
sanitation sector as a whole? Thirdly, how extensive is economic regulation in the water 
sector in developing countries and what forms does it take? What is the relationship 
between regulation and outcomes? Finally, the chapter reviews the state of knowledge 
on behaviour and welfare outcomes for firms and governments o f PP contracts in water 
and asks, what are the likely pay-offs to the contracting parties and third parties?
The review shows the wide range of experience in the extent of PSP in the water sector, 
in regulatory systems and in outcomes. In many respects, the performance of the water 
sector has been worse than other infrastructure sectors: fewer fiscal benefits for the 
government, low returns for firms, lower rates of investment and service improvement 
than expected and higher rates of renegotiation. At the same time, regulation is less well 
developed than in other sectors. Yet, in comparison to other infrastructure sectors, water 
remains less well researched.
This is largely the result of limitations in the availability of data. A distinctive 
characteristic of the water sector is that it often a local responsibility and PSP contracts 
may be agreed at the local level. As a result, there can be considerable variation in the 
nature of PSP and regulatory structures within a single country. In cases where 
regulation is contract-based, the regulatory regime will be specific to the city or region 
covered by the contract. This sector structure also means that data on the number and 
size of contracts, their operating and financial performance and regulatory structures are 
often not collected and analysed at the national level, let alone the international level, 
making empirical analysis much more difficult.
2.2 Motivating Factors Behind PSP
The first step in the engagement of governments and firms in public-private contracts is 
the decision of the government to open the sector, and the decision of the firm to get 
involved. This section reviews literature on motivating factors which is used to inform 
the selection of the independent variables in the regression analysis presented in Chapter
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4. Poor performance in terms o f coverage and quality o f services is demonstrated in the 
data below and well documented in the 2006 Human Development Report (UNDP
2006). The W HO/UNICEF Joint M onitoring Program has identified countries where 
coverage is particularly low and where coverage rates are declining, as particular targets 
o f  efforts to meet the MDGs, but these data are subject to considerable limitations and 
uncertainty. Among these Tagging’ countries are four in Asia, China, the Philippines, 
M yanmar and Vietnam. The low rates o f  coverage suggest that the public sector does 
not have the incentives or the resources to provide better water and sanitation services.
Table 2.1: W ater and Sanitation Coverage Rates by Region 2002
Population without Population without
access to an improved access to improved
water source (%) sanitation (%)
East Asia 22 55
SE Asia 21 39
South Asia 16 63
W estern Asia 12 21
SS Africa 42 64
Northern Africa 10 27
LAC 11 25
Oceania 48 45
Developed countries 2 2
Source: W HO/UNICEF JM P 2004
Savedoff & Spiller (1999) offer an explanation for why this might be the case. They 
characterise the situation o f many public utilities as a Tow level equilibrium ’ o f low 
tariffs, low investment rates and low coverage and quality o f  service and provide 
evidence for low level equilibrium in the water sector o f  a sample o f Latin American 
countries. Low level equilibrium is due to the com bination o f large sunk costs and low 
marginal costs, which mean that a utility company will still operate even if  revenues 
only cover the marginal cost o f  operating the service and not the cost o f  maintaining or 
replacing assets. Assets will be run down and the quality o f  service will fall, but these 
effects will take time to show through. People not connected to the network -  the 
potential customers o f  the utility, who would benefit from investment in the extension 
o f  the network -  tend not to constitute an effective lobbying group compared to those 
already connected to the network, who can organise more easily to oppose tariff 
increases which creates incentives for politicians to suppress tariffs. These 
characteristics are shared to some extent by all utilities, but are particularly acute in the 
w ater sector because o f  the long life o f assets and the slow pace o f technology change. 
In the telecoms sector, the decline in service quality caused by underinvestment would 
become clear much m ore quickly. These characteristics mean that the incentives o f
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politicians or the constraints on their behaviour need to be changed before water 
services improve.
Evidence o f poor operational and financial perform ance for Asian cities has been 
gathered by the Asian Development Bank and is shown below. The data show a very 
small positive change in coverage but declining real tariffs and declining financial 
performance, shown in the working ratio o f more than 1. O f the cities included in the 
comparison, only two, Manila and Jakarta, are under private concession contracts, two 
few to allow for statistical comparison between PSP and non-PSP utilities.
Table 2.2: Performance Indicators for 15 Asian Utilities 1995 and 2001
i o o cV ", 7 ' - ' - 1995 2001
W ater production (m3/day) 1,675,420 1,823,360
Number of connections 665,830 886,250
W ater Coverage (% pop) 77.3 78.0
Domestic consumption (led) 145 164
Average tariffs (US$/m3) 0.195 0.175
Staff numbers 5,030 5,270
Non revenue water (% o f production) 43.5 35.8
W orking Ratio (O&M cost/ revenues) 0.93 1.12
Source: ADB Water in Asian Cities 2004
As water is usually structured as a municipal service, data on efficiency and financial 
indicators o f  water service providers and on tariffs is rarely collated at the national level 
in developing countries. Recently, a few benchm arking schemes have been set up at the 
national level, as in Indonesia and Vietnam .5 Efforts have begun to collate these data 
into an international dataset under the W ater Research C entre’s International 
Benchmarking Review (2001)6 and recently under the W orld B ank’s program me 
IBNET (W orld Bank 2006).7 However, these international datasets are only beginning 
to be used as the basis for analysis and should provide interesting avenues for research 
in the future as more countries are included.
Poor performance does not by itself motivate reform . In practice, low-level equilibria 
can last for long periods, as the cases presented by Savedoff & Spiller show. Under 
what circumstances is reform o f  the water sector likely to take place? Reform will only 
take place where there is a confluence o f  factors strengthening the interest groups in 
favour o f reform, and the influence o f those opposed to reform can be overcome. 
Estache (2005) notes how politically vocal m iddle-class users becam e increasingly
5 For Indonesia, see: http://www.perpamsi.org/benchniarking eng.htm) and for Vietnam, (World Bank 2002))
6 International Benchmarking Review ((Water Research Centre UK 2001) See http://www.wrcibr.com )
7 See http://www.ib-net.org/
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dissatisfied with service quality in the 1990s, tipping the balance in favour of reform. 
Poorer groups who were not connected to the network had not had sufficient voice to set 
reform in motion before. In addition to a strong demand for reform, reform must also be 
feasible (sources of resistance to policy change can be overcome) and credible (actors 
expected to participate in the restructured sector must believe that the reform will be 
implemented and sustained). This framework for considering policy change is fruitfully 
employed by Alcazar (2000), Menard & Clarke (2000a & 2000b), Shirley (2000) and 
others and fits well with the experience in utility reform in developing countries. From
O
the point of view of the firm, credibility is the critical factor.
This same group of case studies points to the involvement of external actors, like 
international financial institutions, as significant in the decision to liberalise the water 
sector. This relationship is investigated in the empirical analysis of Chapter 4.
2.3 Significance of PSP in the Water Sector
As we saw in the previous chapter, the number o f countries with PSP in the sector is 
comparable to that o f the electricity distribution or rail transport sectors. Yet, the 
number of people who receive water services from a formal private provider is 
relatively small. This section sets water PSP in the context of water provision as a 
whole.
Water services are provided by the large-scale private sector to an estimated 5 percent 
of the global population (Hall and Lobina 2006) but the quality of the data available on 
service coverage and the classification of private cast doubt on the reliability of any 
global estimate. As mentioned in the previous chapter, 35 percent of developing 
countries have some large-scale private investment in the water sector. Private sector 
involvement is unsurprisingly concentrated in urban areas (WATSUP Database), but 
again the quality of data makes it difficult to estimate the proportion or the urban 
population served by the private sector.
Small-scale private provision o f water services is also significant but its coverage is 
difficult to estimate. In a review of the water and electricity sectors, Kariuki and 
Schwartz (2005) estimate that there are 10,000 small-scale private water service 
providers (SPSP) in the 44 developing countries reviewed, but note that this is likely to
8 For example, Alcazar et al (2000) for Buenos Aires, where water was part of a wide-ranging economic reform 
programme; Guinea, where the privatisation took place under the Structural Adjustment Programme (Menard & 
Clarke, 2000), or Manila where electricity privatisation preceded PSP in water (Dumol 2000).
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represent only a fraction of the total population of SPSPs, given the scarcity of 
documentation on this type of provision. SPSPs are active where utilities do not provide 
adequate service and have made significant investments to serve areas that are out of 
reach o f formal networks. They are especially prevalent in low income and conflict- 
affected regions.
During the 1990s, countries liberalised infrastructure sectors rapidly, with water usually 
the last utility sector to be opened up (Estache 2005), although PSP for water has a 
longer history in a handful of places.9 Among developing countries, Cote d’Ivoire was 
one of the first to have a concession contract, which was awarded in 1959 (Menard and 
Clarke 2000) while the first concession contract for water services in Asia was signed 
for Macau in 1985. This was soon followed by other countries in the region.10 However, 
the pace of change of institutional reform in the water sector has since slowed down. In 
2001, 11 countries closed their first contract for PSP in the water sector. This figure 
declined in 2002, when four countries signed their first project, then to 1 in 2003 and 
none in 2004 (Izaguirre and Hunt 2005). Trends in private investment are examined in 
more detail in Chapter 4.
The total amount of private investment in the water sector is difficult to estimate 
because the available figures relate to commitments rather than disbursements. Izaguirre 
and Hunt, drawing on the World Bank’s PPI Database, estimate annual investment 
commitments to the sector averaged US$1.9 billion in 2001-04, compared to an average 
commitment o f US$4.2 billion in the period 1995 to 2000 (Izaguirre and Hunt 2005). 
Again, bearing in mind the poor quality of data on volume of investment in water and 
sanitation, it appears that private finance has overtaken development assistance as the 
second largest source of finance for the sector after public finance, constituting 
approximately 20 percent of overall financing to the sector (Estache 2004).
These figures of private sector involvement in the water sector consider only formal 
private providers, but many poor customers in urban areas are currently served by
9 Among the developed countries, France has a long tradition of PSP through ‘delegated management’ contracts 
(Bezancon 2004). French companies have operated for long periods in Spain and some French colonies (World Bank 
and PPIAF 2006). In the US and Canada, municipalities awarded contracts to private companies in the 19th Century, 
but many of these utilities were subsequently brought under public ownership (Gomez-Ibanez 2003; Palast, 
Oppenheim et al. 2003). The UK introduced water privatisation in the 1980s, at the beginning o f a new wave of 
privatisation (Bakker 2001).
10 Malaysia announced its policy to liberalise the sector in 1985, followed by Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines. 
In Latin America, the first countries to experiment with PSP were Argentina, Colombia and Mexico from 1991 
(Foster 2005).
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informal private providers (See UN Task Force on Water and Sanitation 2005 for 
descriptions of common water service structures pp.47-54). Other alternatives to piped 
networks are self-provisioning from wells or surface water sources.
2.4 Economic Regulation in the Water Sector
Regulatory frameworks -  the principles, procedures and formal institutions for setting 
tariffs -  in the water sector are generally less developed than those for telecoms or 
power in both developed and developing countries. However, the basic principles 
behind economic regulation are well understood. Ideally, the regulator’s objective 
should be to maintain the alignment between a company’s rate o f return and its cost of 
capital. A ROR in excess of the cost of capital inappropriately penalizes consumers, 
while a ROR beneath the cost of capital discourages further investment. But the 
practical application of this balance is often difficult to achieve.
The cost of capital is one o f the most important factors that regulators have to estimate. 
The method for calculating it is well established: regulators first estimate the risk free 
rate, the company specific debt premium (straightforward when companies have 
existing quoted debt); the equity risk premium, and the beta coefficient. Again, 
however, this has proved more controversial in practice than in theory. In UK for 
example, the estimation of the beta has tended towards 1 even though there are good 
reasons to think that utility stocks are much less risky than the average company 
(Jenkinson 2006).
Regulators are also concerned with quality under price-cap variants, as firms have 
incentives to cut costs, potentially at the expense of service quality. The key concern for 
utilities will be the reliability of service, and there is a strong link between the level of 
investment by the utility in the maintenance of the network and interruptions to service. 
If  quality incentives are too strong, on the other hand, the regulated company will have 
an incentive to ‘gold plate’ its service. Regulators have introduced quality incentives 
using a range of mechanisms including legally binding targets for specific service 
levels, league tables and they way in which maintenance expenditure is capitalised in to 
the company’s regulatory asset base. Of these, empirical work suggests that reputational 
effects may be the most effective (Elliott 2006).
In practice, the practical application of regulatory economics theory on incentive 
regulation has been limited by the commitment problem. Regulators have not been able
to commit not to expropriate the gains of the firm: “No regulator can even admit that it 
allows the firm to retain information rents let alone commit to such a practice” (Crew 
and Kleindorfer 2006: 71). Regulators have instead tended toward performance-based 
regulation (PBR), a hybrid under which the regulator sets an allowed ROR and a small 
dead band around this rate, within which no change in rates is triggered. Outside the 
band, changes result in sharing the excess between customers and the company. “PBR 
has the potential for increased efficiency, while accommodating both sides of the 
process.” (Crew and Kleindorfer 2006: 73)
In the absence of a full-proof solution, regulators rely on other methods to reduce the 
information asymmetry between themselves and the companies, such as benchmarking. 
Shleifer (1985) showed that a firm’s revenue needs could be assessed by looking at cost 
in comparable firms or industries, thereby reducing the effect of the company’s own 
costs on its prices. This grounds the widespread use of benchmarking by utility 
regulators. However, it has proved difficult in practice for regulators to let firms go 
bankrupt, and restrictions on data availability -  too many variables and too few 
companies -  have limited the application of benchmarking. Questions also remain about 
whether operating and capital expenditure should be handled together or separately.
Despite these challenges in implementing economic regulation, there is general 
agreement on these principles and theoretical and practical experience in this area has 
built up. Yet, the development of regulation in the water sectors has lagged behind other 
infrastructure sectors.
Estache and Goicoechea (2005) provides a first-brush assessment of the extent of PSP 
and regulation by region and income group. The data cover two indicators, whether 
there is ‘significant PSP’ and whether there is an ‘independent regulator’ based on 
expert opinion. In each case, they use a binary ‘yes or no’ indicator. In the sample of 
countries covered, only 21 percent have an independent regulatory agency for the water 
sector.11 For water regulation, differences between income groups are relatively small.12 
The results by region show other interesting variations: the Middle East & North Africa 
region and South Asia have no independent regulators, while only 12 percent of the sub- 
Saharan African countries do. By far the highest score for regulation is in Latin America
11 This compares with 51 percent for electricity and 66 percent for telecoms.
12 21 percent o f  all developing countries have such an agency, against 20 percent for developed countries, 
and only 11 percent for low income countries.
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where half the countries in the sample have an independent regulatory agency of some 
kind. The authors indicate a figure of 25 percent for East Asia but note that the Asian 
sample, which only contains information for eight countries, is too small to allow for 
robust conclusions.
Foster provides a more detailed picture of regulation in a sample of six Latin American 
countries (2005). She finds that regulation is more widespread than private sector 
provision in the region as restructuring of the sector has occurred in some cases without 
liberalisation to PSP.13 Foster estimates that 41 per cent of urban consumers benefit 
from regulation, while only 15 per cent are served by private operators.14 Overall, Latin 
America has proceeded much further with water sector reforms than other regions, but 
has encountered tensions between the centralised nature of regulation and the highly 
decentralised structure of service provision. In sharp contrast to Latin America, water 
sector restructuring and the development of regulation in Asia has been limited. A 1998 
NERA study found that overall the development of regulation was limited across utility 
sectors in Asian countries, and particularly in the water sector (National Economic 
Research Associates 1998). Estache (2005) also notes the limited nature of regulatory 
reform in Asia, which contrasts with the region’s success in attracting foreign 
investment in infrastructure. Only one country in the region, Laos, has an established 
independent regulatory authority (Mosley, Arriens et al. 2004).15 In most Asian 
countries, regulatory responsibilities are shared between national and municipal 
governments. Local utilities are usually largely self-regulating, reporting periodically to 
the municipal government. The municipal government will usually have final control 
over tariff-setting, within a framework of guidance set by the central government 
(McIntosh 2003; Mosley, Arriens et al. 2004).
The limitations in the data have restricted empirical analysis on the effects of economic 
regulation specifically for the water sector, but some cross-sector studies have been
13 In Chile, reform preceded PSP by almost a decade, while in Bolivia and Colombia, reform has been 
nationwide, but PSP has been confined to a small number o f  cities.
14 Regulation is generally organised at the national level but in Argentina, regulators have been created by 
about half o f  the provinces in addition to the national level regulator, and in Brazil regulation takes place 
at the State rather than the Federal level. In several Latin American countries, regulators make 
recommendations on tariff-setting, but municipalities have the final power to approve tariff adjustments, 
as in Peru and Bolivia.
15 The Philippines has a national agency with responsibility for economic regulation but it has only taken 
on these functions very recently, and they do not apply to the country’s private utility providers 
(Interview: Alikpala). In early 2006, Malaysia passed legislation to create a national regulator which  
begins functioning in 2007 (Interview: Kapparawi, 2006).
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conducted which raise interesting and sometime surprising conclusions about the 
relationship between regulation and investment. Overall, the literature suggests that 
good regulation is associated with better welfare outcomes (Estache 2004), but more 
independence is not necessarily related to more investment.
Wallsten (2002) examines the relationship between sector regulation and private 
investment in the electricity sector, and in particular the existence of a separate 
regulatory agency not directly under control of the Ministry. He finds that countries 
with a regulator have more private sector investment and that regulation has a positive 
impact on the prices investors are prepared to pay for privatised assets. Looking at the 
sequencing of reform and privatisation, Wallsten finds that the establishment of a 
regulator prior to privatisation is significantly and positively correlated with 
infrastructure penetration and investment levels. But his analysis also generates the 
surprising result that regulatory independence has a robust negative correlation with 
investment. He suggests that ‘too much independence from political influence may be 
harmful’ to the firm’s interests (Wallsten: 13). In the absence of political control over 
the regulator, the regulator might either engage in arbitrary behaviour, or might interpret 
its role as protecting the interest of the consumer, at the expense of the firm.
Pargal’s work on cross-sector data from Latin American countries, Pargal (2003), finds 
that the passage of legislation liberalising the investment regime is a significant 
determinant of investment volumes. These results show that the existence of a 
regulatory body loses its significance when legislation is controlled for, and imply that 
the legal basis for reform is more important than specific aspects of the institutional 
framework for PSP. However, when Pargal breaks the results down by sector, she finds 
that the relationship between legislation and investment does not hold for the water 
sector. She suggests that the powerful natural monopoly characteristics of the sector and 
the ‘essential’ nature of the service make the water sector riskier than others. Investors 
may require more than just a sector law to reassure them of a fair and consistent 
regulatory regime. Furthermore, the ad hoc nature o f PSP contracting in the water sector 
means that sectoral legislation is neither necessary nor sufficient for private investment. 
Another explanation is that water sector laws may address water resource issues (i.e. the 
allocation of water resources between agricultural, industrial and household use, 
establishment of a water rights trading regime), rather than the competitive structure of
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water service provision and economic regulation, which would be the issue of most 
concern to potential investors.
The work of Keefer and Stasavage (2000) on the impact of political stability 
demonstrates its importance through a more indirect channel of commitment. They 
show that the relationship between an independent central bank and lower inflation 
rates, which has been found in some studies, falls away when political stability is 
included in the regression and that it is the interaction effect between central bank 
independence and political stability that has a significant impact on inflation rates. A 
similar relationship may exist with regard to private investment in utilities: governments 
are only able to overcome the commitment problem associated with long-term 
investments by the private sector if the underlying institutional characteristics constrain 
the government’s and future governments’ ability to expropriate these investments. This 
work also supports the selection of institutional variables as potential determinants of 
the decision of the private sector to engage in a PSP contract.
Andres et al (2007 ) consider regulation from a different angle, developing an index of 
regulatory quality based on its independence from government, and test this against the 
profitability of firms. They find support for their argument that good regulation will be 
associated with alignment of firm profitability and the cost of capital, but that regulators 
seem to be more focused on keeping tariffs low for consumers than in ensuring the ROR 
for firms.
2.5 Cooperation and Opportunism under Public-Private Contracts
This section considers the findings of research in the water and other sectors on the
welfare impact of PSP. There is a wide degree of variation in the outcomes of PSP 
contracts in the water sector, making it difficult to generalise. Differences are due to the 
provisions of the contract and contract award process, the extent to which the contract is 
enforced, and existing conditions in the water sector at the time of contract award. There 
is some evidence on the impact on tariffs and on extensions in coverage, but it does not 
show a clear pattern for non-competitive sectors. One o f the areas of greatest interest -  
whether investment rises under private control -  is also one of the areas in which data 
are poorest. The findings o f a small number of case studies in the water sector are 
presented here, but more research is needed before more general claims can be made. I 
take up both these issues in the case studies in Chapters 6 and 7. In terms o f 
implementation, the available evidence suggests that a majority of PP contracts in the
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water sector are renegotiated, due both to contract-specific and general institutional 
factors. At the same time, the existing case study literature points to the complexity of 
renegotiations, suggesting that a nuanced, case-specific approach to implementation 
may be necessary to supplement the large sample analysis.
2.5.1 Tariffs
The impact of PSP on tariffs depends on the process of contract award, the quality of 
economic regulation (whether the regulator ensures that cost savings made by the firm 
are shared with consumers) and the existing situation in the utility at the time of contract 
award (Estache, Gomez-Lobo et al. 2000). Average tariffs may rise as part of an effort 
to improve cost recovery and make the utility financially self-sufficient and to allow the 
private firm to earn an appropriate return on its investment, although the degree to 
which these increases are actually implemented depends on the degree of commitment 
of the government to the private firm’s financial viability. Tariffs may also rise if  the 
government prioritises the reduction in the fiscal effect and therefore selects a contract 
award process based on the sale value of the company. If  the contract award is based on 
the lowest price, then tariffs may -  at least initially -  go down, or may rise at a lower 
rate because of greater efficiency.16 Evidence from Latin America shows that tariffs 
have, on average, risen after PSP (McKenzie and Mookheijee 2005).
Evidence from other utility sectors, including electricity and telecoms, shows very 
significant tariff reductions after sector restructuring. However, the downward trend in 
tariffs is associated with the introduction of competition and increased uptake o f new 
technologies, rather than just to the shift in ownership (Estache, Gomez-Lobo et al. 
2000). In addition to changes in the level of the average tariff, PSP has often been 
associated with rebalancing of tariffs and withdrawal o f grants or cross-subsidies. 
Depending on local conditions, the restructuring of tariffs has been either regressive or 
progressive (Estache, Gomez-Lobo et al. 2000).
Several studies have considered the overall welfare effects o f PSP. For a sample of 
projects in Argetina, Chisari et al find that the government was the main winner from 
privatisation in welfare terms (Chisari, Estache et al. 1999). A subsequent review o f the 
literature for utility sectors in Latin America by McKenzie and Mookheijee (2005) finds
16 Two examples o f  competitive bidding based on lowest tariffs resulting in tariff reductions are Manila 
(Dumol 2000) and Buenos Aires (Abdala 1996). However, in both cases, tariffs were raised substantially 
in the period leading up to contract award and tariffs were raised as a result o f  renegotiation after contract 
award.
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that overall privatisation has been neutral in welfare terms but that there has been a net 
welfare gain for consumers. This gain is largely due to positive effects from increases in 
coverage after privatisation, which outweigh the negative distributional impact of 
increases in tariffs.
2.5.2 Efficiency, Investment & Returns
There is an extensive literature on the impact o f PSP on efficiency which finds a 
positive effect on efficiency in competitive sectors (Megginson and Netter 2001) and 
when taking both competitive and non-competitive industries together (Estache, Guasch 
et al. 2003; Andres, Foster et al. 2005; Birdsall and Nellis 2005; Kikeri and Kolo 2005). 
On the other hand, in infrastructure sectors, where competition may be restricted, 
privatisation is associated with efficiency only under certain conditions. Reviewing the 
literature, Hall & Lobina (2005) find that there is little evidence in favour of the 
superior performance of private performance for utilities overall (For example, Wilner 
and Parker 2002; Estache, Perelman et al. 2005). O f the studies that focus specifically 
on the water sector, Estache and Rossi (2002) find no significant difference between 
public and private utilities in terms of efficiency using data for a sample of Asian 
utilities, while Kirkpatrick et al (2004), similarly, find no significant differences in 
efficiency for a sample of utilities in Africa. An exception is a study by Estache, Guasch 
and Trujillo (2003), which finds a positive efficiency effect from PSP in Argentina. 
Estache et al (Estache, Goicoechea et al. 2006) examine the links between sector reform 
(including PSP), performance outcomes and corruption for infrastructure sectors. For 
the water sector, they find that reform does not have a significant effect on access; nor 
does corruption. Across sectors, they do not find support for the contention that PSP is 
associated with a reduction in corruption. For telecoms and water, the interaction term 
between coverage and corruption is also not significant, suggesting that PPI did not 
have the desired effect of addressing the effect of corruption in these sectors on access. 
They were unable to test for affordability and other performance outcomes for the water 
sector because of limitations in the data.
The paucity o f data on investment by private and public entities in the water sector has 
already been noted. The evidence from case studies, meanwhile, is mixed. Abdala’s 
study of the first few years of the Buenos Aires concession contract, for example, finds 
annual investment by the private sector to be five times higher than investment under 
public management, leading to higher rates of coverage, and lower NRW (Abdala 
1996). However, a later study of the Buenos Aires contract finds that private investment
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17was lower than specified in the contract (Aspiazu and Forcinito 2002:23-28). 
Similarly, investment was lower than required in Cordoba and Sante Fe (Argentina), 
Campo Grande (Brazil) and Siza Water in Dolphin Coast, South Africa (Lobina and 
Hall 2003), but this does not tell us how investment after privatisation compared with 
investment before.
2.5.3 Regulation & Institutions
In other infrastructure sectors, where the quality of data is better, some papers have 
analysed the relationship between investment and institutional factors. Levy & Spiller 
(1994) consider investment in the telecoms sector in five countries over several decades. 
They find that for the one country, Jamaica, that experimented with fully discretionary 
regulation, investment rates were lower in that period than in other periods when 
discretion was constrained with contracts. However, it is difficult for them to 
demonstrate their case with these five examples, because the regulatory systems used 
were mostly hybrids of statutory and contract-based regulation, in both the Presidential 
and Parliamentary systems. Levy & Spiller’s supposition that regulatory regimes will be 
more difficult to change in Presidential systems is not supported by these cases, either, 
as changes in the regulatory regime occur as often in the Presidential systems as in the 
Parliamentary ones (Gomez-Ibanez 2003: 52-3). While the underlying link between 
credibility and investment rates is certainly worthy of further investigation, the core idea 
of Levy & Spiller -  that contracts offer more credibility than primary law in political 
systems where constraints on the executive are weak — does not seem to be borne out by 
the evidence presented, or the case studies documented in the literature or carried out 
for this research.
Later papers have attempted to test the underlying insight of Levy & Spiller using large 
sample quantitative studies. Two studies use long-term historical data for the power and 
telecoms sectors respectively in regression analysis to demonstrate the effect of political 
constraints on investment rates (Henisz and Zelner 2001; Henisz 2002). In both cases, 
the political constraints variable constructed specifically for the research is found to be 
significant. However, the drawback of these studies is that coverage rates are used as a 
proxy for capital investment. This is problematic because it does not distinguish 
between public and private investment and so does not tell us anything specifically
17 45% of projected investments were not implemented in the first three years of the concession, amounting to a total 
of about USS 300m (Aspiazu and Forcinito 2002). A further study has estimated that from May 1993 to December 
1998, Aguas Argentinas failed to realise 57.9% of the originally agreed investments for a total of USS 746.39m.” 
(Lobina and Hall 2003:11)
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about the impact of government stability on the decision of the firm; further it assumes 
that the efficiency of capital investment is constant across time. This literature provides 
support for the link between political institutions and investment but further analysis is 
required to demonstrate the link with the decision of the private firm to engage in long­
term capital investments.
Several studies find links between investment and corruption. Laffont (2005) finds a U- 
shaped relationship between corruption and privatisation, such that very high levels of 
corruption and very low levels are associated with low rates of privatisation. The 
relationship between corruption and private investment is investigated further by 
Everhart and Sumlinski (2001). They find that the mechanism driving the negative 
effect of corruption on private investment levels is due to the detrimental impact of 
corruption on the quality of public investment. Guasch et al (2003, 2006) find 
corruption is significant in their analysis of renegotiation. Interestingly, corruption has 
opposite effects on the probability of renegotiation led by the firm (where more 
corruption is associated with more renegotiation) and renegotiation led by the 
government (where more corruption is associated with a lower probability of 
renegotiation).
Several papers have considered the outcomes of PSP from the point of view of the firm. 
Both Estache and Pinglo (2004) and Sirtaine et al (2004) find that returns to 
infrastructure investments in developing countries have not been commensurate with 
risks. Estache & Pinglo find that for a sample o f 120 PSP projects in developing 
countries from 1998-2002, the cost of equity (COE) exceeded the return on equity 
(ROE) for private investors in all years, for all sectors and all country-income groups. 
For the water sector, ROE were negative in two years (1999 and 2002) while COE 
stayed close to 10 percent throughout the period. Using a smaller sample, Sirtaine et al 
find that ROE rates in the water sector have been highly volatile from 1990-2001 and 
are lower on average over this period than in the transport, telecoms and energy sectors. 
O f the four infrastructure sectors considered, water performed the worst in terms of the 
returns to firms. However, Estache and Pinglo note that their estimates of returns are 
lower-bound estimates based only on dividend payments. In fact, firms may extract 
profits from concessions through management fees and internal subcontracting. Profits
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• 1 8 *from these sources are not made public and are very difficult to estimate. Sirtaine et al 
do attempt to estimate these figures and find that returns in the water sector are still not 
commensurate with risks incurred in most of the estimation forms considered.
2.5.4 Implementation
The complexities of contract implementation make it extremely difficult to develop an 
indicator of contract implementation. One way around this is to follow a case study 
method, which makes it possible to take these complexities into account. Another 
avenue is to look at the stability of the contract itself as a striking feature of the 
anecdotal evidence on water and other infrastructure contracts in developing countries is 
precisely how unstable these contracts are. A series o f papers based on a large dataset of 
concessions in Latin America have addressed this issue by looking at contract 
renegotiation (Guasch 2004). Guasch finds that renegotiation is extremely common in 
the water sector, with 74 percent of contracts being renegotiated. 19 On average, water 
projects were renegotiated within the first two years of the contract. Most of these
renegotiations were preferential to firms, perhaps suggesting opportunism on their part
20(Guasch 2004: 12). Guasch argues that this demonstrates opportunism by the firm and 
that governments have been unable to resist requests from firms to renegotiate.
Guasch’s analysis of the factors influencing the probability of renegotiation provide 
confirmation o f the role of institutions in the implementation of contracts. First, he finds 
that some attributes of the political and institutional environment raised the probability 
of renegotiation: the absence of a regulatory agency in place when the contract was 
signed, elections, corruption and low bureaucratic efficiency. Secondly, he tests a 
number of contract specific variables and finds that some significantly raised the 
incidence of renegotiation. These were competitive bidding, price-cap regulation, 
contract award based on tariff, contracts specifying investment requirements. These 
results are discussed in more detail in Chapter 5.
18 A few contracts explicitly allow for internal subcontracting, as in Szeged, Hungary (Lobina and Hall 2003:15, 24) 
Management fees may be specified in the contract, and may be as much as 5 percent of operating income, as in 
Jakarta.
19 This compares to rates o f  renegotiation o f  55 percent for transport, 10 percent for electricity and 30 
percent for all sectors.
20 The most common outcomes o f  a renegotiation were preferential to the firm, including delays in 
investment obligations (69 percent) or decreases in investment targets (63 percent), tariff increases (62 
percent) and increase in the number o f  cost categories for automatic pass through to tariffs (59 percent). 
Many fewer renegotiations resulted in an acceleration o f  investment targets (18 percent) or tariff 
decreases (19 percent).
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There are also a number of documented cases of contract cancellation, although it seems 
to be much less common than renegotiation (Dalton 2001; Lobina and Hall 2003).21 
Overall, the World Bank PPI database identifies 20 projects that were either cancelled 
or have become ‘severely distressed,’ accounting for 7 percent of projects and 37 
percent of investment commitments in 1990-2004 (Izaguirre and Hunt 2005:2). Most 
renegotiations examined in case studies involve compromises by both parties, rather 
than being a one-sided exploitation of a shift in bargaining power (Aspiazu and 
Forcinito 2002 on Buenos Aires; Lobina and. Hall 2003 on Santa Fe). A common 
resolution is for the government to make concessions to the firm in the form of delays or 
reductions in investment obligations or performance requirements and for firms to 
acquiesce to tariff freezes or more modest tariff increases than those set out in the
77original contract (Hall, Lobina et al. 2003: 11, on Tallinn, Estonia).
This evidence prompts many further questions about cooperation and opportunism 
under long-term contracts. Under what conditions do governments and firms decide to 
engage in renegotiations? What determines the outcomes? What are the incentives and 
constraints facing governments and firms over the life of a PSP contract which would 
encourage or discourage renegotiation? These questions are framed in Chapter 5 and 
considered in the light of evidence from the case studies.
2.6 Conclusion
This review o f the literature has raised several issues for further research but has also 
acknowledged the limitations on research strategies imposed by the lack of high quality 
data for the water sector. For this thesis, original quantitative and qualitative data has 
been collected, including quantitative data on the extent and nature o f PSP in the water 
sector, and on tariffs and investment after contract award; and qualitative data on the
21 Examples o f  cancelled concession contracts include Cochabamba and La Paz-El Alto, where contracts 
were terminated by the national government o f  Bolivia, the former after only 6 months, the latter after 3 
years. In Argentina, the private investor withdrew from the Buenos Aires Province contract, while the 
Santa Fe and Buenos Aires cities concessions were eventually terminated by the Firm after long 
negotiations. In Tucuman (Argentina), the contract was terminated by the provincial government after 
consumers had stopped paying their bills (Lobina and Hall 2003: 14). In Nkonkobe (South Africa) the 
contract was terminated by the municipal government claiming that the contract, signed by the previous 
government, was invalid. The municipality had been unable to pay the management fee to the company. 
A  contract for water services in Puerto Rico was awarded to one multinational water company, then re­
awarded to its main rival after seven years and finally cancelled in 2003. Trinidad’s water utility has also 
been returned to the public sector and in Malaysia, the national sewerage company was renationalised in 
2001 and a concession project in Kelantan was cancelled.
22 Other examples include Buenos Aires, where there have been several rounds o f  renegotiation, the first 
initiated by the government, the second round by the firm. A  further interesting point to note in the 
Buenos Aires concession is that the executive intervened on behalf o f  the company to over-rule the 
regulator and during the renegotiations, the regulator was side-lined and discussions took place directly 
with the government (Alcazar, Abdala et al. 2000: 32)
50
behaviour of the contracting parties, the implementation of contracts and the role o f the 
regulatory agency.
Several different strands of the literature reviewed here point to the significance of 
institutions in shaping the outcomes of PSP. Institutions were found to be relevant 
factors in investment and coverage levels for utility sectors and in the probability of 
contract renegotiation. Sector-specific institutions, including the regulatory system and 
the existence of a sector law, were seen to be significant determinants of asset sale 
prices and investment volumes. There are also some surprising results, notably that 
regulatory independence is associated with lower investment volumes. The mechanisms 
at work here need to be investigated further.
The following chapter reviews the theoretical literature, which provides the basis for the 
identification of the mechanisms connecting institutions, regulation and government and 
firm decisions. The significance of these relationships and the mechanisms are then 
investigated using original data and information in Chapter 5 onwards.
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3 Theoretical Approaches to Utility Regulation
3.1 Introduction
This chapter reviews the theoretical literature on economic regulation, highlighting 
work that relates to the interaction of governments and firms under long-term public- 
private contracts. I cover literature drawn from several branches of economics: agency 
theory, contract theory, law and economics and economic theories of policy credibility 
and the behaviour of public agencies. I draw on this literature to develop the analytical 
framework in Chapter 5.
All of these fields share certain common assumptions. They approach the analysis at the 
level of the organisation and identify the key actors as the government, or agency of 
government, and the firm. They view these agents as rational, utility-maximisers, but 
consider both benevolent and non-benevolent governments.
Some of the key works that form the foundations of this thesis have already been 
introduced, notably Laffont’s work on regulation and development (Laffont 2005), and 
Levy & Spiller’s work on the relationship between the institutional framework and 
investment by regulated firms (Levy and Spiller 1994). From these two works, I draw 
the key insights that the institutional environment affects the behaviour of regulated 
firms, and that the institutional environments of developing countries pose particular 
challenges for public-private contracting. I pursue this line of investigation in the 
following chapters by trying to identify particular institutional attributes and 
mechanisms linking institutions to the behaviour of the agents. In this chapter, I set 
these key works in the context of their respective fields of research and look at how 
these fields contribute to our overall understanding o f government and firm behaviour.
Several branches of economic theory introduced in this chapter identify the crucial 
influence o f timing on the behaviour of agents. Contract theory focuses on private- 
private contracts, but can also be applied to contracts between firms and governments. It 
shows how firms’ incentives to invest will be dampened if  contracts are incomplete, and 
the government cannot make a credible commitment not to make changes in the 
regulatory regime (Williamson 1979). Later work in the field considers ways in which 
contractual incompleteness can be overcome, and I consider how these might be applied 
in the particular context of long-term water contracts in developing countries. The
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policy credibility literature also emphasises how a welfare-maximising government may 
have incentives to reverse its own policies.
The origins of the economic analysis of regulation lie in welfare economics, which 
shows that government intervention may be necessary to overcome the market failure of 
natural monopoly. However, early work in this field of economics assumes a benevolent 
government maximising total welfare with perfect information. It does not interrogate 
the incentives or constraints for the firm or regulator, so does not provide the basis for a 
deep investigation of economic regulation. More pertinent here is agency theory, which 
waives the assumption of perfect information and looks at how the regulator can shape 
the incentives of the firm to operate and invest efficiently. Laffont’s work on regulation 
and development is based in this theoretical school, but he takes it further by looking at 
the effects of institutions on incentive schemes. Extensions o f the principal-agent 
framework to cover multiple principals are very relevant to the issues that I am 
considering, and I review some of the key papers in this area.
The fields of law and economics and public choice theory analyse government 
behaviour through the same framework of incentives and constraints that is applied to 
private agents and so provide a useful perspective for questions of political economy. 
Key works relevant to my research include Demsetz’s work on ‘regulation by contract,’ 
Stigler and Peltzman’s work on the incentives of the regulator, and several papers in the 
policy credibility literature which draw attention to the problem of time inconsistency in 
economic regulation, and the possible solution offered by delegation to an independent 
regulatory agency. Together, these papers inform my perspective on the behaviour of 
governments and regulators. I retain Stigler/Peltzman’s framework in which the 
government faces a trade-off between negative utility from higher tariffs, and positive 
utility from the performance of the firm (although I model this as the level of 
investment by the firm rather than its returns). The assumptions made in this work are 
consistent with cases examined in the course of this research. Levy & Spiller’s work fits 
in to the law and economics tradition, but was the first to examine the institution- 
regulation link. Although the authors did not focus on the development/developing 
country dichotomy in their analysis, their central insight -  that the political system 
would have an effect on the implementation of economic regulation, and on the 
behaviour of regulated firms -  is highly relevant to an analysis o f regulation in 
developing countries.
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The legal literature on relational contracts and extra-contractual norms provides a 
different view on how problems of contractual incompleteness can be and, in fact, are 
addressed in long-term contracts between firms. In this view, the legal contract is one 
element in a package of social-legal norms and reputational effects that arise from 
repeated interaction. When changes occur in the operating environment that are not 
addressed explicitly in the contract, norms and reputation will provide the basis for 
readjusting the contract. However, this literature has not specifically addressed the 
complexities of relational contracting between government and private firms, although 
the concepts can usefully be translated to this new context.
3.2 Information & Incentives in Regulatory Economics
The agency literature focuses on the asymmetry of information between the government 
-  the principal -  and the regulated firm -  the agent -  and analyses the incentives o f the 
firm under different regulatory structures. A large number of papers in this literature 
examine the design of selection procedures for the private operator (looking at the 
different properties of competitive bids, auctions etc.) and the design o f the regulatory 
incentive regime under conditions of two types of asymmetric information: adverse 
selection23 and moral hazard.24
The optimal design for contract award mechanisms is based on the revelation principle 
by which efficient (low cost) and inefficient (high-cost) firms can be induced to reveal 
their true type; the optimal design of contract incentives provides the operator with 
incentives to cut costs (Laffont and Tirole 1986). Agency theory is the theoretical 
foundation for incentive regulation which is associated with the use of ‘price-cap.’ 
Incentive regulation, which became widespread around the world in the 1990s, in theory 
provides the firm with stronger incentives to operate efficiently as it benefits from its 
efficiency gains.
From the perspective of agency theory, the regulator faces a trade-off between 
strengthening the efficiency incentives for effort on the part of the firm (implying a shift 
from ROR to price-cap) and transferring a higher information rent to the efficient-type 
firm, both of which constitute a loss of utility for the regulator. The government, in the
23 A transaction in which the principal is unable to verify the agent’s efficiency or ability, resulting in the selection of 
less efficient or less able agents and in some cases the collapse of the market.
24 A transaction in which the principal is unable to verify the agent’s level o f effort, resulting in sub-optimal effort 
levels on the part of the agent.
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role of the principal, must therefore choose between ‘high-powered’ incentive schemes 
like price-cap, in which the agent has strong incentives for efficiency but faces greater 
risks and earns a high rent, and ‘low-powered’ schemes, where the transfer o f rents is 
limited but the efficiency incentives for the firm are weaker.
Applying agency theory to utility regulation, we can see that there are several layers of 
principal-agent interactions in a typical regulatory scenario: the electorate tries to 
exercise control over its agent, the government; the government in turn deals with the 
regulator as an agent; finally, the regulator is the principal in relation to the regulated 
firm. The latter relationship, between the regulator and the firm, has generated an 
extensive literature in the field of economics (Laffont and Tirole 1993). This work has 
examined in detail the trade-offs between high- and low-powered incentive schemes 
(price-cap and rate of return schemes respectively). In practice, these two approaches
25may differ less than might be expected (Alexander and Irwin 1996).
Later papers in agency theory cover dynamic settings, including the effects o f weak 
enforcement on the optimal regulatory contract (Laffont and Tirole 1988; Aubert and 
Laffont 2002). This has implications for developing countries where enforcement might 
be weaker. But the ‘Ratchet Effect’ - whether the possibility of government-led 
renegotiation in later periods will cause the efficient firm to mimic the behaviour o f the 
inefficient firm in the first period has first been identified by Weitzman (1980). The 
anticipation of opportunistic behaviour by governments will lead firms to hide 
information about their efficiency to protect future rents. In this case, the efficiency 
incentives of the regulatory system will be dampened or lost.
A further branch of the agency literature has considered the implications of having more 
than one principal. These models take a more realistic view of government, viewing it 
as multiple actors with interests that may compete. Multi-principal models have
25 The weakening o f  efficiency incentives under price-cap occur because the price-cap is periodically 
reviewed, and during a review the regulator will usually take into account the level o f  returns that firms 
have been earning in the intervening period, lowering prices i f  the ROR is below  the estimated cost-of- 
capital to the firm. In the run-up to the review, the firm has an incentive to influence the efficiency saving 
requirement by not operating at maximum efficiency. This has been documented empirically in several 
papers (Guasch 2004; Ballance and Shugart 2005; Foster 2005). It seems that the incentives acting on 
firms to increase efficiency between periodic reviews are eclipsed by the incentives to inflate costs as the 
price review approaches in order to secure a larger price increase for the next period. Regulators have also 
found it impossible in practice not to consider past profit levels when setting tariffs for future periods, 
known as ‘clawing back’ profits (Bakker 2001). In the expectation that this w ill occur, firms’ efficiency  
incentives are dampened. Over time, price-cap systems have been modified to allow for cost pass through 
for certain categories o f  expenditure to reduce risks to firms, leading to hybrid systems (Guasch 2004).
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approached the question from several different angles. Shleifer (1985) argues that 
multiple regulatory agencies allow the ultimate political principle to apply ‘yardstick’ 
competition to regulatory agencies. Each regulator may have private information, but 
the government can reduce the information rents extracted by the regulators if  there are 
several non-cooperative agencies. Martimort (1999) develops a model of multiple 
benevolent regulators with imperfect commitment and shows that division of 
responsibilities between non-cooperative regulators makes it more difficult to 
renegotiate the contract and so acts as a commitment device. The role o f multiple 
principles during non-opportunistic renegotiations has not been considered.
Laffont and Martimort (1999) present a third model of the benefits of multiple 
regulators, focusing on non-benevolent, non-cooperative regulators with imperfect 
commitment. They find that the presence of multiple regulators reduces the likelihood 
of regulatory capture. However, they recognise that there are significant transactions 
costs in creating a new agency. Laffont (2005) considers the question of multiple 
regulators with reference to developing countries and concludes that the benefits of 
separation of regulators are greater in countries with weaker institutions but that the 
costs of setting up these regulatory agencies is also higher in developing countries 
because of the cost of public funds, and the limited ‘stock’ of institutions in these 
countries. Common to all these approaches, however, is the view that separation of 
powers between multiple principals contributes to the quality of the institutional 
environment.
Within this field, the paper closest to this research is Laffont (2005), which examines 
the optimal contract in the institutional environment of developing countries. In many 
ways, this is an exploratory work which examines some implications of institutions for 
regulation, but because so many aspects of the institutional environment are potentially 
significant, and because there are multiple mechanisms through which institutions will 
act on the incentives of the parties, Laffont 2005 does not provide a unified approach 
that could allow us to say from any one country, what the implications o f institutions are 
for that country. My research comes at this problem from the opposite direction, 
working from qualitative material in contract-level case studies to identify the 
mechanisms through which institutions affect economic regulation.
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3.3 Law and Economics
Within the field of law and economics, the policy credibility literature is relevant to this 
research both for the problem it identifies and for the solution that it proposes. The 
problem is this: a government with a long-term objective to provide a utility service at 
the efficient price and quantity creates a regulation to this effect, and the firm invests on 
this basis. Yet, once the firm has made a sunk investment, the government can change 
the rules to achieve a lower price with the same level of service. The firm knows that 
the government will do this, which undermines the credibility of the original regulation. 
Firms may also behave strategically in situations of weak commitment. This is 
considered further in Chapter 5. In this section, I present the development of this theory, 
which originally focused on central bank independence, and its extension to utility 
regulation.
Barro & Gordon (1983a), building on earlier work by Kydland & Prescott (1977), set 
out the time consistency problem as a complete information game between the 
government and private actors: A government (represented by a single actor) which 
makes an initial announcement of low-inflation monetary policy will have an incentive 
to create ‘surprise inflation’ to lower unemployment once private sector actors (also 
represented by a single actors) have formed their inflationary expectations and signed 
contracts accordingly. However, when people understand the government’s objectives, 
they readjust their expectations and build this inflation bias into their contracts. As a 
result, higher inflation rates are sustained. The term ‘time-inconsistent’ refers to the 
government’s incentive to deviate from the rule when private agents expect it to be 
followed (Barro and Gordon 1983a: 599).
Barro & Gordon (1983b) propose that the time consistency problem can be overcome 
through reputational effects, but in order to be effective, policy-makers must have a 
sufficiently low discount rate (in other words, they must set a high value on future 
losses caused by higher inflation). Where government discount rates are high, as would 
be expected in polities with frequent leadership turnover, the reputational equilibrium 
cannot be sustained. A second strategy is to constrain the actions of the policy-maker 
with rules; “The model stresses the importance o f monetary institutions, which 
determine the underlying rules of the game... The rule of law or equivalent 
commitments about future governmental behaviour are important for inflation, just as 
they are for other areas that are influenced by possibly shifting public policies.” (Barro
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and Gordon 1983a: 608) Vlaicu and Keefer (2005) examine the choices available to 
politicians to overcome their credibility deficit in the context of young democracies: 
politicians can either build up their reputation directly with voters or they can use 
intermediaries (patrons). They show how building reputation with voters is costly but 
leads to better public good provision.
Time inconsistency theories have been subject to empirical testing. Rogoff (1985) 
demonstrates how the delegation of policy to an independent central bank(er) will lead 
to lower average inflation (but higher output variability). This finding prompted many 
governments to delegate monetary policy, with varying degrees of success.
However, breaking down the analysis by national income level, they found that the 
relationship does not hold for developing countries. Keefer & Stasavage (2000) develop 
a plausible argument for why this might be the case. They model the effect o f weak 
governance on credibility, In their model, they allow for the possibility that a 
government may reverse a policy commitment to central bank independence or may 
over-ride the independent bank’s authority. In cases where constraints on policy
reversals are weak, the creation of an independent agency does not allow the
government to overcome the perverse consequences of the time inconsistency problem. 
They test the model empirically and demonstrate that the effects of delegation to an 
independent agency are very sensitive to the institutional rules and in particular to the 
number of veto players in the government.
Policy credibility is a concept with broad application: it has been shown to undermine
structural adjustment programmes and trade liberalisation efforts, encourage capital
flight and depress savings (Murphy, Shleifer et al. 1991; Rodrik 1992; Rodrik 1993). 
Credibility and delegation also have a clear parallel to utility regulation where the 
optimal output/tariff combination can only be reached if  the private sector finds the 
government’s regulatory commitments credible and invests accordingly (Stem and 
Trillas 2001). Levine, Stem & Trillas set out the parallel thus:
For utility services like telecoms there is a classic time inconsistency problem: these services 
require large volumes o f  investment which, once installed become ‘sunk assets’ in the sense that 
most or all o f  them cannot be removed and used elsewhere or sold on second-hand markets at 
their original cost. In consequence, private investors are at risk o f  opportunistic behaviour by 
Governments, particularly over prices, once the investments have been installed; and awareness 
by private investors o f  this regulatory risk drives up the required rate o f  return and the cost o f  
capital. (Levine, Stem et al. 2005: 449)
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Applying the work on credibility and delegation provides a useful frame to analyse the 
decision of governments to use reputational mechanisms or delegate regulatory 
authority for utilities to independent agencies. In both cases, reputational solutions are 
possible provided that the policymaker is sufficiently far-sighted. However, Levine et al 
(2005) find that the hold-up problem is more serious for utility regulation than for 
central banking. In their model, a benevolent regulator sets the tariff for the firm to 
maximise total welfare. If the initial tariff meets the firm’s participation constraint, it 
will carry out investment. After the firm has invested, the regulator can raise welfare by 
reducing the tariff. The firm will not invest further, but if capital depreciates slowly and 
consumer demand rises slowly, there will be a period during which the regulator will be 
‘tempted’ to suppress tariffs. At the end o f this period, when demand has risen and the 
original capital invested must be replaced, the regulator will be ‘punished’ for 
suppressing tariffs. In some sectors, this temptation period might be very short, or 
absent, as in telecoms for example, where demand and technology change rapidly, but 
in the water industry, which fits the two criteria o f slow changes in demand and slow 
depreciation, this regulatory period would be long, and so a reputational equilibrium 
could not be sustained.
The credibility approach retains the assumption of government benevolence and shows 
how even under these conditions it may still be worthwhile for the government to create 
an independent regulator with a clear objective to balance producer and consumer 
interests. This literature does not question what happens if  either the government is not 
benevolent, or the regulator does not fulfil its theoretical role as a rational implementor 
of regulatory rules.
In terms o f this research, I carry over the critical role played by timing in the policy 
credibility literature to the development of the model and to my case study analysis, 
although I do not assume a benevolent government seeking to maximise welfare even in 
the long-run.
From other strands o f the law and economics literature, which covers a disparate range 
of topics, I highlight here two particular themes: rational choice and utility 
maximisation by government agencies (public choice theory), which provides a 
framework in which to consider the disparate goals o f public sector actors; and
59
collective action, which can be used to explain why some groups are more influential 
with the regulator -  or directly with the government -  than others. I then look in more 
detail at the analysis of Stigler and Peltzman which I draw on extensively in my 
approach to the behaviour of the government. The work of Levy and Spiller (1994), 
which was introduced in Chapter 1, also falls within the field of law and economics and 
is of great relevance to my research.
The public choice literature characterises governments not as benevolent maximisers of 
the public interest, but instead as agents with their own private interests (Niskanen 
1971; Buchanan and Tollison 1972; Buchanan 1975). These are shaped by political 
institutions, and diverge more or less widely from the public interest depending on the 
nature of those institutions. As bureaucratic agencies, regulators fit closely into the 
model of bureaucratic departments described in the public choice literature or Wilson 
(1989). This work envisages that bureaucrats seek to maximise their utility through 
factors like the prestige of the department; the scope o f the department’s activity; or the 
size of the department (reflected in staffing or budget).
The public choice perspective implies a disaggregated view o f the state, breaking it 
down into the executive, legislature, bureaucracy, courts and so on, or further, into the 
different departments and agencies of government. Each may have different goals and 
incentives from the others. Thus, whether the regulator is located within a government 
department or is an autonomous agency will affect its incentives and so may be 
important to its susceptibility to capture.
The collective action literature seeks to explain why some interest groups are more 
active and influential than others within the political system. The work of Downs (1957) 
and Olson (1965) demonstrates how collective action can be more easily achieved when 
the group of agents is small and its members stand to gain or lose a great deal from 
regulation. Where the group is large, monitoring costs are high and the group members 
do not have incentives to incur costs in monitoring each other, and when the benefit to 
any one member of the group is small, each individual will have an incentive to free- 
ride on the efforts of the others. Together, these factors help to explain why general 
interests, like the interests of utility consumers, may lose out to particular interests in 
democratic systems.
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Applying the theories of collective action to economic regulation, we can see that a 
small group of regulated firms will be better able to organise collectively to influence 
the regulator, a phenomenon known as regulatory capture. Regulatory capture is not 
exclusive to economic regulators, of course. It follows “patterns not peculiar to 
commissions but common to a whole range of bureaucratic interdependency between 
government agencies and organized interest groups whether in labor, agriculture, 
defense or other private interests able to use the power of the state for their own 
benefit.” (McCraw 1975 : 180).
The early literature on regulators developed in the US, which has a long history of 
private ownership in network industries. In the first half of the 20th Century, regulatory 
agencies were seen as agents of the public interest, protecting consumers from 
exploitation by monopolists (See McCraw 1975 for a review). Over time, however, 
critiques of economic regulation developed. Stigler (1971) argues that the demand for 
regulation comes from industries and that regulation is designed and operated for their 
benefit. Regulatory agencies are ‘captured,’ in the sense that they regulate in the 
interests of the industries that they are intended to control. Posner (1972) refined the 
critique, arguing that capture by other groups was also possible. Peltzman (1976) 
formalised these ideas in a model of regulation that took into account the influence of 
both consumer and producer interests. In Peltzman’s model, the government’s utility is 
a negative function of consumer tariffs and a positive function o f the profits o f the
9 6regulated firm. The model assumes that increases in tariffs are unpopular with the 
public, and so reduce electoral or financial support for the government. Thus the 
government chooses a tariffs which reflects the optimal trade-off between these two. I 
adopt the broad parameters of this model for my analysis, modifying it to reflect factors 
emerging from the empirical work.
Concerns about regulatory capture fed into Demsetz’s influential paper, which showed 
how natural monopoly market failures could be addressed through ‘regulation by 
contract’ (Demsetz 1968). He argued that ‘competition for the market’ could be created 
by periodically re-bidding short-term monopoly contracts for service. If  the incumbent 
firm did not win, it would be compensated for the investment in sunk assets made in the
26 Government here refers to the political leadership rather than the bureaucracy. In Peltzman’s model, the 
politician maximises power (M) where M(p,n) where p is price and n  is profit. M decreases with high 
prices and increases with high profits. The politician will choose the level o f  regulation that maximises 
M.
61
previous period. Competitive tendering would ensure that prices were set at competitive 
levels. Although this solution is theoretically satisfying, it has rarely been implemented 
in practice due to two main concerns: competition for contracts may be ineffective 
because of collusion or incumbency advantages; and under-investment, depending on 
the observability and transferability of investment. In any case, the government will 
have a continuing role in contract administration (monitoring, enforcing and bargaining 
over unspecified contingencies) (Vickers and Yarrow 1991).
In a developing country context, regulation by contract will be associated with 
implementation problems. When there is a clear breach of contract, the contract will 
need to be enforced to change the non-compliant behaviour or to compensate the losing 
party. Enforcement mechanisms centre on contract law and the judicial system but these 
may be less effective in developing countries. Where the quality of the judicial system 
and the confidence of the parties in the ability of judges to deliver fair and informed 
judgements is lower, and corruption is more pervasive, efficiency incentives based on 
contract provisions will be ineffective (Laffont 2005). Further, more asymmetric 
information and higher transaction costs in developing countries will reduce the 
effectiveness of the contract monitoring body.
Developing countries have invested less in enforcement mechanisms over time. In order 
to overcome this, they would have to make a massive short-term effort to improve the 
quality of enforcement institutions in order to ensure effective enforcement, but these 
resources are rarely available. On the other end of the spectrum, developed countries 
benefit from the fact that high quality enforcement mechanisms with demonstrated 
effectiveness can also act as a deterrent. If  the parties do not have confidence in the 
enforcement mechanism, they are more likely to try to cheat. If  they perceive that are 
likely to be caught, then they are less likely to cheat, which reduces the deadweight 
costs o f monitoring and enforcement.
Closely related to the law and economics literature is the legal literature on relational 
contracts. This draws attention to concerns about reputation, which I build into the PPC 
model and also emerge as an important explanatory factor in some of the case studies.
Based on empirical observation, this body of work points to the fact that contracts may 
be deliberately incomplete relational contracts: they are long-term, continuing and
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interactive relationships in which the contracts is only one parameter shaping the 
relationship, distinct from contingent contracts in which all relevant parameters are 
defined in the contract (Goetz and Scott 1981). Relational contracts are those in which 
the parties are unable to, or choose not to, specify important terms of the arrangement in 
well defined, formal obligations. They depend on norms or extra-contractual conditions 
like influential third parties, sources of competition, access to information etc to achieve 
stability and these factors that constrain the outcomes of bargaining between the parties. 
These contracts and are in fact extremely common in relationships between firms 
(Baker, Gibbons et al. 2002), and in places where legal institutions are weaker, they 
may be the predominant form of contractual assurance (Johnson, McMillan et al. 2002 ). 
These empirical studies have examined contracts between private parties, but there is a 
close parallel between long-term private-private contracts and contracts between 
government and private firms: both sides may have incentives to build a relationship 
with the other contracting party rather than just relying on the terms of the contract. In 
some cases, a ‘relational contract’ which provides a structure for but does not determine 
the pattern of interaction between the parties may work better than a conventional 
contract (Shugart 1998).
Contract enforcement is both costly and risky. Even where they exist, contracts are 
often not referred to when disputes arise between firms (Macaulay 1963), either for 
reputational reasons or because the risks of pursuing legal remedies are too high. This 
trade-off is illustrated in the experience of international creditors to developing 
countries after a macroeconomic crisis.27 An extra-contractual approach may be 
motivated by concerns for reputation, when expectations o f a continuing relationship 
with that party or potential relationships with third parties raises the cost of legal action.
Are long-term PSP arrangements relational contracts? Shugart (1998) argues that such 
contracts are widely used in French municipal services. However, the successful 
employment o f relational contracts depends on the existence of special monitoring or 
bonding mechanisms (Goetz and Scott 1981), and it is precisely these norms and extra- 
contractual influences that are often absent in PSP projects in developing countries.
27 One o f  many examples is Indonesia after the fall o f  Suharto. Banks initially took their debtors to court, 
but failed to secure judgements in their favour, or were unable to track down assets to enforce the 
judgement (Robison and Hadiz 2004: 191). A  further example is the high profile case o f  a Japanese 
company building an expressway in Bangkok which refused to use the arbitration mechanism provided 
for in the contract, even when the government expropriated the expressway (Gomez-Ibanez 2003: 352).
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3.4 Contract Theory
The focus of my research is on regulation based on contract, so it is natural to consider 
the implications of contract theory for the specific case of public-private contracting. 
Contract theory considers the extent and implications of contractual incompleteness and 
the remedies for its undesirable effects and ways in which they can be mitigated. This 
theory can usefully be applied to the developing country context, where contractual 
incompleteness is likely to be pervasive.
The central insight of Williamson (1975) is that, in principle, it would be possible for 
two firms to sign a ‘complete’ contract specifying their terms of exchange in every 
future state of the world. A complete contract may be defined as one that, “describes all 
possible future states of the world and the rights and obligations of the contracting 
parties in those states of the world precisely enough that any competent adjudicator 
would come to the same conclusion about the application of the contract, based solely 
on the assessment of what the parties had actually agreed in the contract.” 28 With 
complete contracts, the contracting firms are able to achieve optimal efficiency, 
whichever state of the world is realised. The second key implication is that there will be 
no difference to total welfare between a situation in which two firms sign a long-term 
contract, and one in which the two firms are integrated. With complete contracting 
asymmetric information between principal and agent becomes irrelevant, as the 
principle does not need to monitor the behaviour o f the agent, just the delivery o f output 
agreed under the contract. This leads to the irrelevance result o f Sappington and Stiglitz 
(1987): With complete contracts, ownership does not matter, despite asymmetric 
information.
In the real world, however, as Williamson describes, long-term contracts are always 
incomplete. This is due to the bounded rationality o f the contracting parties and the 
impossibility o f describing future states of the world in all relevant detail so that an 
external adjudicator would be able to apply the contract without the need for 
interpretation or reference to extra-contractual principles. The problem of hold-up then 
arises because contracts are based on consent (Barnett 1992) and can always be 
renegotiated if both parties agree.
28 This definition is used by Shugart (1998) drawing on the concept developed by Williamson.
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Complete contracts are ex ante optimal in the sense that the parties agree to the utility- 
maximizing terms of exchange for every future state o f the world. In Williamson’s 
model, it is assumed that the parties will always have a choice about whether to trade, 
and so they will only trade if this is welfare-enhancing. Neither party can be coerced 
into an agreement, but must decide together ex ante how the gains from trade will be 
divided between the parties. Once the contract has been signed, the contracting parties 
will decide how much to invest and will carry out their investments. After the firms 
have made their investments, one party may be able to ‘hold up’ the other party by 
renegotiating the contract and expropriating its rent. As there are no restrictions on 
renegotiation in the model, the other firm will be forced to renegotiate and will lose 
some or all of its gains from trade to the first firm. As long as the second firm’s 
reservation utility is met, he will still trade, but on less advantageous terms. If the firm 
has invested in assets that cannot be transferred to other uses, known as relationship- 
specific assets, his reservation utility will be close to zero and the other firm will be able 
to expropriate all the gains from trade.
This gives rise to the key problem under incompleteness: knowing that there is a 
possibility of expropriation, firms will invest less than the optimal amount in 
relationship-specific assets and so the gains from trade will be reduced. The first-best 
utility outcome cannot be achieved in a long-term contract because of this hold-up 
problem (Hart and Moore 1988). To take an example, in a water services contract, 
almost all the firm’s capital expenditure will be in the pipe network, which cannot be 
transferred to other uses, making it a typical ‘relationship-specific asset’. Under 
incompleteness the firm will under-invest in the pipe network, leading to lower rates of 
coverage than would be achieved under completeness. The dampening effect on 
investment of incomplete contracts will therefore be a serious cause for concern for 
water PSP.
Some models integrating enforcement o f the contract by a third party have demonstrated 
how an incomplete contract may nevertheless allow for optimal levels of relationship- 
specific investment if  the parties agree a rule for renegotiation as part o f the contract so 
that when new information becomes available, either party may choose to enforce the 
status quo or agree a welfare-improving renegotiation (Chung 1992). But, where 
enforcement is imperfect, as it usually will be, there will still be a tendency towards 
under-investment.
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In practice, contracts imply a degree of coercion and renegotiation is not costless, as in 
Williamson’s theory. The judicial system plays a role in enforcing the original terms of 
the contract and contract law implies costs on parties that do not comply with their 
contractual obligations, so there are costs associated with expropriation, and this should 
reduce the asset-specific investment dampening effect.. In addition to the costs of 
formal external enforcement, other mechanisms support compliance with contracts, like 
informal institutions. But enforcement is imperfect, and is likely to be more costly and 
difficult in developing countries where there has been less historic investment in 
enforcement institutions.
Contract theory originally addressed contracts between private firms but its insights 
may equally be applied to contracts between governments and private enterprises. 
Where contracts are complete, a benevolent government can sign a contract for the 
provision of any good or service by a private firm on terms that maximise public 
welfare. Equally, the government can sign a contract with the manager of a public 
enterprise to provide the good or service on the same welfare-maximising terms. 
However, there are greater enforcement problems associated specifically with the role 
o f the government as one of the contracting parties. The government may play a role as 
regulator in addition to its contracting role, which does not have a parallel in the private 
sector. This allows the government to impose conditions on private firms that are not 
part of a mutually agreed contract. Secondly, the government has special powers to 
modify and terminate contracts which private firms do not have, making third-party 
enforcement solutions to hold-up problems less effective and, as a result, reducing asset- 
specific investment. As Hart writes, “What ensures that the government respects an 
agreed-on allocation of property rights? The government, unlike a private agent, can 
always change its mind: it can nationalize assets it has privatized or privatize assets it 
has nationalized.” (Hart 1995).
How can the investment dampening effect of incomplete contracts be overcome? 
Grossman & Hart (1986) develop the theory that the problem of hold-up can be resolved 
through the allocation of residual rights. In the ‘residual claimant’ model, all residual 
rights and associated rents will accrue to the owner o f the asset in states of the world not 
covered by the contract. The owner therefore will be able to internalise all the gains 
from trade and will invest in relationship-specific assets up to the optimal level,
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resolving the under-investment problem of incomplete contracts. Residual rights should 
therefore be allocated to the party that needs to make the bulk of the relationship- 
specific investment. Williamson (1985) finds that integration will be preferable in cases 
where the assets are highly specific, where there is high uncertainty about future 
conditions and where the type of transaction is likely to be recurrent.
The allocation of the residual has two potential drawbacks in the context of PSP: If both 
parties need to make relationship-specific investments, only the owner will invest at the 
optimal level, while the other party will under-invest; secondly, where the rents 
accruing to the owner are high, the other party will have a powerful incentive to 
renegotiate the terms of the contract to change the ownership structure, intensifying the 
hold-up problem. In a private-private contracting situation, institutional constraints may 
make expropriation costly, but the government still has the power to expropriate private 
property, and may decide to do so if the perceived benefits are high enough. Hart, 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) (HSV) develop a modified model of public-private 
contracting which identifies a trade-off between two types of effort by the firm: 
innovation, which increases efficiency or improves quality; and cost-reduction, which 
reduces quality.29
The contracting literature emphasises the pervasiveness of incomplete contracts. 
Incompleteness will be particularly likely where market characteristics, including 
demand, supply and available technologies are difficult to predict. Would we expect 
contracts in the water sector to have problems with incompleteness? As contracts are 
usually long-term, lasting 25-30 years, there will inevitably be changes in the operating 
environment over the life of the contract. Technologies for water treatment and 
distribution do not change rapidly -  compared to the information technology or 
telecommunications sectors, for example -  but demand may be difficult to forecast.30 
Even more difficult is verifying data about the initial operating environment. There is 
often a severe lack of accurate information about the extent of network assets and their 
condition and about the customer base. Operating conditions have frequently turned out
29 In the H SV  m odel, the private firm w ill have stronger incentives to engage in innovation compared to the public 
enterprise i f  the increased residual accrues to managers, but the private firm w ill also have a stronger incentive to cut 
costs by reducing quality, i f  quality is difficult to monitor.
30 This w as the case for the BOT project in Chengdu, China, for example, where demand in the pre-project period 
rose 150% over 8 years, but demand fell by 5% in the first year o f  the project’s operations and then stayed steady. 
(Zhou X u 2004)
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to be different from those established in the contract, again leading to contract 
renegotiation, as we will see in the case studies.31
In addition to the allocation of ownership rights, there are other possible ways to deal 
with contractual incompleteness. One way could be to make contracts more complete, 
by providing provisions for more possible future scenarios, but given the range of 
parameters that would need to be covered, and the high transactions costs involved in 
drafting such a contract, efforts to write complete contracts are likely to be futile. There 
will always be a trade-off between detail and flexibility to deal with new operating 
conditions (Ballance and Shugart 2005).
In addition, increasing the detail and level of complexity of contracts raises the 
transactions costs associated with the agreement and puts a greater burden on the 
enforcement of the contract. In developing countries, where enforcement is more likely 
to be weak, a more detailed and complex contract may actually be counter-productive 
when dealing with shocks to the operating environment as it reduces flexibility and 
makes the adjustment process more costly. Enforcement is also less reliable for 
contracts in which the government is one o f the contracting parties, in comparison to 
private-private contracts; making the contract more complete does not contribute to the 
government’s commitment capacity. Another option is to include a general clause in the 
contract that can be applied to unforeseen situations. However, it will not be possible to 
write a contingency clause that is sufficiently clear and unambiguous to be enforced 
(Hart and Moore 1988).
The implication of this theory -reduced relationship-specific investment -  applies to the 
water sector to explain lower than expected investment following PSP. The resolution to 
the hold-up problem in the literature -  vertical integration between the contracting 
parties -  has been tried by most governments in the past for the water sector, with little 
success in terms of performance. This prompts two questions for further research: what 
external constraints act upon the parties to abide by contracts, even when they could 
achieve preferential provisions in a renegotiation, and what other resolutions can be 
found to the hold-up problem?
31 Private operators in Manila, for example, claimed that the information that had been provided in the tender had not 
been accurate (Dumol, 2000).
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Contract theory offers a striking theoretical argument against relying on a contract to 
deliver optimal outcomes that can easily be applied to an economic regulation situation 
where the firm is expected to undertake large relationship-specific investments. 
However, contractual incompleteness does not mean that governments and firms 
necessarily fail to cooperate. One of explanation may be the existence of relational 
contracts, discussed above. Another may be that the parties have long-term incentives 
for mutual compliance even in the absence o f enforcement. I investigate the 
circumstances where these incentives might exist through the model and case studies.
3.5 Conclusion
This chapter brings together several strands of literature, mostly based on a common 
broad set of assumptions of rational utility-maximising behaviour by both governments 
and firms, within a set of incentives and constraints imposed by the contract, contract 
enforcement institutions, and the wider institutional environment. Several strands of the 
literature have highlighted the time inconsistency problem and the resulting strategic 
behaviour on the part o f both governments and firms. This turns out to be very relevant 
to long-term public-private contracts where both parties make upfront relationship- 
specific ‘investments’ -  financial in the case of the firm, political in the case o f the 
government -  in the expectation o f positive pay-offs in later years. This makes both 
parties vulnerable to ‘hold-up’ and makes the contractual arrangement sensitive to 
changes in the parties’ pay-off functions over time.
Within the principal-agent literature, multiple-principal models have particularly 
interesting implications for the concession contracts that I am interested in. In Chapter 
1, I mapped out the institutional structure of concessions, which demonstrated clearly 
the multiple government actors that have a stake in the concession. The models 
reviewed here emphasise the advantages of the separation of powers. However, in the 
context of the deliberately incomplete contracts that are used for water concessions, the 
role o f multiple principals may also have some negative consequences. I explore these 
in the following chapters.
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4 Empirical Analysis of Trends and Determinants of PSP Projects
4.1 Introduction
This chapter presents an empirical analysis of public-private contracts in the water and
T9sanitation sector in developing countries using an original dataset, WASTUP that was 
developed for the purposes of this research. Descriptive statistics on projects by country, 
type of contract, origin of investor and trends over time are presented and discussed for 
a sample of developing countries. The data show that private investors are active in the 
sector, but regional companies are becoming more important and investment is flowing 
towards a small number of host countries.
The dataset is employed for a regression analysis of the determinants of the number of 
projects by country. I develop hypotheses on drivers of the ‘hand-shake’: a short-hand 
term that refers to the agreement of public and private sector agents or ‘partners’ to 
engage in a PSP contract. The hypotheses are tested on data for a sample of 460 signed 
PSP projects in water and sanitation in 60 developing countries in 1990-2004. Building 
on the literature discussed in the previous two chapters, indicators of institutional, 
macroeconomic and demand characteristics of countries are tested. The analysis reveals 
that national-level institutions are a significant determinant of the number of deals 
signed in each country in addition to measures of market size.
This chapter focuses on the first stage in the PSP cooperation: the initial agreement 
between the parties. This stage in the life-cycle of projects has not yet been addressed in 
the quantitative literature and allows me to make full use o f the WATSUP dataset. The 
determinants of investment volumes are not addressed directly in this chapter because of 
concerns about the quality of the date. Subsequent chapters treat the firm’s investment 
decision from a theoretical and empirical angle, through the development o f a model 
and case studies. The findings of this chapter in relation to institutional determinants 
feed into the structure of the model and the selection of case studies.
Section 2 presents descriptive statistics from the dataset by year, region, income group, 
type o f investor and type of project contract. In Section 3 , 1 derive the model o f drivers
32 In this thesis, the term ‘project’ is used to refer to an individual case o f  PSP. Project is applied equally to 
arrangements in which the private sector takes over the management o f  an existing utility or facility, such as a water 
treatment plant, or when a new company or facility is set up. In most cases, the nature and scope o f  the project w ill be 
defined under a legal contract and so contract is broadly synonym ous with project and is used in this sense in the 
thesis. However, divestitures do not necessarily involve a legal contract o f  this kind so project is used as the 
encompassing term.
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of contract agreements or the ‘hand-shake,’ explain the selection o f independent 
variables and discuss the count outcome methodology that is employed. In Section 4, 
the existing data on PSP and its limitations are discussed. The WATSUP database is 
presented and the extra value offered by the database is considered. Section 5 presents 
the results o f the negative binomial count regression model. Section 6 concludes and 
relates these results to the rest of this research.
4.2 Descriptive Statistics
Recent discussions between private firms and donors, such as the ‘Operators’ 
Roundtable Initiative, organised by the World Bank, have referred to an ‘impasse’ in 
private participation in the water market in which private investment in the sector has 
dried up (Janssens and Mandri-Perrott 1 March 2005). The ‘impasse’ is understood to 
be due to risks in the sector in developing countries being too high for equity investment 
by private companies and the proposals generated by the Operators’ Roundtable group 
were for private companies to take on only management and not financing 
responsibility. This description of the impasse rests on two assumptions: that private 
investment in water overall has fallen since the Asian crisis and has not recovered; and 
that the number of PSP projects in which private companies take on financing risk 
(divestitures and concessions) has fallen to a low level.
4.2.1 Investment Trends
Figure 4.1 and Table 4.1 show the number of contracts signed by year and by type. This 
shows a downturn from 2000 to 2003, followed by an upturn in 2004. 2004 is the 
strongest year yet in terms of number of deals signed: WATSUP reports 60 new projects 
in 14 countries in 2004, driven by very high levels of activity in the Chinese market. 
This compares to the findings of the World Bank PPI Database, which records 28 
projects agreed in the water sector in 9 countries in 2004.33
33 The World Bank’s PPI (Private Participation in Infrastructure) Database collects data on private sector investment 
in infrastructure sectors in low - and m iddle-incom e countries. It is updated annually using commercial news 
databases, industry publications and internet resources. However, the World Bank recognises that the database is not 
com plete, especially in its coverage o f  the water sector where project size tends to be smaller: ‘T h e  Private 
Participation in Infrastructure (PPI) Project Database lacks good coverage o f  sm all-scale providers o f  water and 
sewerage services because projects involving such providers usually are not reported by the sources it uses.” 
(Izaguirre and Hunt 2005). A  further concern with the PPI Database is the divergence between investment 
commitments and disbursements, discussed in the main text. T w o other databases o f  PSP projects have been 
assembled: the Water and Sanitation Sector Public Private Partnerships Database maintained by Institute o f  Water 
and Environment, Cranfield and a database o f  companies involved in the private provision o f  public services 
maintained by the Public Services International Research Unit, University o f  Greenwich. These databases are not in 
the public domain. The former database contains information on 1,300 PPP contracts announced up to 2003 using a 
broad definition o f  PPP that includes providers in the informal sector but it has not been consistently updated; the 
latter focuses on the activity o f  multinational firms.
See http://www.silsoe.cranfield.ac.uk/iwe/cws/pppdatabase/pppdatabase.htm and www.psiru.org.
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Previous highs were recorded in 1998 and 1999. The high level o f  investment in these 
years just after the Asian Crisis may seem surprising. However, there is a lag between 
the firm ’s decision to make the investment and the signing o f  the contract, so the effects 
o f  the Asian Crisis may account for the downturn in 2000-2003.
Figure 4.1: W ater and Sanitation Contracts Awarded by Year and Project Type (1991-
2004)
50
45
40
30
25
20
15
10
5
O
—♦—  BOT-type —■—  Concession —A— Dives* h ire  —X — Lease lype 
—* — Q & M type —• — Total
Source: WATSUP Database
Table 4.1: W ater and Sanitation Contracts Awarded (1991-2004) by Project Type 
(424 o b s e r v a t i o n s ) ______________________________ ______________________
Year 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
No. contracts 
signed 2 8 9 17 22 20 39 35 45 45 40 36 32 47 27
BOT-type 2 3 6 11 14 13 28 29 28 31 21 27 19 18 20
Concession 0 2 2 0 1 1 5 4 1 4 5 6 5 6 5
Divestiture 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 2 6 2 4 2 4 7 0
Lease type 0 1 1 4 5 4 4 0 5 5 4 0 2 10 2
O&M type 0 2 0 2 1 1 1 0 5 3 6 1 2 6 0
Source: WATSUP Database
4.2.2 Contract Types
Using a 60-country sample from the W ATSUP database to examine the frequency o f 
contract types35, it is evident that the proportion o f new BOT projects signed out o f  total 
projects has recently fallen back towards the levels o f the m id-1990s (Table 4.1 & 
Figure 4.2). The falling popularity o f  BOT projects may be explained by the experience 
that many countries, particularly in the Asian region, have had with this structure.36 
BOTs imply equity risk for the investor, so one explanation for the downward trend
34 The author would like to thank Antonio Estache for drawing attention to this point.
35 The differences between contract types were explained in Chapter 1. Under divestitures and concessions, firms 
take on all financing risk; under lease contracts, firms take on some financing risk while under management contracts, 
the firm does not take any responsibility for financing capital investment.
36 High tariffs paid to BOT suppliers for treated water near to or exceeding retail tariffs have undermined the financial 
viability o f  public water utilities, rendering some projects unsustainable. See case studies o f  Selangor and Johor in 
Chapter 9 and reference to Chengdu (China) project in Chapter 8.
72
could be that private players are no longer willing to act as investors and finance the 
capital expenditure o f projects. However, this view is contradicted by the evidence on 
concessions, which also involve financing risk. Figure 4.1 shows the num ber o f  new 
concessions signed each year has been higher in the 2001-2005 than all years in the 
preceding period, with the exception o f 1997 which saw a high level o f  activity.
The data also show that there is no clear upward trend in the num ber o f  new lease and 
management contracts signed in more recent years over the pre-1997 period, 
contradicting the view that investors are becoming overall more risk-averse in the 
sector. China is an example o f the risks that investors are willing to take when expected 
returns are high where there have been several large equity deals in recent years, 
involving high levels o f debt and equity investment.37 In 2004, Chile and M exico also 
attracted substantial new investments. Together, these three countries accounted for 90 
percent o f investment flows and 70 percent o f projects in that year (Izaguirre and Hunt
2005).
4.2.3 Regional Trends
Source: W A T SU P  D atabase
Looking at the distribution of contract types across regions and income groups shows 
that there have been no divestitures among low income countries, but divestitures are 
the second most frequent model in the upper middle income group. Concessions appear 
to be most common in the lower middle income group. Across regions, concessions 
have been very rare in Europe and most frequent in Asia. Divestitures are concentrated 
in the Latin American region, although there are also some examples in Europe. These 
figures are consistent with the view that investors are more willing to take equity risk 
(in BOTs, divestitures and concessions) in higher income countries.
4.2.4 International and Local Investors
There is much anecdotal evidence for the withdrawal of international private investors 
from the developing world. The WATSUP database records 28 terminated projects or 
4 percent of the total number. This compares with the World Bank PPI database which 
identifies 20 projects that were either cancelled or have become ‘severely distressed,’ 
accounting for 7 percent of projects and 37 percent of investment commitments in 
1990-2004 (Izaguirre and Hunt 2005:2).
However, these well publicised views of a few high profile international investors do 
not tell the whole story. As Figures 4.3 and 4.4 demonstrate, private water investment is 
booming in some regions, notably Asia, where China is driving the trend (Blanc-Brude 
and Jensen 2004), with investment by both international and local investors.
Figure 4.3: Number of Projects Announced with Foreign Investors by Region and Year 
(1991-2004)
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38 For example, in 2005, Suez (Ondeo), one o f  the world’s two largest water service companies, 
announced that it was withdrawing from two major projects, in La Paz-El Alto (Bolivia) and Buenos 
Aires (Argentina).
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Elsewhere in Asia and in Latin America, regional and national companies are 
increasingly active. Local investors seem willing to take on financial risks that the 
largest international water companies are not, and are expanding rapidly into new 
markets. Figure 4.4 shows the increasing role of local investors in these regions, who 
are taking the place of international companies, which contrasts with the established 
view that the water sector is dominated by a small group of European companies. This 
trend is also confirmed by anecdotal evidence: projects without international 
involvement constitute the majority of projects in Malaysia and China and local 
companies won deals in Latin America (Chile and Peru) in 2004-5 (WATSUP). 
However, in Europe there are no projects without international involvement and there is 
only one project of this kind in Africa. Figure 4.3 also provides a comparison with the 
level of foreign investment. It shows that in Latin America the level of international 
involvement in the region has collapsed. In contrast, in Asia, the growth in project 
numbers is due to both domestic and foreign investors. Moreover, the latter include 
many regional investors such as Malaysian companies investing in China.
Figure 4.4: Number of Projects Announced with Local Investors by Region and Year 
(1991-2004)
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This review o f the descriptive statistics has demonstrated the recovery in investment 
levels in 2004 and their high degree of concentration in a handful of countries. The 
WATSUP data also show that the common belief that investors are no longer engaging 
in concession-type contracts is not accurate and that local private corporations are 
increasingly important players in the water and sanitation markets. In the next section, I 
review the literature pertinent to the analysis of PSP in the water sector, before 
developing and testing the model of PSP with WATSUP data.
Stylised facts:
75
■ Investment in the water sector in developing countries has recovered but this is 
driven by investment in a small number o f countries (Chile, China, Mexico).
■ Investment by large international companies has seen a sharp drop in some 
developing regions (Latin America) but is rising in other areas (China).
■ Local companies are growing in importance in Latin America and Asia but do 
not have a significant presence in Africa or the transition countries.
■ The BOT contract type has declined but concessions, leases and management 
contracts do not show a discernible upward (or downward) trend in the period 
under study.
4.3 Context
From the investor’s point of view, the fundamental calculation is whether the expected 
return on the investment is commensurate with the risks. In a portfolio of investment 
projects, we would expect investors to balance high risk-high return projects with low 
risk-low return projects. On the returns side of this equation, important factors are the 
number o f people currently served and unserved, and the average and expected tariff 
levels for water services. The FDI literature finds these host-country characteristics 
significant in attracting investors, as one of the three elements (ownership, location and 
internalisation) of the eclectic paradigm (Vernon 1966; Dunning 1993).
Many o f the factors determining the level of risk will be project-specific. However, 
others will be associated with country-level characteristics for which indicators are 
available. The firm will take into account macroeconomic risk, political risk, regulatory 
risk at the country level, as well as the management and operational risks associated 
with the particular project. For this analysis, I focus on measures of country-level 
political and regulatory risks that have been identified in the literature but also include a 
composite measure of macroeconomic risk in the model (the ICRG Index of economic 
risk). As we saw in the literature reviewed in the previous chapter, the government’s 
‘commitment’ not to renegotiate the terms of a contract or change regulatory 
arrangements ex post may influence the decision o f the firm to invest.
The government’s ability to demonstrate this commitment will be affected by the 
country’s institutions. This has been explored in empirical papers, which have used a 
variety o f indicators of institutional quality. Henisz and Zelner (Henisz and Zelner 
2001; Henisz 2002) use an index of political stability based on the number o f veto 
points in the political system and the degree o f political contestation (the ‘Political
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Constraints Index’) constructed specifically for the research. (Their choice o f dependent 
variable is discussed below).
The previous chapter also referred to a pair of papers in the economic growth literature 
are of particular interest here as they begin to break down the black box of ‘institutions’ 
into specific institutional attributes. Here, I provide more details on the data and 
identification strategies used by the authors. Acemoglu and Johnson (2003) identify the 
protection of property rights (those institutions that protect private parties from 
expropriation by government) as being significant for economic growth, private 
investment and financial development, while contracting institutions (institutions that 
enable private parties to contract with each other) were not significant. The authors use 
Political Risk Services’ assessment of the risk of government expropriation in a country, 
and Polity IV’s indicator o f executive constraints as indicators of property rights 
institutions, and an indicator of legal formalism as an indicator for contracting 
institutions as a proxy for the measurement of costs o f enforcing private contracts. They 
then employ an instrumental variables strategy to test the effects on economic 
outcomes.
Second, Rigobon and Rodrik find that the rule of law has a significant impact on 
economic performance, using an ‘Identification through heteroskedasticity’ strategy to 
examine the relationships between four endogenous variables: democracy, rule o f law, 
openness and income. The authors find that rule of law and democracy both have a 
positive effect on income but that the magnitude of the rule of law effect is much larger. 
The authors use the World Bank Governance Indicators ‘rule o f law’ index (Kaufmann, 
Kraay et al. 2005 ) as the rule of law indicator; democracy is measured with the Polity 
index and the executive constraints index from Polity IV that Acemoglu and Johnson 
use as an indicator of rule of law.
The review of the literature in Chapter 2 also noted the significance o f the sector 
regulator variable in some empirical studies in interaction with other institutional 
characteristics in relation to central bank independence and renegotiation o f concession 
contracts respectively (Keefer and Stasavage 2000; Guasch, Laffont et al. 2003; 2006). 
The work on renegotiation is discussed in more depth in the following chapter.
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The literature demonstrates links between institutions and economic outcomes which 
suggest a promising avenue for research on the determinants of PSP projects. I include a 
selection of institutional variables in the analysis which have been found significant in 
existing studies.
It would be interesting to consider how these contract specific characteristics affect the 
propensity of the parties to engage in PSP, either on their own or as interaction terms 
with institutional variables, but limitations in the data and difficulties created by 
endogeneity mean that the effects o f sector-level characteristics are not tested here. 
However, I include an indicator of political stability in the regression to test whether 
this has an independent effect.
Empirical analysis of the impact o f institutions raises the problem of endogeneity 
because private investment could be driving regulatory reform. Saleth and Dinar (2004) 
emphasise these feedback effects between institutions and outcomes in their work on the 
water sector. The water sector seems particularly susceptible to this error as PSP has 
frequently preceded sectoral restructuring legislation. In these circumstances, the private 
partner may exert a direct influence on the kind of regulatory regime created and the 
nature and powers of any regulatory agencies created. Indeed, the regulator may be 
created at the behest of the private partner as a condition for their involvement. It is not 
possible therefore to maintain the assumption that causation runs exclusively from the 
regulatory arrangements to the level of private investment. To deal with the problem of 
endogeneity, I use institutional variables that are not affected by private investment in 
the water sector. I choose institutional variables that are sufficiently general, such as the 
‘rule of law’, that I can be confident that the direction of causation runs from the 
institutions to outcomes in the water sector. Thus it is possible to isolate the effect of 
institutions on private investment.
From the government’s point of view, there will be other relevant determinants to 
consider. A common theme, echoed in many case studies, is strained public finances. 
Infrastructure investment tends to be cut more severely and sooner when governments 
are undertaking programmes of fiscal retrenchment than other types o f expenditure 
(Calderon, Easterly et al. 2003). In their review of the Latin American experience with 
economic stabilisation programmes, Easterly and Serven show that governments expect 
privatisation to improve the fiscal balance by: generating revenues in the short-term
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through asset sales; reducing government expenditure on operating and capital 
expenditures; raising tax revenues (Calderon, Easterly et al. 2003). This view is also 
backed up by case studies (Menard and Clarke 2000a, and others).
In the water sector, divestitures are comparatively rare and most governments do not 
expect to generate funds from this. Exceptions to this pattern are Chile and China 
(WATSUP Database). Generally, the impact on the public finances will instead be felt 
through the reduced burden on the government to fund operating or capital expenditure 
requirements for the sector. Where the municipality takes the decision to engage in PSP, 
it will be motivated by the state of municipal financing. Here, there will be a trade-off 
for the municipality between profits earned by the water utility and reduced long-term 
investment obligations, or a cash injection from the sale of assets.39 Autonomous, self- 
financing utilities may consider privatisation if their financial position deteriorates so 
they can no longer borrow in the financial market (see Alcazar, Xu et al. 2000 on Lima, 
Peru).
Case studies and reviews point to the active role that the World Bank has historically 
played in promoting PSP.40 For example, in Guinea, a loan for a capital investment 
programme was conditional on the involvement of the private sector in management of 
the utility (Clarke, Menard et al. 2000: 7-8). In Cote d’Ivoire, water sector reform was 
part of the country’s Structural Adjustment Program (Menard and Clarke 2000) and in 
Lima, PSP was considered (although finally rejected) in the course o f negotiations with 
the Bank for a project loan (Alcazar, Xu et al. 2000: 6, 4 5 )41. In Argentina, the role of 
the World Bank came after the initiation of the privatisation process, but subsequently 
became a condition of a loan from the Bank (Hill and Abdala 1993: 13).
A review of World Bank and IMF loans shows that PSP or cost recovery conditions 
were included as conditions in water and sanitation loans in many countries. (Grusky
39 Dividend revenues are an important constituent o f  municipal financing in Indonesia, where municipalities take 
dividends from the water utility whether or not the utility is generating a profit. The political econom y o f  the 
Indonesian water sector is presented in the context o f  the Jakarta case study in Chapter 7. Selling assets to generate 
short-term revenues has been a common phenomenon in mainland China. This is discussed further in Chapter 8.
40 The World Bank’s position on PSP has been m odified. The Bank now  officially  recommends a ‘case by case’ 
approach. A  recent policy review states, “The fact that state ownership is flawed does not mean that privatization is 
appropriate for all infrastructure activities and all countries. Before state ownership is supplanted by another 
institutional setup, it is essential to assess the properties and requirements o f  the proposed alternative— taking into 
account the sector’s features (its underlying econom ic attributes and the technological conditions o f  its production) 
and the country’s econom ic, institutional, social, and political characteristics.” (K essides 2004)
41 In Lima, the loan was conditional on sector reform rather than PSP specifically and the loan went ahead despite 
plans for PSP being abandoned.
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2001, quoted in Lobina and Hall 2003: 34). Grusky also notes that in countries where 
IMF loan conditions include water privatization or cost recovery requirements, there are 
usually corresponding World Bank loan conditions for water projects which specify the 
details of sector restructuring. Further evidence for this influence is provided by my 
case studies.42
However, if we consider the decision of the government to engage in PSP, we should 
not assume that governments choose to reform the sector directly as a result o f poor 
coverage. In fact, it is common for the water sector to be stuck in a low-level 
equilibrium of low tariffs, low investment and low service quality (Savedoff and Spiller 
1999). Reform will be the result of a confluence of factors strengthening the interest 
groups in favour of reform (Estache 2005).
On the basis of this literature, the following key hypotheses emerge which will be tested 
using the WATSUP data:
HI: Private investors will be more likely to engage in PSP where institutions 
support government commitment to upholding contracts or implementing 
established regulatory rules. Institutions of possible significance are: the rule of 
law; contract enforcement, bureaucratic quality; political stability; corruption.
H2: Private water companies will be more likely to enter countries where there 
is a large market for services.
H3: Developing country governments will engage in PSP when implementing 
fiscal retrenchment.
H4: IFI involvement makes PSP more likely.
4.4 Data
4.4.1 The WATSUP Database
The data currently available on global private investments in the water sector has 
drawbacks for statistical analysis. The best existing source o f data was the World 
Bank’s PPI Database, but WATSUP captures a broader range of projects. The 
difference between the two is due to (1) inclusion of data on projects from private data 
sources; (2) better coverage of China in the WATSUP database. Chinese projects 
account for 52% of the total signed in 2004; (3) the inclusion of dual desalination and
42 Field research in Malaysia (Johor State) and Indonesia (Jakarta) revealed a common pattern: the water utility in 
each case received a loan from a donor or development bank to carry out service improvements w hich was linked to 
considering models for private sector participation in water service delivery.
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power projects in the WATSUP database, which make up 8% of projects recorded in 
2004 and (4) higher minimum investment cut-off for the World Bank database. Small 
projects accounts for 17% of the new contracts awarded in 2004 recorded in WATSUP. 
The exclusion of small projects might have little impact on the observation of PSP in 
the power or telecom sectors, smaller projects without international involvement 
constitute a significant proportion of projects in the water sector and small capital 
investments (below US$20m) often are enough to lead to significant changes in sector 
performance at the municipal level.
The limitations of the existing data prompted the development of a new dataset. The 
WATSUP PSP dataset covers both water and sanitation projects in lower and middle 
income countries for the period 1990-2005. The data has been collected from multiple 
sources and cross-checked.43 As previously noted, data collection on PSP in water is 
complicated by the municipal structure of the sector. As a result, information on PSP 
projects is not necessarily collected at the national level and multiple data sources need 
to be used to fill in the gaps. Data was collected on the extent and nature of private 
involvement, the origin o f private partners, investment volumes and contract type from 
public and private sources and confirmed where possible in interviews. This information 
was not available for all projects. Despite the distinctions that are often drawn between 
types o f divestitures, concessions, leases and management contracts, in practice these 
distinctions may often be blurred. For the purpose of this research, I classify the 
contracts into broad categories.44
A subset of the data, including only signed projects from a sample of 60 developing 
countries is used for the analysis. It contains 460 project observations in 45 countries 
and a group of 15 other developing countries where PSP has been considered or 
experimented with but where there are no active PSP projects in the water and sanitation 
sector. The countries included in the control group have all indicated a willingness to 
consider PSP in the water and sanitation sector, either by introducing a national policy 
to that effect or engaging in negotiations with one or more private investors for a project
43 The sources o f  data are: World Bank, Thomson Financial, Global Water Intelligence, Water Market China (Blanc- 
Brude and Jensen 2004), Water Market A sia (Blanc-Brude and Jensen, 2006) and numerous media and company 
releases. These data are cross-checked in interviews with operators, financiers, legal advisers and international 
institutions.
44 ‘BO T-type’ includes BROT, BOOT, ROT and DBO  contracts. Lease-type contracts include TOT and DBL. O&M  
type includes all contracts that do not require the private party to make any capital investment. See section 2 for a 
discussion o f  PSP contract acronyms and their limitations as proper econom ic concepts.
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in the sector. Countries in which PSP in the water sector is ruled out by policy or 
forbidden by law or policy are not included.45
4.4.2 The Dependent Variable
The dependent variable in the regression analysis is the count of PSP contracts agreed 
per country. This distinguishes this paper from others which employ either (a) 
investment volumes; or (b) sector outcomes as the dependent variable. Both of these 
offer certain advantages for use as the dependent variable, especially linearity, but I 
choose to use the count or projects because of several concerns, described here.
Firstly, there are concerns about the quality of the data available on private investment 
volumes in the water sector. A first problem arises in the way that the figures are 
collected. For divestitures, the recorded investment figures refer to the purchase price of 
equity. For concessions, the figures refer to the investment commitments made by the 
concessionaire under the contract. In the World Bank PPI Database, equity sales are 
recorded in the year of the transaction, while investment commitments for concessions 
are recorded in the year of financial closure, or in the year of the transaction, where the 
investments are phased and only if  this information is known. However, after the initial 
transaction, information on realised investments is often not made available publicly. 
Even where this information is known, it can be very difficult to verify. Where 
information is available, it seems that the actual level of investment by the private firm 
may not meet commitments made in the contract, by a wide margin. Additionally, a 
large proportion of PSP contracts in the water sector are renegotiated and it is common 
for the revised contract to include the rescheduling o f investment commitments (Guasch 
2004).46
Investment figures are only available for a subset of projects, dramatically reducing the 
sample size. These tend to be the largest transactions, those involving international 
investors, and divestitures rather than concessions, generating a biased sample of the 
population of water PSP contracts. For many projects, this information is considered 
confidential and is not announced publicly.
45 Uruguay introduced a constitutional amendment in 2004 to prevent private provision o f  water services. However, 
as this decision was made only at the end o f  the period that w e are considering (1990 and 2004), w e include Uruguay 
in the dataset.
46 Field interviews conducted in Manila and Jakarta further substantiate this point.
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Henisz and Zelner use service outcomes (the number of lines per capita) as the 
dependent variable in their analysis of the telecoms sector (Henisz and Zelner 2001). 
This approach allows the authors to deal with the problem of unproductive investments, 
but would not allow us to isolate the effect of institutional variables on private 
investment, rather than public investment. In the water sector, private sector 
involvement is often relatively recent, and covers only a small section of the population. 
We would therefore expect the relationship between the level of private sector 
involvement and infrastructure penetration to be weak and we do not pursue the use of 
outcomes as a dependent variable. Furthermore, insufficient data are available on the 
production volumes or population served by projects and those data available come 
from multiple sources and may be inconsistent and unreliable.
While reliable data on investment volumes (both public and private) or the number of 
users served by public or private would undeniably yield interesting results and allow 
for OLS-type regression analysis, this information does not exist on a reliable basis. 
Anecdotal evidence collected in Asia by the Authors indicates that concessionaires 
sometimes ignore how many people they are serving, while regulators ignore how much 
concessionaires have invested.
Thus, while the count of projects awarded does not reflect the importance of the private 
sector in providing water and sanitation services in a particular country, in the context 
of the present research, it will help explaining the decision of the government and the 
firm to engage in a partnership, what we have labelled “the handshake”.
A final remark is needed on the difference between signed and active projects. Looking 
at the data, a small number of projects have been officially terminated, yielding different 
figures for the number of contracts signed and the number of projects that are currently 
active. This does not, however, account for the many shades of grey between truly 
active projects and those that, once signed, have stalled, or are being renegotiated, 
arbitrated. In this chapter, I analyse only the number o f projects signed, on the grounds 
that the determinants of termination will be very different from the determinants that get 
firms or governments to engage in PSP in the first place. I then go on to investigate the 
implementation stages of concession contracts separately in the following chapter.
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4.4.3 The Independent Variables
A cross section o f independent variables (IV) for the sample o f 60 countries is used. 
Since the DV is the cumulative num ber o f PSP projects awarded over a 15-year period, 
mean values are used to build the cross-section o f IVs:
Table 4.2: Independent Variables and Indicators
IV
Market size
Macroeconomic risk 
Public finances 
1FI influence 
Institutions 
Rule o f  law
Contract enforcement
Government effectiveness 
Corruption 
Regulatory quality 
Political stability
Indicator
Population
GDP per capita
ICRG Economic Risk Index
Debt/ GNI
World Bank lending to the sector
World Bank Governance Indicators ‘rule o f law’
Polity IV ‘executive constraints’ indicator
Number o f  days to enforce a contract
ICRG investment profile index (average for 1989-2003)
World Bank Governance Indicators ‘government effectiveness’ 
World Bank Governance Indicators ‘control o f  corruption’ 
World Bank Governance Indicators ‘regulatory quality’
World Bank Governance Indicators ‘political stability’
Annex 4-C describes the variables and their sources in greater detail. While classic 
quantitative variables such as population or GDP per capita are available for 1990-2004, 
institutional and risk indices are not. Indeed, most o f  theses indices were created during
indicators often capture only one aspect o f the underlying institutional phenomenon that 
is of interest to the researcher. For example, data on the number o f days that it takes to 
enforce a contract can be used as an indicator of the quality of legal and judicial 
institutions. However, this is only one of several relevant features of those institutions. 
Others could include corruption or arbitrariness in the system, which may be more 
important from the investor’s point of view. Furthermore, objective indicators often do 
not capture the implementation of regulation or policy. On the other hand, perceptions 
indicators are subject to measurement error of a different kind: non-specificity and halo 
effects, where respondents’ answers are affected by the general level of prosperity in a 
country (Kaufmann, Kraay et al. 2005 ). For the purposes of this research, 1 employ 
indices which combine objective with perceptions indicators. I am nevertheless well 
aware of the difficulty of finding indicators that reflect adequately underlying 
institutional attributes.
The analysis is also restricted by the absence of reliable, comparable data on sector- 
level institutions. 47 Efforts are currently being made to put together data on regulatory 
institutions in the water sector (Estache and Goicoechea 2005; Foster 2005)48, but as yet 
there is not enough data to include this in the regression. The addition of sector-specific 
regulatory variables would be an interesting extension to the analysis, although it would 
pose challenges in dealing with endogeneity, as noted above.
4.5 The Model & Methodology
Market size, market risk, and public finance are assumed to have nonlinear relationship 
with the predicted mean of project count (i.e. the predicted occurrence of PSP contract 
signature49). I assume that these relationships are best described by the natural log 
function: beyond a certain threshold, the effect of the variable tends to wear off. For 
instance, I hypothesise that the ability to pay for service will partly determine the extent 
o f private sector involvement, but beyond a certain level of wealth, this is unlikely to 
make a difference.
The model to be tested is: Xj = a + pj Yj +02 R-i + p 3 Dj + B4 Fj + /? 5  Nj + e 
Where:
X = Number of PSP contracts signed in country i 
Y  = Market Size (Country GDP, GDP per capita)
47 The typical structure of the water sector was discussed in Chapter 2, where I noted that regulation is frequently 
contract-specific. Structural reform of the water sector and the establishment of national regulatory agencies is much 
rarer than in the telecoms and power sectors.
48 See Chapter 2 for a summary of Estache and Goicoechea’s findings.
49 See section 5 and annex D for a detailed explanation of count models and of the regression model used here.
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R = Market Risk (Country risk)
D = Public sector indebtedness 
F = IFI influence 
N = Institutions
Annex 4-A shows the correlation matrix for the variables used in the regression. It 
demonstrates that many of the institutional variables (mainly those drawn from the 
World Bank Governance indicators) are highly correlated. To avoid multicolinearity 
and loss of explanatory power, these colinear institutional variables are tested 
separately. This colinearity weakens the interpretative power of the individual 
institutional variables, compounding the measurement difficulties associated with 
institutional variables notes earlier. Any conclusions about the relative importance of 
different institutions must therefore be treated as tentative. However, the use of several 
different measures can be thought of as multiple robustness checks for the underlying 
relationship between institutions and the probability of a signing a PSP contract.
4.6 Count Outcome Regression
Count variables indicate the number of times an event has occurred, and the model 
estimates the probability of the event occurring a certain number o f times. The use of 
regression models for counts is relatively recent but has wide ranging applications in 
social sciences and, in this case, in investment decision analysis. Figure 4.5 describes 
the counts of signed water PSP contracts in my sample.
While the linear regression model has often been applied to count outcomes, this can 
result in inefficient, inconsistent, and biased estimates. Moreover, count distributions 
are rarely statistically normal. Even though there are situations in which the linear 
models provide reasonable results, findings can be more robust with models specifically 
designed for count outcomes.
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Figure 4.5: Frequency of W ATSUP PSP project counts
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The univariate Poisson distribution is the foundation of regression models for counts. 
The Poisson regression model (PRM) extends the Poisson distribution by allowing each 
observation to have a different value of //, the unique value of the mean and variance of 
the Poisson distribution. In practice the PRM rarely fits due to over-dispersion. That is, 
the model underestimates the amount o f dispersion in the outcome. The negative 
binomial regression model (NBRM) addresses the failure o f the PRM by adding a 
parameter a that reflects unobserved heterogeneity among observations.
The PRM and the NBRM have the same mean structure. That is, if the assumptions of 
the NBRM are correct, the expected rate for a given level of the independent variables 
will be the same in both models. However, the standard errors in the PRM will be 
biased downward, resulting in spuriously large z-values and spuriously small /7-values
results for all the models, in percentage change in expected project count for one 
standard deviation change in the independent variable.
Table 4.3: Estimation o f the NBRM model (i)
IV C oefficient SE
Population (In) 0.6401178 *** 0.161664
GDP per capita (In) 0.9059531 *** 0.2590604
Debt/GNI (In) 0.6422056 *** 0.3190996
ICRG Econom ic Risk Index (In) 3.126164 * 1.850731
Contract enforcem ent -0.0016892 ** 0.0007807
Polity Executive constraints 0.0320531 ** 0.0160026
W orld Bank lending 0.0010961 *** 0.0003794
Table 4.4: Results Summary
Percentage change in expected count for one standard deviation increase in IV
IV (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii)
Population 147.7**"' 151.6*** 134.4*** 152*** 171*** 171.6*** 156.4***
G DP per capita 150.4*** 118.2*** 100.5*** 109.2*** 92.5*** 130.6*** 129.9***
Debt/GNI 48.2*** 52.1** 55.3*** 50.9** 50.1** 50.4** 54**
Econom ic Risk Index 37.6* 33.9* 28.1 34.9* 45** 34.3* 32.4
Contract enforcem ent -32.3** -27.8* -23.6 -26.2 -28.3* -29.3* -29.1*
Executive constraints 3.3** 2.7 2.7 2.8* 2.6* 2.8 2.5
W orld Bank lending  
Rule o f Law
50*** 53.8***
30.2*
57*** 53.4*** 47.3*** 42.1*** 57.2***
Governm ent Effectiveness 
Control o f Corruption  
Regulatory Quality  
Political Stability  
ICRG Investm ent Profile 
Observed SD = 23.624
* * *  Significant a t 1%; ** significant a t 5%;  *  significant a t 10%
52. r
33.4*
54. r
22.2
15.2"
To take one example, the results should be read (looking at the first cell for the model 
(i)): an increase o f  one standard deviation o f the log o f  the population variable increases 
the expected mean o f  project signature count by 148% with 99% confidence. An 
increase o f  one SD in the am ount o f  W orld Bank lending increases expected project 
count by 50% with 99% confidence. Likewise, looking at model (ii), an increase o f  one 
SD o f the rule o f  law index (which corresponds, for example, to the difference between 
the scores o f  Angola and Argentina) increases the expected mean o f  projects agreed by 
30% with 90% confidence.
Overall, the results o f  the regression provide strong support for the hypotheses. The 
basic com ponents o f  demand for w ater services, the size o f  the population and its ability 
to pay (reflected in GDP per capita) are significant at the 1% and take the expected 
positive sign in all the models. The dimensions o f  these two effects on the num ber o f 
projects are comparable.
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Turning next to the factors which drive government demand for the involvement of the 
private sector, the level of indebtedness o f a country is significant in all the models, at 
the 1% or 5% level. The sign of the effect is positive, suggesting a mechanism of the 
following kind: governments of more highly indebted countries find it more difficult to 
access credit, putting pressure on the government to engage in fiscal stabilisation. 
Governments then reduce their investment expenditure on infrastructure and 
compensate for this reduction in infrastructure expenditure by seeking private financing 
for investment in the sector.
A second possible mechanism would be that countries with high levels of indebtedness 
are more likely to come under pressure from international financial institutions. 
However, the World Bank lending variable indicator remains significant in all the 
models, even when controlling for indebtedness. This suggests that the influence of the 
IFIs has a powerful effect even in countries that are not that heavily indebted.
A third mechanism linking debt to PSP is the effect on macroeconomic risk faced by 
investors. However, this risk effect should be captured by the ICRG Economic Risk 
variable. This indicator is designed to capture precisely the aspects of the 
macroeconomic environment of concern to investors, so it could be surprising that it 
does not show greater significance. The inclusion of the debt variable in the regression 
could explain why the significance of the economic risk variable is weak. An alternative 
explanation for the absence of significance of the risk variable is that project due 
diligence can be poor and some macro risks badly evaluated ex ante. This last point is 
supported by field interviews with practitioners and legal counsels (McCormack, 
Hartley).
The role of World Bank sector lending comes out as very significant in all the models, 
even when controlling for the country’s level of indebtedness. This provides strong 
empirical support for the view suggested by the case studies, that IFIs play an important 
role. This role could be exercised through one o f two channels: on the one hand, the 
involvement o f IFIs in a country may give investors more confidence in investing there; 
or IFIs may encourage governments to introduce PSP by linking it to access to 
concessionary finance. The significant relationship found here does not allow us to 
distinguish between these two effects.
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Turning to the institutional characteristics of countries, the significance of many of the 
indicators provides support for the hypothesis. The indicators that perform best are 
government effectiveness and regulatory quality. Contract enforcement and executive 
constraints are significant at 5% in model (i), but lose their significance in some of the 
other regressions. This suggests that some of the underlying institutional characteristics 
reflected in these indicators are being picked up by the multiple-component indices, like 
the World Bank Governance Indicators. Rule of law and the ICRG investment profile, 
which is an indicator of investor protection from enforcement, are less significant, 
which may be surprising given theoretical considerations and the significant 
relationships found in other empirical work. However, the variables are still significant 
at 10%, so the explanation may lie in the ‘hazy’ nature of institutional indicators. The 
rule of law indicator, which captures the quality of the judiciary, as emphasised by Levy 
and Spiller (1994), also captures aspects of the rule of law that are less directly relevant 
to investors in the infrastructure sector, like the costs of common and organised crime 
and the quality of the police. A similar argument for the dilution of the effect of the 
variable may be made for political stability, which does not appear as significant, as this 
indicator encompasses armed conflict and the risk o f terrorism as well as the more 
directly relevant aspects of stability such as frequent or violent regime change or the 
extent o f civil unrest. Unfortunately, it was not possible to test an interaction term 
between political stability and independent regulation because of constraints in the data. 
If the mechanism connecting political stability with investment outcomes is largely 
through the interaction with sector-specific institutions, this would account for the lack 
of significance of this indicator in these regressions.
As the World Bank governance indicators have the same format (see Annex 4-C), their 
effects are directly comparable. Government effectiveness and regulatory quality have 
the largest positive effects, followed by the control of corruption and then by the rule of 
law.
The very positive effect of the control of corruption can be surprising at first in a sector 
(construction) that is very prone to corruption and where competitive bidding has not 
always been the norm. This finding is however consistent with studies of the link 
between investment and corruption mentioned above.
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However, we must be cautious in interpreting the significance of the different 
institutional indicators. Some of the indicators exhibit multicolinearity, which suggests 
that the indicators are capturing some of the same underlying institutional attributes for 
which I do not have more direct indicators (See Correlation Matrix in Annex 4-A). In 
the absence of better indicators that would allow us to ‘unpack’ institutions, the key 
finding is that the institutional indicators as a group do appear as significant. In order to 
pursue the analysis of the impact of institutions on infrastructure investment flows, 
qualitative analysis would be a promising approach.
4.8 Conclusion
Quantitative research on private participation involvement in the water sector has been 
held back until now by limitations in the data. The poor quality of the data is in turn due 
to the relatively lower levels of investment in water and sanitation and the smaller 
average project size, compared to other infrastructure sectors. International data on 
infrastructure penetration and the operating and financial performance of water utilities 
that can be used for cross-country analysis is very limited because of the highly 
fragmented structure of the sector and the fact that many national governments do not 
collect information from municipal and regional providers.
The development of the WATSUP PSP database is a first step towards closing this gap. 
This new database includes well over twice the number of projects covered by the best 
existing source, the World Bank PPI Database. This information makes it possible to 
carry out a count regression model as a first analysis of the factors affecting the number 
of PSP contracts agreed for water and sanitation. In keeping with expectations, the size 
of the market and the level o f indebtedness of the government are linked with more 
PSP. Institutions emerge as significant in the regression, for a variety of different 
indicators. Institutions that reflect the effectiveness of the bureaucracy -  government 
effectiveness and regulatory quality -  emerge as more significant than more general 
institutional indicators like the rule of law. Contract enforcement and executive 
constraints, which should reflect the ability o f the government to demonstrate 
commitment, are also significant, giving support to the theory on commitment and 
investment. However, the indirect measures of institutional characteristics provided by 
the existing indicators do not allow us to identify precisely the underlying institutional 
attributes that are significant to PSP rates, or to capture the interactions between 
institutions that shape the overall environment for PSP. This points to the need for 
qualitative analysis to help identify these underlying attributes and the mechanisms
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through which they affect investment. This qualitative investigation is pursued in the 
following chapters.
This analysis of the determinants of water PSP has informed the methodology of the 
qualitative approach used in the following chapters, which seeks to identify relevant 
institutions and the patterns of interaction between these institutions for a sample of 
countries in Asia. The data collected on sector-specific institutions for these countries 
will also contribute to the broader effort of closing the data gaps that are currently 
pervasive in the water sector. The cases studied are all concession-type contracts, which 
involve both foreign and local investors, situated in different institutional settings, 
which makes it possible to compare the decisions of governments and firms in PSP 
contracts and to move towards a deeper understanding of what drives their behaviour 
over the life of the contract.
Given data limitations, it has so far been difficult to test hypotheses about the link 
between commitment and private investment suggested by the theory and by anecdotal 
evidence. Previous efforts to analyse this quantitatively were not able to separate out the 
impact of institutions on private investment and public investment. This chapter is a first 
step towards a more focused analysis of the role of institutions on PSP, which takes 
advantage of the count outcome regression approach to overcome limited availability of 
data for continuous variables, notably private investment. The specific characteristics of 
the sector, its political economy, the type of investors involved and the financing of PSP 
are all worthy of further exploration to better characterise private sector participation in 
the water sector.
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Annex 4-A : Correlation Matrix and Regression Results
Table 4.5: Correlation Matrix
P o p u la t io n  G D P p e r  ICRG  E c o  D ebt/G N I
(In) C a p ita  (In) R is k  (In) (In)
P o p u la tio n  (In) 1 .000
G D P  p e r C ap ita  (In) -0 .2 9 9 1.000
ICRG E co n o m ic  Risk 
(In)
-0.031 0 .5 3 7 1.000
D ebt/G N I (In) -0 .0 0 2 -0 .5 1 4 -0 .3 1 8 1 .000
R ule  of Law -0 .3 1 8 0 .6 3 9 0 .3 2 4 -0 .3 7 9
G o v ern m en t
E ffe c tiv e n e ss
-0 .1 9 7 0 .6 4 8 0 .4 1 8 -0 .411
Political Stability -0 .5 2 5 0 .6 3 3 0 .331 -0.271
Contro l o f C orruption -0 .3 3 2 0 .6 9 6 0.361 -0 .4 2 3
C o n trac t E n fo rcem en t 0 .1 5 8 0.021 -0 .1 2 4 0 .0 3 7
ICRG In v estm en t 
P rofile (In)
-0 .3 3 3 0.551 0 .3 2 3 -0 .4 2 9
Polity -0 .2 6 6 0 .3 1 3 0 .0 4 4 -0 .0 8 4
Political C o n s tra in ts -0 .0 8 8 0 .1 9 4 0 .0 2 9 -0 .0 6 7
W orld B ank  se c to r  
lending
0 .7 2 5 -0 .0 4 6 0 .0 9 2 -0.071
R u le  o f  
L aw
1.000
0 .9 4 7
0 .8 7 0
0 .9 4 5
-0 .249
0 .7 3 6
0 .3 6 7
0 .0 9 5
-0 .2 2 7
G ov .
E ffe c t iv e ­
n e s s
ICRG
P o litic a l C o n tro l  o f  C o n t r a c t  In v e s t  P o lity
S ta b il ity  C o r ru p tio n  E n f o rc e m e n t  P ro fi le  In d e x
(In)
P o litic a l
C o n s t r a in t
In d e x
1 .000
0 .8 0 3 1.000
0 .9 3 7 0 .8 0 5 1 .000
-0 .265 -0.191 -0 .2 4 6 1 .000
0 .6 9 6 0 .7 1 3 0.731 -0 .0 4 0 1 .0 0 0
0 .2 8 9 0 .3 8 2 0 .3 3 6 -0 .0 2 5 0 .3 3 5 1 .0 0 0
0 .0 8 4 0 .0 9 0 0 .0 3 9 0 .0 7 6 0 .1 2 6 0 .2 2 0
-0 .136 -0 .287 -0 .2 0 7 0 .1 5 8 -0 .2 5 6 -0 .1 5 4
1.000
-0 .1 9 0
W o rld
B a n k
le n d in g
1.000
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Table 4.6: Negative Binomial Count M odel for W ATSUP PSP in Developing Countries
V a r ia b le C o e f  ( r o b u s t  s e )  C o e f  ( r o b u s t  s e )
. . .  /
C o e f  ( ro b u s t  s e )
P o p u la tio n  (In)
G D P  p e r  ca p ita  (In) 
D ebt/G N I (In)
ICRG E co n o m ic  R isk Index  
(In)
C o n trac t e n fo rc e m e n t 
Polity E x ecu tiv e  c o n s tra in ts  
W orld B ank  lending  
R u le  o f  Law
G o v e rn m e n t E ffec tiv en ess  
Contro l of C orruption
0 .6 4 0 1 1 7 8  (0 .161664)**’
0 .9 0 5 9 5 3 1
(0.2590604)***
0 .6 4 2 2 0 5 6
(0.3190996)***
3 .1 2 6 1 6 4
(1 .850731)*
-0 .0 0 1 6 8 9 2
(0 .0007807)**
0 .0 3 2 0 5 3 1  (0 .0160026)*
0 .0 0 1 0 9 6 1
(0.0003794)***
0 .6 5 1 0 4 6 7
(0.1614632)***
0 .7 6 9 9 2 9 7
(0.2554892)***
0 .6 8 4 7 8 7 4  (0 .3145965)*
2 .8 58871
(1 .758522)*
-0 .0 0 1 4 0 9 2
(0 .0008783)*
0 .0 2 6 9 6 4 5
(0 .0 1 7 1 9 7 )
0 .0 0 1 1 6 4 8
(0.0003686)***
0 .4 2 2 9 4 0 4
(0 .2622483)*
0 .6 0 1 2 5 4 9  (0.158587)***
0 .6 8 6 5 0 0 3
(0.2313121)***
0 .7 1 8 7 2 1 5
(0.3151888)***
2 .4 2 2 1 8 9
(1 .6 1 2 6 7 1 )
-0 .0 0 1 1 6 5 5  (0 .0 0 0 8 8 6 2 )
0 .0 2 7 0 3 7 4
(0 .0158612)*
0 .0 0 1 2 2 0 9
(0.0003446)***
0 .6 8 5 1 3 2 6
(0.2284185)***
R eg u la to ry  Q uality
Political S tability
ICRG In v es tm en t Profile (In)
C o n s ta n t
O b se rv a tio n s
Log p s e u d o  likelihood ratio
P s e u d o -R 2
W ald  Chi s q u a re
-2 7 .8 2 2 8 5  (5.612792)*** -2 6 .1 9 5 5 6  (5 .342247)*
53
-113.61
0 .2 2 2 7
130.71**
53
-1 1 2 .5 9 1 0 6
0 .2 2 9 6
157.61***
E x p o su re  v ariab le: y e a rs  s in c e  first in fra stru ctu re  P S P  p ro jec t 
*** Significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%
-2 3 .8 3 5 4 3  (4.963354)*** 
53
-1 1 1 .3 2 3 5
0 .2 3 8 3
194.74***
C o e f  ( ro b u s t  s e )
0 .6 5 2 3 1 4 (0 .1 5 8 7 6 7 8 )* * *
0 .7288011
(0.2626125)***
0 .6 7 1 7 4 8 7  (0 .3088039)**
0 .9 3 1 3 1 6 7
(1 .67124)*
-0 .0013161  (0 .0 0 0 8 6 4 6 )
0 .0 2 7 9 3 4 5
(0 .0167588)*
0 .0 0 1 1 5 7 2
(0.0003623)***
0 .5 1 2 5 1 4 5  (0 .2498874)**
-2 6 .1 2 5 9 7  (5.228714)*** 
53
-1 1 2 .5 2 7 3 9
0 .2301
152.06***
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C o e f  ( r o b u s t  s e )  C o e f  ( ro b u s t  s e )
0 .7 0 3 5 5 6 5  0 .7 0 5 1 1 7 5
(0.1516604)*** (0.1582122)***
0 .6 4 6 2 5 8 6  0 .8 2 4 5 4 1 3
(0.2296129)*** (0.2636084)***
0 .6 6 3 1 9 9 6 (0 .2 9 6 5 9 1 1 )* *
3 .6 4 1 3 1 4
(1.688005)**
-0 .0 0 1 4 3 7 4
(0 .0007904)*
0 .0 2 5 4 2 7 8
(0 .0141415)*
0 .0 0 1 0 4 6 8
(0.0003462)***
0 .6 1 9 2 4 8 6
(0.1794388)***
-2 8 .5 9 6 9 3  (5.374369)*** 
53
-1 1 0 .7 8 1 0 9
0 .2 4 2
0 .6 6 6 3 8 5 3  (0.3034328)**
2 .8 8 8 2 0 9
(1 .720636)*
-0 .0 0 1 5 0 3 3
(0 .0008424)*
0 .0 2 7 6 6 1 6
(0 .0 1 8 0 5 0 8 )
0 .0 0 0 9 5 0 1
(0.0003612)***
0 .2 6 0 7 6 0 9
(0 .2 4 3 9 3 7 7 )
-2 7 07901
(5.24084)***
53
-1 1 2 .8 5 5 0 9
0 .2 2 7 8
C o e f  ( ro b u s t  s e )
0 .6 5 9 2 8 5 2
(0.1655563)***
0 .8 1 5 0 4 4 5
(0.2476036)***
0 .7 2 9 5 1 2 8  (0 .3 1 4 9 6 7 9 ) '
2 .9 8 8 8 8
(1 .8 7 1 3 5 4 )
-0 .0 0 1 5 7 7 7
(0 .0008475)*
0 .0 2 5 1 3 4 9
(0 .0 1 5 8 3 0 7 )
0 .0 0 1 2 1 5 7
(0.0003726)***
0 .1 4 1 0 8 8 8
(0 .0879054)*
-2 8 .5 1 3 9 9  (6 .072471)*
52
-1 1 2 .3 8 4 2 1
0 .2 2 7 2
LIC LMC UMC Latin America Africa Asia Eastern Europe
20 23 17 16 19 13 12
50 241 168 132 28 253 47
2.50 10.48 9.88 8.25 1.47 19.46 3.92
43 225 165 130 26 230 47
8 16 3 2 2 23 0
86% 93% 98% 98% 93% 91% 100%
16% 7% 2% 2% 7% 9% 0%
6, SD (outliers correction): 9.34
icipation -  460 Observations
LIC LMC UMC LatAm Africa Asia Eastern Europe
29 138 105 73 27 127 45
22 103 63 59 1 126 2
58% 57% 63% 55% 96% 50% 96%
430 Observations
LIC LMC UMC LatAm Africa Asia Eastern Europe
24 153 96 92 13 154 14
5 30 12 10 3 32 2
0 4 26 20 0 5 5
12 15 22 6 7 15 21
10 9 12 4 5 17 5
ution
V 2 |  . H H  S i H  a *
4 7 8 11 12 13 14 15 16 19 22 23 27 42 166
4 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
6.7 1.67 3.3 1.67 1.67 1.7 1.67 1.67 1.7 1.67 1.67 1.7 1.67 1.67 1.7
75 76.7 80 81.7 83.3 85 86.7 88.3 90 91.7 93.3 95 96.7 98.3 100
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s: W orld  B ank PP1 D atabase, T h o m so n  F in an c ia l, G lobal W ater 
iter M arket C hina. C ro ss-c h eck ed  th ro u g h  in te rv iew  w ith  p rac titio n e rs
inflation, bud g e t ba lance  and  cu rren t acco u n t ba lance . T h e  eco n o m ic  risk 
s p x ? p a g e = ic rg m e th o d s
:st reco rded  p riva te  in v estm en t in in fras tru c tu re  reco rd ed  in th e  d a tab ase
rives a score  o f  1. A first in v estm en t in 1990 receives  a sco re  o f  15._________
/e  co n fid en ce  in and ab ide  by  the  ru les o f  so c ie ty " . Inc ludes: in c id en ce  o f  
y o f  the  ju d ic ia ry , an d  the e n fo rceab ility  o f  co n trac ts . S co res  a re  n o rm alized
ivernance/govdata/_____________________________________________________
ov is ion , the  qua lity  o f  the  b u reau cracy , the  co m p e ten ce  o f  c iv il servan ts , 
n p o litica l p ressu res , and  the c red ib ility  o f  th e  g o v e rn m e n t’s c o m m itm en t to
ivernance/govdata/
it the g o v ern m en t in  p o w e r w ill be  d e stab iliz ed  o r  o v e rth ro w n  by  p ossib ly  
e lu d in g  d o m estic  v io len ce  an d  te rro rism . S co res  a re  n o rm a lize d  a ro u n d  0.
ivernance/govdata/_____________________________________________________
ned as “ the  ex erc ise  o f  pu b lic  p o w er fo r p riv a te  g a in .” Inc ludes  sm all-sca le  
tlized a ro u n d  0.
ivernance/govdata/_____________________________________________________
itract
ility , p ro fits  repa tria tion  and p ay m en ts  de lays. S co res range  from  0 -15 , w ith  
itm ent p ro file
spx?page=icrgm ethods_________________________________________________
■ o f  the c h ie f  execu tive . Index  ranges from  1-7 w ith  1 rep resen tin g  a po lity  
; on  the  actions  o f  the  e x ecu tiv e” an d  7 rep re sen tin g  a po lity  in w h ich  
ho rity  equal to o r g rea te r than  the  ex ecu tiv e  in m ost a reas  o f  a c tiv ity .” 
lity /index .h tm _______________________________________________________________
id  funds. U S$ m illions. See: W orld  B ank O E D  R eport 26443  (2003  )
Annex 4-D: Count Outcome Models
This Annex describes how count outcome models can serve the purpose of testing the 
determinants of the PSP projects identified in my database. It borrows heavily from 
Long and Freese (2001).
The Poisson Distribution
The univariate Poisson distribution is the foundation of regression models for counts. 
Let y  be a random variable indicating the number of times an event has occurred. If y  
has a Poisson distribution, then:
Pr(y | p) = (e-/i * py) / y\ fory  = 0, 1, 2, . . . (1)
where /v > 0 is the sole parameter defining the distribution
p  is the mean of the Poisson distribution, p  is also the variance. Thus, Var(y) = //, which 
is known as equidispersion. With most datasets, many count variables have a variance 
greater than their mean, which is called overdispersion. As p  increases, the probability 
of a zero count decreases. Thus, for many count variables, there will be observed zeros 
than predicted by the Poisson distribution.
The Poisson Regression Model
The Poisson regression model (PRM) extends the Poisson distribution by allowing each 
observation to have a different value of p. More formally, the PRM assumes that the 
observed count for observation i is drawn from a Poisson distribution with mean pt, 
where //, is estimated from observed characteristics. This is sometimes referred to as 
incorporating observed heterogeneity, and leads to the structural equation:
Pi = E(yi | X ,)  = exp(XjJT) (2)
Using the exponential of xfi forces p  to be positive; this is necessary since counts can 
only be zero or positive. For each value of p, the distribution around the mean 
represents the probability of each count. Interpretation of the model involves assessing 
how changes in the independent variables affect the conditional mean and the 
probabilities o f various counts.
Exposure time
In my sample, not all countries introduce PSP in the water sector at the same time. 
Statistically, different observations will have different exposure times i.e. each 
observation is ‘at risk’ of having a positive count for a different amount o f time. In my 
example, each country will have been ‘at risk’ of having a positive count of private 
project for as long as a country’s legal framework allows private participation in the 
water sector. Before that date the probability of counting zero projects is by definition 
equal to unity, and the probability to count more than zero projects is nil.
I create an exposure variable (FIRSTPSP) which measures the number o f years since 
the first private infrastructure project (not just in the water sector) was signed in country 
i. For most countries this signals the beginning o f reform of public utilities and the point 
after which a private water project becomes possible. The data for FIRSTPSP is drawn 
from the World Bank’s PPI database.
Exposure times can be incorporated quite simply into count models. Let /, be the amount 
of time that observation i is at risk. If the rate (i.e., the expected number o f observations 
for a single unit o f time) for that case is //„ then we would expect U *p,- to be the
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expected count over a period of length /,. Then, assuming only two independent 
variables for simplicity, the count equation becomes:
//, * tj = [exp(/?0 + P\x\ + Pix2)] x U (3)
Since t = exp (In /) we have //, * /,• = exp(/?o + P\X\ + P2X2 + In/,)
This shows that the effect of different exposure times can be included as the log o f the
exposure time with a regression coefficient constrained to equal unity.
The Negative Binomial Regression Model
I now address over-dispersion in the sample. The PRM accounts for observed 
heterogeneity (i.e., observed differences among sample members) by specifying the rate 
/v, as a function of observed x*’s. In practice the PRM rarely fits due to over­
dispersion50. That is, the model underestimates the amount of dispersion in the outcome. 
The negative binomial regression model (NBRM) addresses the failure of the PRM by 
adding a parameter a that reflects unobserved heterogeneity among observations. For 
example, with three independent variables, the PRM is:
//, = exp(/?0 + P ]*,, + p 2Xi2  + PyXjz) (4)
The NBRM adds an error e that is assumed to be uncorrelated with the x ’s,
jjj = exp(/?0 + p\xn + p2xn + PiXi3 + eft 
= expipo +P\Xj] + p 2x ,2 +/?3*/3) exp(e,)
= exp(/?0 +P\Xj\ + p2x,2 + P^ Xiz) Sj
where the second step follows by basic algebra, and the last step simply defines S = exp 
(s). To identify the model, I assume that E (3) = 1 which corresponds to the assumption 
E{e) = 0 in the PRM. With this assumption, it is easy to show that:
E (ju) = iiE (S) = fj
Thus, the PRM and the NBRM have the same mean structure. That is, if  the 
assumptions of the NBRM are correct, the expected rate for a given level of the 
independent variables will be the same in both models. However, the standard errors in 
the PRM will be biased downward, resulting in spuriously large z-values and spuriously 
small ^ -values (Cameron and Trivedi 1998).
The distribution of observations given both the values of the x ’s and S is still Poisson in 
the NBRM. That is,
Pr(y,1 X,-, Si) = (e-/" * f/' j) / y,! (5)
Since S is unknown, I cannot compute Pr (y \ x). This is resolved by assuming that S is 
drawn from a gamma distribution (see Long (1997: 231-232) or Cameron and Trivedi 
(1998:70-79) for details). Then I can compute Pr (y \ x) as a weighted combination of Pr
50 Using STATA 8.2 SE, I fit the Poisson regression for our basic model. As with most Poisson regressions applied 
to real-world data, we find a poor fit. Various measures of pseudo and adjusted R-squared are suspiciously high and 
the Chi-Square test for the goodness of fit of the regression forces us to reject the null hypothesis that our distribution 
is a Poisson distribution. The bad fit of the PRM is not a surprise since the standard deviation o f our distribution is 
about three times the mean. This is partly due to the very high number of PSP projects in China. Even after for 
correcting for outliers (China), the SD of the distribution (9.34) is still almost twice the mean (5.6) -  See Annex B 
for detailed descriptive statistics.
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{y | x, S) for all values of S, where the weights are determined by Pr (S). This leads to 
the negative binomial distribution:
Pr (y | x) = [T(y + a~')/yl * T (o f1)] * [of1 / (c f1 + /j)]a~1 * [ p / ( a - 1 + ju)f 
where T is the gamma function. (6)
The larger value of a, the greater spread in the data; indeed, if  a = 0, the NBRM reduces 
to the PRM, which turns out to be the key to testing for over-dispersion.
I estimate the basic model (without the institutional variables) with the NBRM using 
STATA 8.2.
Negative binomial regression Number of obs = 56
LR chi2(5) = 62.83
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
Log likelihood = -122.88584 Pseudo R2 = 0.2036
PSPSIGNED | Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval]
 +-------------------------------------------------------------------------
LOGPOPMEAN| .5880215 .1261757 4.66 0.000 .3407216 .8353213
LOGGDPCAPM-N | .9950203 .2148994 4.63 0.000 .5738251 1.416215
LOGICRGECO | 3.25384 1.808789 1.80 0.072 -.2913212 6.799002
COVERAGEGAP| .0000794 .0000312 2.54 0.011 .0000181 .0001406
LOGBDEBTGNI | .5546001 .3261312 1.70 0.089 -.0846054 1.193806
_cons | -28.54979 6.39603 -4.46 0.000 -41.08578 -16.01381
FIRSTPPP | (exposure)
--------------+_
/Inalpha | 
_________ +_
-.8124094 .3793467 -1.555915 -.0689036
alpha | .4437875 .1683493 .2109962 .9334167
Likelihood-ratio test of alpha=0: chibar2(01) = 36.43 Prob>=chibar2 = 0.000 
M easures of Fit for nbreg of PSPSIGNED
Log-Lik Intercept Only: -154.302 Log-Lik Full Model: -122.886
D(49): 245.772 LR(5): 62.833
Prob > LR: 0.000
McFadden's R2: 0.204 McFadden's Adj R2: 0.158
Maximum Likelihood R2: 0.674 Cragg & Uhler's R2: 0.677
AIC: 4.639 AIC*n: 259.772
BIC: 48.529 BIC': -42.706
Figure 4.6: Observed and Predicted Frequencies o f  PSP Counts
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The LR test for HO: alpha = 0 is highly significant and I can reject the null hypothesis 
and conclude that there is significant evidence o f over-dispersion. From this and the 
Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) we can see that the NBRM  is to be preferred to 
the PRM.
Figure 4.6 plots the observed and predicted frequencies using the NBRM -fitted model. 
We can see that the model fits the data correctly even though it tends to slightly over 
estimate the number o f zeros51. Having determined that the NBRM  fits my data best, 
this can be used to test the different versions o f  the model.
51 T h e  PR M  fitted  w ith  th e  sam e  d a ta  tends to  u n d erestim ate  zero  coun ts.
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5 Government & Firm Behaviour Under Public-Private Contracts: An 
Analytical Framework
5.1 Introduction
This chapter takes forward the analysis of the interaction between contracts and 
institutions with the development of a theoretical framework for the analysis of contract 
implementation. This implementation phase encompasses contract compliance, 
renegotiation and -  in some cases -  termination. The framework specifically addresses 
situations, like those to be found in many developing countries, in which both contracts 
and institutions are incomplete.
Contractual incompleteness takes two familiar forms: it may be deliberately built into 
the contract in the form of a periodic review or rate rebasing process, which allows the 
parties to take account of new information following a contractually specified 
procedure, or it may be the result of shocks that require a contract adjustment to restore 
the balance of pay-offs between the parties or the financial viability of the arrangement. 
Institutional incompleteness, meanwhile, takes a plethora o f forms, many of which are 
likely to be worse in developing countries. Theoretical work on this topic has tended to 
focus on the two extreme cases of perfect contract enforcement and no contract 
enforcement. The reality is likely to be somewhere in between. In this chapter, I 
consider how these two types of incompleteness might interact, and ask, What are the 
consequences of institutional incompleteness for deliberate contractual incompleteness, 
and on the ability to adjust the contract after a shock?
One relevant aspect of the institutional environment is the relationship between different 
public sector actors, and the degree to which they constrain each other’s discretionary 
powers. The ‘separation of powers’ is a feature of many forms of government, and is 
associated with more complete institutional environments. In addition to the division of 
powers between the executive, legislative, bureaucratic and judicial branches of 
government, sector regulatory agencies add another layer of complexity to institutional 
arrangements. This raises several questions: Do these multiple principal environments 
imply that the contract is more likely to be enforced, or are there potential disadvantages 
to the division of powers between the different bodies? If a new regulatory agency is 
created to monitor and implement the contract, does this make institutions more 
complete, and the contract more likely to be enforced?
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In the first section of this chapter, I consider why contract adjustments or renegotiations 
occur, and why they might be a problem. Second, I review the empirical literature 
linking institutional attributes to contract implementation. The work of Guasch, Laffont 
and Straub on renegotiations provides the basis for this discussion. The third section 
brings together these elements in the analytical framework, while the concluding section 
presents the hypotheses that emerge.
The framework presented here is used to analyse the case studies in the following two 
chapters. It is not intended to explain all aspects o f the complex interaction between 
governments and firms, but instead provides a lens through which to consider the 
complex events recounted in the case studies.
5.2 Time Inconsistency in Concession Contracts
Chapter 3 introduced the puzzle of time inconsistency in long-term contracts and its 
effects on the incentives of the contracting parties. In the practical context of a 
concession contract, the story might go like this: the Government and Firm agree a 
contract under which the Government commits to raise tariffs and the Firm commits to 
carry out a capital investment programme. In the long-run, both parties would expect 
positive returns from the contract; the Government benefits from increased political 
support as a result of better service quality and higher coverage, and the Firm gains a 
stream of returns on its investment. But in the short-term, it is costly for both parties to 
implement, as tariff increases are unpopular and reduce the political support of the 
Government, and the investment programme increases the Firm’s liabilities. Figure 5.1 
below shows a typical distribution of pay-offs to the parties over time. Figure 5.2 shows 
an empirical example of planned returns to the Manila concessionaire, which follows 
the J-curve. Unfortunately, no simple indicator o f pay-offs to government is available 
for comparison.
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Figure 5.1: Returns to Finn & Government under a Concession Contract
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In an incomplete institutional environment, renegotiation will usually be possible, 
though not costless. Bearing this in mind, the parties engage in strategic behaviour to 
reduce their exposure to renegotiation: the firm will invest less than it would under a 
complete contracting case to avoid ‘government hold-up’ or opportunism, and the 
government will allow fewer tariff increases to reduce its exposure to ‘firm hold-up’.
Government hold-up is referred to both in the empirical literature (Levy and Spiller 
1996) and in the theoretical literature (Hart 1995; Levine, Stem et al. 2005). It occurs 
when firms make long-term investments in sunk assets (assets with no alternative uses). 
When the private firm has carried out its capital investment, the government forces the 
firm to renegotiate the contract, reducing the revenue stream to the firm. As long as the 
firm can cover its operating costs, it will minimise losses by continuing to operate the 
service and the government can extract the firm ’s rents. The rational expectation o f 
hold-up by the government will lead the firm to decrease its relationship-specific capital 
investment and lower total benefits from the contract (Hart 1995). This foregone 
investment is difficult to demonstrate empirically; Levy and Spiller (1996) find some 
evidence in support o f  this for the telecoms sector, but it is not conclusive.
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An alternative scenario is firm hold-up. This fits with a perception of powerful 
companies negotiating with inexperienced governments. In this scenario, the 
government stages a tender and awards a long-term contract to a company. Before 
carrying out any capital investment, the firm then forces the government to renegotiate 
the contract to make the terms more preferential to the firm. The renegotiation could 
involve reducing the size of the concession fee payable to the government by the firm, 
increasing the tariff or reducing the investment obligations of the firm. Any of these 
would increase the firm’s revenue stream over the life of the project. Governments 
agree to this because of the high transactions cost o f terminating and then rebidding the 
contract. In the expectation that the firm might try to secure a preferential adjustment to 
the contract, we government might delay tariff increases until after investments have 
been sunk.
Linked to this type of renegotiation is the phenomenon of ‘dive-bidding’ or ‘low ball 
bidding’ in weak institutional environments when a firm deliberately puts in a bid that is 
not financially viable for the firm, in the expectation that the contract can be 
renegotiated after it has been awarded. Evidence of this phenomenon is provided by 
Guasch (2004: 36) and is found in the Manila case study in Chapter 6.
Common to these two stories is the idea that the party with most to lose from contract 
termination is in a weak bargaining position and is vulnerable to opportunism from the 
other party. This is consistent with the theoretical literature on non-cooperative 
bargaining theory (Rubinstein 1982). Which party has the most to lose will depend on 
the specific attributes of the contract and the resulting distribution of pay-offs.
Not all contract adjustments are opportunistic, o f course. The literature distinguishes the 
rent-redistributing negotiations discussed above from welfare-enhancing renegotiations. 
(Guasch, Laffont et al. 2003; 2006). The latter occur after shocks or when new 
information becomes available that is relevant to the implementation of the contract. 
They adjust the terms o f the contract with the mutual agreement of the parties, 
according to common principles, to set a new combination of tariffs and capital 
investment that delivers higher overall welfare.
Contracting parties will use a variety of mechanisms to allow contract adjustments 
while restricting the scope for opportunism. As we saw in Chapter 3, these mechanisms 
may be defined either in the contract or in statute and may include:
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• Assigning responsibility for tariff review to an autonomous agency;
• Defined procedures for review tariffs;
• Procedures to challenge the decision of the regulator;
• Principles to set the appropriate return on capital;
• Principles to assess the efficiency of the firm’s operating and maintenance costs;
• Principles to set the level of capital expenditure.
However well defined, these mechanisms will almost certainly be difficult to implement 
in practice, even in well established regulatory regimes and there will always be scope 
for interpretation and dispute.
5.3 Renegotiation: Empirical Evidence
Empirical research on the link between institutions and contract implementation has 
focused on formal renegotiations. Guasch (2004) defines his focus thus:
Renegotiation occurs when the original contract and financial impact o f a 
concession contract is significantly altered and such changes were not the result of 
contingencies spelled out in the contract. For example, stated and standard tariff 
adjustments resulting from inflation or other stated drivers do not count as 
renegotiation. Nor do periodic tariff reviews stipulated in a contract, or 
contingencies (such as significant devaluations) in a contract that induce tariff 
changes. Only when substantial departures from the original contract occurred and 
the contract is amended can one say that a renegotiation took place. (Guasch 2004: 
34)
For the purposes of quantitative analysis, it is evident that a clear-cut definition is 
necessary. However, incomplete contracts are a complex and more pervasive 
phenomenon than this definition takes account of. Looking first at the phrase, “not the 
result of contingencies spelled out in the contract,” we can see that it is not always 
possible to separate out modifications that are provided for in the contract from those 
that are not. During a periodic price review, the concession’s financial and operating 
plans may be substantially revised, including the level and timing of investment and 
performance targets. These reviews may be mandated by the contract, but the revised 
plans can be very different from those agreed at the bidding stage and may involve 
significant shifts of rents between the parties.
A further area of ambiguity arises in situations in which both parties fail to comply with 
the contract but neither party seeks to enforce the contract. In an incomplete institutional 
environment, no external parties will be able to enforce the contract. This kind of 
‘informal’ renegotiation results in the same strategic behaviour by the parties as the 
possibility o f formal renegotiation.
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In the analytical framework developed here, I therefore consider a broader category of 
cases:
“A contract is considered to have been renegotiated if there is any significant 
departure from the terms of the original contract. These changes may be formally 
agreed in a renegotiated contract or amendment, a major modification agreed in the 
context of a periodic comprehensive review, or ‘informal’ in the sense that they 
result from extensive non-compliance with non-enforcement of contractual terms.”
Despite the restrictive definition of renegotiation used, Guasch, Laffont and Straub’s 
analysis of firm-led negotiations (2003, henceforth GLS 2003) and government-led 
renegotiation (2006, henceforth GLS 2006) provides the best current evidence on
52contract incompleteness, and the relationship with institutions.
Before discussing their results, it is worth mentioning briefly some limitations. In their 
data, it is not possible to distinguish in the data between opportunistic and other 
negotiations. Furthermore, as the analysis only covers a subset of the renegotiations that 
concessions undergo, the overall balance between government- and firm-led 
renegotiations might be different. For example, governments may be more likely to use 
the context of a periodic review to reduce the firm’s rents and increase its own. On the 
other hand, firms might be better at disguising their failure to comply with the contract.
A further caveat with these data is that they are drawn from a sample of five Latin 
American countries. It is not implausible to suggest that the Latin American experience 
with concessions has been qualitatively different from other developing regions. PSP 
began earlier in Latin America than in other regions, in the context of severe fiscal 
constraints, (Calderon, Easterly et al. 2003) and against the background of a particular 
set o f political and economic institutions. In Asia, on the other hand, PSP took place in a 
period of high growth, in many cases in the context o f a government-led development 
strategy. This could lead us to expect a higher rate of government-led renegotiation in 
Asia than in Latin America, for example. Care should therefore be taken before 
extrapolating the GLS results to other regions.
GLS use this data to test a selection o f institutional indicators as determinants o f both 
types of renegotiation and find strong evidence to support the contention that
52 The studies carry out Probit analysis for panel data o f  307 water and transport concessions in five Latin 
American countries from 1989-2000. They test the impact o f  macroeconomic variables, institutional 
indicators and contract-specific variable on the likelihood o f  renegotiation. Institutional indices 
(bureaucracy quality, corruption, rule o f  law) are taken from the International Country Risk Guide 
(Political Risk Services).
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institutions are relevant. In particular, they find that bureaucratic quality and corruption 
are significant determinants of the likelihood of both government- and firm-led 
negotiations, and the occurrence of national elections is significant for government-led 
renegotiations, but not for firm-led renegotiations.53 They find that a less corrupt 
environment is associated with more government-led renegotiation.
What are the mechanisms behind the relationships that GLS demonstrate?
Bureaucratic Quality. Measures of bureaucratic quality reflect the ability of the 
bureaucracy to govern without drastic changes in policy or interruptions in government 
services, despite changes in the political leadership. High bureaucratic quality also 
implies that the bureaucracy is more autonomous from political interference and that 
officials develop expertise in policy areas. A strong bureaucracy is clearly important to 
provide consistency in the implementation o f long-term contracts, as the political 
leadership is likely to change several times over the life of the contract. The capacity of 
civil servants to implement their functions is also important: in a concession contract, 
the regulator will need to resolve the complex technical issues involved in setting tariffs 
and capital investment plans. This requires adequate access to information and the 
ability to analyse this information. Without this, the contracting parties will not have 
confidence in the implementation of the contract and will be more likely to engage in 
strategic bargaining. Institutions outside the bureaucracy, like accountancy standards, 
auditing procedures, corporate governance regulation and financial reporting 
requirements will all support the ability of the bureaucracy to implement the contract by 
improving transparency and reducing information asymmetries.
Corruption, “the exercise of public power for private gain,” may be linked to the 
implementation of contracts through several channels. On the one hand, small-scale 
bribes and demands for side-payments create distortions in the operating environment 
and impose extra costs on the concessionaire. A greater concern for the implementation 
of long-term contracts is corruption within the political and judicial system that leads to 
the biased implementation of laws and regulations. This weakens the parties’ confidence 
in the enforcement of the contract and thus gives rise to more strategic behaviour. 
Another serious concern is that contracts awarded or implemented in a corrupt way will 
be vulnerable to further corrupt demands from a new government and challenges to the
33 The two studies use panel data for 307 water and transport concessions in 5 countries from 1989-2000. 
The authors run a Probit model o f  the probability o f  renegotiation with: s.
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legitimacy of the contract by a new government or by the public. In highly corrupt 
institutional environments, private firms will be vulnerable to popular backlash and 
political instability. Corruption has been associated with privatisation programmes in 
the eye of the public in many countries, even though it has been widely argued that 
privatisation should reduce the scope for corruption (Shleifer and Vishny 1993; 
Kaufmann and Siegelbaum 1996). The public and media will be on the look out for 
suspicious deals that appear to favour private parties.
The Electoral Cycle. In the run-up to an election, politicians become more sensitive to 
public opinion and are likely to promise policies that will be popular in the short-term, 
even if  they are not beneficial or sustainable in the long-term. This is not just a feature 
of democracies -  populist autocrats also stage elections to boost the legitimacy of their 
rule. As a mass consumption good, water can easily become a political issue. We would 
expect politicians to intervene to suppress tariffs in the run up to an election, even if  this 
came at the expense of improvements in service quality in the medium-term. The degree 
to which this will affect private utility contracts will depend on the political salience of 
utility tariffs and service quality and on the level of political contestation. In turn, this 
will be affected by the proportion of average income spent on utility bills and the 
existence of alternative forms of provision. Utility tariffs are likely to come to the fore 
as a political issue in a period of macroeconomic crisis when household incomes fall 
and vulnerability rises.
Rule of law is not robustly significant across their specifications. GLS do not test the 
quality of the judicial system in contractual commitment, although this particular 
institutional attribute has been emphasised by many other authors. However, in the 
specific context of concession contracts, the parties can use independent international 
arbitration as a way of getting around the problems associated with local courts. 
Arbitration awards still have to be enforced locally, of course, but the use of 
international arbitration may reduce the significance of the judicial system in the 
implementation of contracts.
GLS also test contract attributes and sector-specific institutional variables, and 
demonstrate their significance.54 Here, they face an endogeneity problem in using
54 Competitive bidding has a negative and significant effect (after instrumentation only) on the likelihood 
o f  firm-led renegotiations and a positive and significant effect (with and without instrumentation) on 
government-led renegotiation. Price-cap regulatory incentives and minimum income guarantees are found
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contract attributes as explanatory variables, as these attributes are likely to be selected 
based on the characteristics of the contract. The authors employ an instrumentation 
strategy to overcome this.55
O f particular interest here is the test for a regulatory body (RB). They find that the 
existence of a RB at the time of concession award has a significant negative impact on 
the probability of firm-led renegotiation, but only before instrumentation. After 
instrumentation, the RB loses most of its significance, suggesting that the positive 
impact o f the regulator comes from its role in influencing the design and award of the 
contract. For government-led renegotiations, the existence of a regulatory body is not 
consistently significant and changes its sign in both basic and instrumented estimations. 
After instrumentation, the existence of the regulatory body is negative and significant in 
only one model.
These results fit with the case studies in which the RB is sidelined in contract 
renegotiations (for example, Aspiazu and Forcinito 2002 on the renegotiation of the 
Buenos Aires contract and the Manila case study described in Chapter 6). These results 
may also underestimate the impact of the regulatory body because the authors have 
tested only for its existence, and not for its effectiveness. A strong, autonomous 
regulator might have more of an effect on the implementation of the contract, but this is 
difficult to test for given insufficient data.
In order to investigate the relationship between contracts and institutional characteristics 
further, they also test the following interaction terms and find them all to be significant:
• Existence of a regulatory body and corruption;
• Elections and corruption;
• Elections and bureaucratic quality.
This suggests that the existence of the RB plays a particularly important role in weak 
institutional environments and, as we would expect, that the effects of the political cycle 
will be exacerbated in these weak institutional environments. The other results are 
consistent with the explanation of the mechanisms described above, with both lower
to be a positive and significant determinant o f  renegotiation for both firm-led and government-led; and 
investment requirements are found to be significant and positive for firm-led renegotiations only.
55 For each contract clause, the authors develop a set o f  two instruments that are correlated with the 
variables to be instrumented (regulation, the structure o f  financing, guarantees etc), while not being 
correlated with the unobserved factors (corruption, the operator’s strategic behaviour). GLS 2006: 18.
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levels of corruption and greater bureaucratic quality reducing the impact of 
politicisation.
Finally, and not surprisingly, GLS find that fluctuations in macroeconomic growth rates 
significantly affect the probability o f renegotiations, with recessions increasing it and 
booms decreasing it. However, they note that not all macroeconomic shocks lead to 
renegotiations.
5.4 Framework
The framework developed here draws on the work of Stigler (1971), Peltzman (1976) 
on government incentives, and Martimort (1999) which models multiple principals with 
competing powers and different objectives.
Basic Framework
To begin, we assume that there are just two players -  the Government and the Firm. The 
players have a discount rate 8 and an associated Hurdle Rate, Rg for the Government 
and Rf for the Firm. They will engage in a project when its expected pay-offs (R^g for 
the Government and Rcf for the Firm) equal or exceed this hurdle rate. They negotiate a 
contract (Contract 1) that provides for these pay-offs:
R cgi >  R g
ReFl > R f
Pay-offs, or returns, for the Government are both financial and political: on the financial 
side, the government receives concession fee payments from the firm; on the political 
side, the government benefits from increased popular support if  quality of service and 
coverage rise. Pay-offs for the Firm are equivalent to the stream o f financial returns on 
investment.
The discount rate and associated Hurdle Rate o f the Government is a function o f the 
length of time that the Government expects to remain in power. This, in turn, is affected 
by the electoral cycle, the nature of political institutions, and the degree of political 
competition.
The Hurdle Rate of the Firm is determined by its WACC (weighted average cost of 
capital) and its business strategy, which may become more or less risk averse over time.
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The contract between the parties specifies the return to the firm and an implied return to 
government (through contract provisions specifying the firm’s performance 
requirements and schedule of concession fees) and specifies the structure of these pay­
offs over the life of the contract. These would usually be negative in the initial period, 
as discussed above.
1. Adjustment of Incomplete Contracts with Uncertain Enforcement
The typical contract is explicitly incomplete. As contracts are long-term, new
information is expected to become available over the life of the contract and the contract 
allows for adjustments over time through a specified mechanism, periodic rate rebasing. 
At the rate rebasing, the contract specifies the principle for the regulator to re-set tariffs, 
investment and performance requirements so that the return to the firm is equal to ReF 
specified in the contract. The contract provisions are asymmetric in this respect, as Rg 
is not specified in the contract and there is no principle or mechanism to restore the 
government’s return over time.
Typical sources of contractual incompleteness include:
- Inaccurate information on the state of the distribution network at the time of 
transfer;
- Actual rates of demand growth different from those forecast;
- Fluctuations in inflation rates.
The first example might require the firm to make more capital investment than planned,
lowering its rate of return; the second might mean a lower stream of revenues, also 
lowering net returns.
In these examples, actual pay-offs under the original contract (Contract 1) are 
unchanged for the government, but lower than expected for the firm:
Rgi -  Rg, Rfi < Rf
After rate rebasing, the pay-offs fulfil the initial conditions and restore the return to the 
firm to the level specified in the contract. As a result, actual pay-offs for the government 
may be lower than expected under the original contract but are still above the 
government’s hurdle rate. These conditions can be summarised as:
Rgi > Rg2 — Rg 
Rfi = Rf2^ Rf
where Rgi is the pay-off under the original contract and Rg2 is the pay-off under the 
adjusted contract.
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The second form of contractual incompleteness to consider is exogenous shocks which 
reduce returns to one or both parties. The contract adjustment mechanism does not 
cover adjustments to the contract for shocks (shocks are, by definition, unforeseen). For 
example, a currency devaluation could raise the cost of concession fee payments 
denominated in foreign currency, while increasing the foreign debt service requirement 
of the government. In this example both government and firm are worse off:
Rgi < Eg, Rfi < Rf
Other shocks might affect only one of the parties, as in the case of a water resource 
shortage, which might affect the firm but not the government:
Rgi = E g, Rfi < Rf
There are three possible outcomes after a shock: the parties may renegotiate 
successfully; the parties may try to renegotiate but fail to come to agreement; or the 
original contract may be enforced.
The contract is enforced with probability pr (rc). This is a function of the quality of 
judicial institutions and the quality and transparency of auditing and accounting, and the 
existence of an independent and competent monitoring agency or agencies. The 
renegotiation will fail with probability pr (1- n) X, either because of effective 
enforcement or because the parties fail to come to an agreement (A.), which captures a 
combination of factors, including the size o f the shock and the negotiating ability o f the 
parties.
Neither of the parties wants the original contract to be enforced, but are not able to 
prevent autonomous institutions from trying to enforce it. The parties renegotiate in the 
spirit of the original contract so both parties now receive lower returns than originally 
expected but receive returns above their hurdle rates to deliver:
E g <  R g 2 <  R gi 
R f <  R f2 <- R fi
If the parties cannot agree a set o f contract requirements that meet these conditions, the 
renegotiation fails, and the parties decide whether or not to terminate. This might be the 
case if  the shock was severe or if the parties negotiate badly.
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Termination imposes a cost on the firm of -K  (sunk capital investment) and on the 
government of -H  (the transaction cost of finding an alternative operator for services 
and lost concession fees).
Termination will occur if  expected discounted returns to either party after the shock are 
lower than the loss from termination.
R gi < H, R fi <  K
If pr (71) is low, the parties may act strategically in the event o f a shock to seek to 
capture a larger share of the rents, while meeting the other party’s participation 
constraint.
If the participation constraints can be met, the outcomes of the renegotiation will be 
determined by the bargaining power o f the two parties, which in turn is related to the 
cost o f termination (H and K for the government and firm respectively). Where H and pr 
( 1 -  7 r )  are high, the firm will have more bargaining power in the renegotiation and is 
likely to be able to secure preferential renegotiation. Where K is high, the government is 
likely to be able to do so. Figure 5.3 illustrates this case in the form of a game tree.
Figure 5.3 C ontract Im plem entation A fter a Shock
Terminate (-H, -K)
Enforce
Shock
Renegotiation
su cceed s
Proceed (Rgi < Rg , R fi < R f)
Preferential to G 
(Rg2 >  R g , Rf2 < R f)
Preferential to F
Renegotiate H > K
H+K low Terminate (-H, -K)
Renegotiation
fails
Proceed (R gi < R g , R fi <  R f)
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2. Changes in Discount Rates
In addition to shocks that affect the stream of returns from the contract, shocks may 
occur that shift the discount rates of the parties. Shocks that shorten the life expectancy 
of the government, such as an increase in the likelihood of losing in an election, or, 
more dramatically, the transition from an autocratic to a democratic system of 
government, will raise Rg. Rf may rise as a result o f macroeconomic shocks, political 
shocks or changes in the firm’s global strategy, e.g. to reduce debt levels.
Say that a shock causes 5 and thus the hurdle rates of the parties to increase in period 2.
R gi <  R g2 
R fi <  R f2
Once again, if the contract is likely to be enforced (pr (7t) is high), the parties will decide 
whether or not to terminate depending on the cost of termination.
If renegotiation is possible, the parties will bargain over the new distribution of pay­
offs. Again, the party with the lowest cost of termination will be able to secure a 
preferential distribution, while meeting the participation constraint of the other party. 
Where the costs of termination for both parties are very high and balanced, parties will 
cooperate to agree a new set of pay-offs, under which returns from the contract are 
below their new hurdle rates but exceed their initial hurdle rates.
R g 2 <  R g 2 
R f2 <  R f2
This result violates the participation constrain of the parties and so it is not a long-term 
equilibrium. The parties will seek to maximise their short-term revenues from the 
contract and will terminate when H or K has declined. The Figure below illustrates this 
case.
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Figure 5.4 Contract Implementation With an Increase in Government’s Discount Rate
Terminate (-H, -K)
Enforce
Increase in 
Government 
discount rate
Renegotiate
Renegotiation
succeeds
Proceed (R gi < R g 2, R fi >  R f)
H > K (Rg2 <  Rg2, Rf2 >  R f)
(Rg2 > R g2i R f2 >  R f)
Preferential to G
Preferential to F
Terminate (-H, -K)
Pr(*)
Renegotiation
fails
H+K high Proceed (R gi < R g 2, R fi > R f)
3. Multi-party Games
An interesting extension to the framework is to waive the assumption that government 
is a unitary actor. In practice, multiple public sector actors will usually be involved in 
negotiation and implementation of concession contracts.
In the theoretical literature, multiple agencies with competing powers and different 
objectives improve the government’s ability to commit and reduce the likelihood of 
regulatory capture because it makes renegotiation harder (Martimort 1999).
Consider two government actors, the executive (denoted G) and the bureaucracy 
(denoted B) which may be the former public utility or government department or 
agency. One party values political pay-offs more highly, say, the executive, while the 
other values financial pay-offs more highly. The two parties also have different discount 
rates and different costs of termination. For example, the executive’s termination cost 
may be higher than that o f the public agency for reputational reasons (Hg > He) or the 
agency may be obliged to make a termination payment, in which case Hq < Hb.
The executive and public agency are independent, in the sense that they cannot force 
each other to agree to renegotiate or terminate the contract and the agreement o f both
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parties is needed either to renegotiate or to terminate. Both actors have veto power over 
any contractual amendments or termination. The parties are usually non-cooperative as 
their pay-off profiles are different.
When enforcement is perfect, the multi-party nature of government will have no impact 
on outcomes, although it may raise transactions costs.
When enforcement is imperfect, renegotiation can now be triggered by all three parties, 
G, B and F. Thus if political pay-offs change but financial pay-offs do not, renegotiation 
will be triggered, and vice versa. As contrary movements in these two types of pay-offs 
cannot balance each other out in the way that they can when the government is a single 
actor, renegotiation is more likely to be triggered.
However, it will also be more difficult to conclude renegotiation because both 
government parties will only agree to the new contract if  it delivers returns that exceed 
both their hurdle rates. Once again, there is no potential for balancing between political 
and financial pay-offs.
Is termination more likely when there are multiple government actors? Because the 
government parties have veto powers but not coercive powers, the party for whom the 
costs of termination are highest will prevent the termination. However, the parties may 
also not be able to agree an amended contract, leading to protracted renegotiations.
We can also consider the effect of adding a third principal, a contract monitoring body 
or regulatory body (RB). The RB has a special status with regard to the concession, as it 
has its legal basis in the contract and has a single defined objective, to monitor and 
implement that contract. Like the other government players, the RB has a distinct set of 
interests defined by the terms o f the contact: its pay-offs are reduced during 
renegotiations, when powers pass to the other two government actors, and a high 
termination cost, because its powers are based on the contract. The RB therefore has an 
incentive to encourage the other government parties to conclude renegotiations.
7. Hypotheses
The framework suggests several hypotheses for investigation in the case study chapters 
which follow.
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HI: If the parties cannot agree a mutually satisfactory renegotiation, but termination 
costs are high, the parties will seek to maximise short-term revenues from the contract 
and will terminate when the costs of doing so have declined.
H2: When the probability of enforcement is low, the party with the lower cost of 
termination secures preferential outcomes in both contractually mandated and shock- 
induced renegotiations.
H3: The involvement o f multiple government principals makes it more likely that 
renegotiation will be triggered, but less likely that renegotiation will be concluded or 
that the contract will be terminated.
H4: The existence of a contract-specific regulatory agency or contract monitoring 
agency will increase the probability o f concluding a renegotiation.
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6 Timing is Everything: The Implementation of the Manila Water 
Concessions
6.1 Introduction
This chapter describes the history Manila water concession contracts and analyses the 
hypotheses of the previous chapter in the light of this evidence.
The Manila concessions raise interesting questions. The original concession contracts 
were detailed and designed with careful attention to the incentives of the parties by the 
International Finance Corporation (IFC), which advised the government on the 
privatisation. They contained provisions reflecting international best practice. Initially, 
investors signalled considerable interest in the concessions and the tender in 1997 
attracted bids from leading international water companies. The bids implied a reduction 
in the average tariff of more than half. However, in the first year o f operations, the East 
area concessionaire secured an unplanned tariff increase and in the third year of 
operations, the West concessionaire began renegotiations, which ended, after long 
battles, in the termination of the contract in 2006.
Was the failure of one of the concessions due to the contract design, or to the 
institutional environment? Existing studies tend to emphasise the impact of particular 
contract provisions (Fabella 2006), but why was one party able to secure a favourable 
renegotiation while the other was not? The answer to these puzzles lies in part in the 
changes of the parties’ discount rates over time and partly in the conflicting interests of 
the different public and private parties involved in the concessions. I consider these 
issues and others raised by the hypotheses set out in the previous chapter after 
describing the history of the concessions.
6.2 History
In 1994, when PSP for Manila’s water services was first being considered, the public 
utility, Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS), served approximately 
two-thirds of the population of the metropolitan area of Manila (‘Metro Manila’) for an 
average o f 16 hours per day. Sanitation coverage was minimal: only 8 per cent o f the 
population was covered by the sewerage network. Non-revenue water stood at 56 per 
cent and was on an upward trend (ADB 2001). There was therefore broad scope for 
improvements in service quality. The potential for improved service fitted neatly with 
the policy orientation of Fidel Ramos’ government. Since his election in 1992, President
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Ramos had promoted privatisation as part o f a far-reaching effort to “bring down the old 
economic order” associated with the Marcos dictatorship (Hutchcroft 1998) and to bring 
the public sector budget deficit under control. One of the great successes of Ramos’ 
Presidential term was the resolution of the Philippines’ power crisis through the rapid 
roll out of private power stations. Ramos hoped to repeat this success in the water sector 
and sought to complete the privatisation of Manila’s water services before the end of his 
term in 1998 (Dumol 2000).
This short window meant that it was not feasible to pass new primary legislation 
restructuring the water sector, and allowing for the creation of a sector regulator. Ramos 
faced a further hurdle: under Filipino law, the power to award franchises contracts lies 
with Congress rather than the Executive, so Ramos had to secure special provision to 
award the concession for Manila’s water services. He did this through the Water Crisis 
Act (1995), which contained a provision allowing the President to negotiate contracts 
with the private sector for water services, and to reorganise the M W SS.56 The bill was 
passed, but the Senate imposed the condition that the Executive powers would become 
void after six months, putting extra time pressure on the award of the contracts (Dumol 
2000).
The concessions were therefore designed to fit within confines of the existing 
institutional structure: the MWSS was designated as the contract signatory and 
continues to own the city’s water assets and liabilities for historic debts. The contract 
monitoring body, the Regulatory Office, was created within the MWSS. It reports to the 
MWSS’ Board of Trustees (BOT) and its decisions must be approved by the Board 
before they can be implemented (Interviews: Sakai, Agustin, Cruz). The Chief 
Regulator and the four other members o f the Regulatory Board are appointed by the 
MWSS BOT. The members of the BOT, in turn, are either appointed directly by the 
President or in directly, by virtue of their position in government. The RO has a degree 
of financial autonomy as it is funded through a levy on the concessionaires but changes 
in its budget beyond inflation adjustment need to be approved by the BOT (Interview: 
Sakai).
The 60 staff of the RO were transferred over from the MWSS, leaving a rump o f 120 in 
the MWSS responsible for managing the development and maintenance of water
56 The Act contained two further provisions o f  relevance to the successful implementation o f  the 
privatisation: it included provisions on the reorganisation o f  the public utility, the Metropolitan 
Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS) and the criminalisation o f  water theft.
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resources (Interview: Cruz). As in Jakarta, the old public utility had the most to lose 
from the privatisation, and its management and employees were the main source of 
resistance to the reforms (Interviews: Sangster; Burrell). Ramos appointed one his 
friends as the Director of the MWSS in the transition period, Francisco Lazaro, to ease 
the process (Interview: Lazaro).
Within the constraints imposed, the Executive and its advisers, the IFC, sought to 
assuage the potential concerns of bidders about political intervention and arbitrary 
regulatory decisions. The role of the RO was restricted to monitoring and 
implementation of the contract. In the case of disputes, the contract provided for a minor 
disputes panel and ultimately international arbitration. Doubts about the capacity of the 
new regulators to carry out their tasks without specific training were addressed with a 
provision for the use of external consultants when needed (Interviews: Cases, Sakai). In 
order to strengthen the regulator’s hand, the concessionaires would post a performance 
bond and to reinstate the bond in each year of the contract. The amount o f the West 
concession’s performance bond declined over the life of the concession from 
US$120mn in Year 1 to US$60mn in Year 20, and from US$70mn to 50mn for the East.
The government’s main concerns were to reduce the liabilities which had been incurred 
by MWSS -  US$1 bn in 1997 -  and to keep tariffs as low as possible. To address the 
first, the private companies would pay concession fees to cover the service and 
repayment of the loans. To address the second, the large capital investments planned 
during the contract were ‘back-ended’ (i.e. extension o f coverage was delayed until 5-10 
years into the concession) (Dumol 2000). Additionally, the service area was split into 
two, creating scope for benchmark competition between the two concessionaires. 
However, this division raised other difficult issues: the Western area was more densely 
populated and had extensive, but older, water infrastructure. The Eastern area contained 
large areas which had not yet been connected to the network, and so was thought to be 
less attractive to bidders who would be wary of the large capital investment 
requirement. The contract designers decided to weight the concession fees to reduce the 
possible divergence in bids for the two areas. 80 per cent of the debt was allocated to the 
West concession, amounting to US$750m in foreign loans and PHP2.2bn in local loans. 
The remaining much smaller proportion of the debt was allocated to the East 
concession.57 The government consulted with potential bidders before deciding on the
57 When the concessions were actually awarded, the balance o f  debt repayment was closer to 90:10 as 
some o f  the loans for the Eastern zone had not yet been disbursed.
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weights, and it was agreed that the division was broadly appropriate. But when the 
Asian Crisis hit, the West concession was to suffer the severe, if unintended, 
consequences of this weighting.
In keeping with the requirements of the Philippine Constitution, the bidding companies 
were required to be at least 60 per cent Filipino-owned and managed by Filipinos, and 
were also required to involve a ‘designated international operator’ with experience in
c o
the water sector. Ideally, this JV structure would offer potential for mutual benefit 
between the parties, who would be able to learn from each other about international best 
practice and local operating conditions. Within each JV, it was envisaged that the 
international operator would play a leading management role, which opened up 
potential for clashes with the Filipino majority owner (Interviews: Rivera, Sangster).
With the elements of the contract structure in place, the government proceeded with the 
bidding, using the consumer tariff as the bid criterion. All the bidders were required to 
place a bid for both the West and East zones. If one company offered the lowest tariff in 
both zones, it would be awarded the zone for which it had proposed the lower tariff and 
the other zone would be awarded to the second lowest bidder for that zone. Great 
attention was paid to the transparency of the tendering process as the Executive was 
concerned to avoid any legal challenges from the unsuccessful bidders that could delay 
the award o f the contract (Dumol 2000). At each stage, care was taken to ensure the 
confidentiality of the bidding documents through elaborate security procedures, with the 
bid box stored over night in bank vaults to prevent tampering (Interview: Lazaro).
The bidding took place in 1997 in a furore of media activity (Dumol). Four consortia 
bid; all offered considerable reductions on the prevailing tariff of 30 percent or more.
The bid results are presented in Table 6.1 below.
58 Philippines Constitution 1987, Art. XII, Sec. 11 states that Filipino citizens or corporations that are 60 
percent owned by Filipinos may receive a franchise to operate a public utility.
Table 6.1: Bids for the Manila Concession
W est T ariff (Peso) Proportion o f MW SS tariff %
Ayala Corp - International Water 2.51 28.63
Benpres Corp -Lyonnaise des Eaux* 4.97 56.59
Aboitiz-Compagnie Generale des Eaux 4.99 56.88
Metro Pacific-Anglian Water 5.87 66.90
East
Ayala-International Water* 2.32 26.39
Benpres-Lyonnaise des Eaux 5.52 62.88
Aboitiz-Compagnie Generale des Eaux 5.66 64.51
Metro Pacific-Anglian Water 6.13 69.79
*Winning consortia 
Source: Dumol (2000)
One consortium, the M anila W ater Company, made up o f  Ayala Corp. and International 
W ater59, bid lowest for both zones, and was awarded the East zone, where it offered the 
lowest absolute tariff. The W est zone was awarded to the second lowest bidder, 
‘M aynilad W ater Service C o’ (M aynilad), a jo in t venture between the Benpres Group 
(the local sponsor), and Suez (France).
The Ayala bid was cause for concern early on because it was so much lower than the 
others, which indicated possible ‘dive-bidding’. The company justified its lower bid 
with reference to the lower discount rate o f  5.2 percent on which the financial model 
was based, compared with an implied rate o f  10.4 percent for the other winning bidder, 
and its more optimistic assumptions about the cost o f  finance and future demand 
(Interview: Rivera). Even so, the financial model in the original bid would not have 
allowed the company to earn positive profits until the tenth year o f the concession 
(Dumol 2000). The bid design had specifically sought to discourage dive bidding by 
allowing the regulator to delay the first round o f rate rebasing until 2007, so the Ayala 
bid took the organisers by surprise. The government asked the IFC to review the 
financial model o f the bid and it was deemed acceptable, so the concession contract was 
awarded, but it raised the possibility that the group would seek to renegotiate the tariff 
later on. Apart from this concern, the bidding was considered a great success by the 
government and the media, generating enthusiastic headlines in the Filipino press 
(Fabella 2006).
The majority owner o f the East concession, the Ayala family, is one o f the Philippines’ 
old elite families and controls a powerful business empire. The fam ily’s wealth has been 
based in part on ownership and developm ent o f M etropolitan M anila’s business district, 
Makati, which is in the zone served by the M anila East water concession. Like the other
59 International W ater was itself a JV o f  Utilities (UK) and Bechtel Corporation (US).
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elite families in the Philippines, whose influence in politics and business is well 
documented (see Anderson 1988; McCoy 1993; Sidel 1997), the Ayalas have been 
involved in politics.60 However, they have managed to avoid the dramatic reversals of 
fortunes experienced by the more politicised business interests. Prior to the water 
concession, they had no experience in regulated utilities.
The Lopez family, majority partner in the West concession, is at the other end of the 
spectrum. The family entered business in the 1880s as a sugar producer; by the 1970s, 
their business had grown into a diversified conglomerate with interests in property, 
media, telecoms, utilities, finance and agriculture (Roces 2000). One of the major 
companies in the group is Meralco, the regulated electricity distribution company that 
service the Manila region. The family has been involved in politics throughout that 
time, initially at the local level as Mayor and Senator, but rising as far as the Cabinet 
and Vice Presidency. Its political and business interests are deeply intertwined: the 
Benpres-owned television network, ABS-CBN, has been used to support political 
campaigns, and the business have secured monopoly franchises and access to credit 
through the political connection (Roces 2000: 23). However, the Benpres fortunes have 
risen and fallen: during the Presidency of Diosdado Macapagal (1962-65), the group 
was targeted for tax investigations, while in the later years o f the Marcos dictatorship, 
the group’s assets were expropriated and family members imprisoned. Its fortunes 
during the period under consideration have been mixed.
The concessionaires began operations in the second half of 1997, a few months before 
elections that brought in Josef Estrada as the new President. Shortly after the election, 
Manila Water petitioned the regulator to adjust its tariff to reflect a higher ADR of 18 
percent. The concessionaire argued that this was the appropriate rate based on market 
comparators, but the regulator refused the petition on the grounds that the bid ADR was 
intended to be maintained until the first Rate Rebasing. In the contract, the ADR is to be 
set on two not necessarily compatible grounds: the ADR implied in the concessionaire’s 
financial bid model and the ADR commensurate with returns to operators in 
concessions internationally with a similar risk profile. In the event, the concessionaire 
took the dispute to the Appeals Panel, which ruled that the appropriate rate was 9.3
60 Jaime Zobel de Ayala, CEO o f  the Corporation, served as an adviser to President Corazon Aquino 
(1986-92), a period in which the company’s business interests expanded significantly. (Crowell and 
Lopez)
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percent, and ordered that the tariff should be adjusted to reflect this until the next round 
of rate rebasing (MWSS 2002).
Manila Water’s petition was well timed. Estrada had won the 1998 election with a 
comfortable majority o f the votes, especially among low income groups. From this 
strong position, the implied increase in Manila Water’s tariff did not constitute a threat 
to his popularity, particularly as the adjusted tariff was still below the tariff in the West 
concession and below the prevailing tariff at the time of the privatisation. Resistance to 
the adjustment came instead from some members of the Regulatory Board and from 
those who had been involved in the contract design, including Francisco Lazaro 
(Interview: Lazaro). They objected that this tariff adjustment cast into doubt the validity 
o f the tendering procedure and considered taking the case to the Supreme Court. 
However, in doing so they would be undermining the contracts by not following the 
specified dispute resolution procedure, and ultimately the case was not pursued 
(Interviews: Sakai, Ortega).
At the same time as these events, the Asian Crisis was unfolding in the Philippines, 
which would bring much greater challenges for the concessions in its train. The 
Philippine Peso devalued from US$1: PHP29 in 1997 to US$1: PHP51 in 2001 (Figure
6.1 shows macroeconomic trends for this period). As a result, Maynilad announced a 
foreign exchange loss of PHP2.7bn by the end of 2000 (Esguerra 2003). At this time, 
the concessionaire was trying to secure long-term loan financing from a consortium of 
international and local banks to finance its investment commitments under the contract, 
but the banks were reluctant to agree the loan before the financial viability of the 
concession was restored and would only agree to a bridging loan to cover expenditure in 
the short-term (Interviews: Burrell, Tirona).
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Figure 6.1 Macroeconomic Trends in the Philippines 1995-2005
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The contract did provide for tariffs to be adjusted on an annual basis for fluctuations in 
the exchange rate and for inflation.61 However, this m echanism had been designed with 
incremental devaluation in mind, so tariff adjustm ents were calculated to deliver 
compensation over the remaining life o f  the contract (Interview: M edalla). The 
devaluation o f 1997-2000 was different because o f  its scale and permanence. Inflation 
jum ped in the short-term, while the currency fell dramatically and settled at the new 
lower level. The tariff adjustm ent mechanism in the contract would not raise cash flow 
sufficiently to reassure the banks and allow the concessionaire to raise m edium-term 
financing (Interviews: Tirona, Medalla). M aynilad therefore approached the regulator to 
amend the contract in 1998 and proposed a m odification in the annual tariff adjustment 
m echanism that would accelerate the recovery o f  foreign exchange losses.
Initially, the contract amendment was discussed principally by the C hief Regulator, Rex 
Tantiongco, and the senior management o f M aynilad (Interview: Flor). The C hief 
Regulator was sympathetic to the com pany’s predicam ent, but some o f  the other RO 
Board members objected, arguing that the RO should not play a role in m odifying the 
contract that they were legally bound to implement. Two board members eventually left 
the RO as a result o f the dispute, but the reasons for their departure is not entirely clear; 
in some accounts, the members were forced to leave by the MWSS BOT (Interviews: 
Esguerra, Ortega). This, and other aspects o f  the renegotiations, attracted considerable 
attention from the media and non-governmental organisations and triggered the
61 Under the Extraordinary Price Adjustment (EPA) mechanism, the concessionaires could apply at the 
end o f  each year for an adjustment to the tariff to compensate them for losses incurred over the course o f 
the year from currency depreciation.
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involvement of the President. The President then nominated a representative, Gloria Tan 
Climaco, who became the chief negotiator with the company.
The parties came close to concluding the amendment in 2000 but political developments 
delayed the final agreement. During 2000, Josef Estrada had been impeached on 
grounds of corruption, and was replaced by the Vice President, Gloria Macapagal- 
Arroyo, in early 2001. In her new position, Arroyo was politically vulnerable as she had 
not been elected to the Presidency and did not have a popular mandate to bolster her in 
relation to the Congress or bureaucracy. Frustrated with slow progress in the 
negotiations, the concessionaire decided to suspend concession fee payments in March 
2001 (Interview: Sangster), leaving the government to cover the MWSS debt service 
obligations.
Arroyo set up an ad hoc committee in early 2001 to discuss the amendment o f the 
contract, although in public, the President expressed a preference for solutions that did 
not violate the original contract (Esguerra 2002a). Maynilad’s creditors were also 
actively involved in pushing for the amendment of the contact terms before they would 
agreed to a medium-term loan (Interview: Burrell). A new Chief Regulator, Eduardo 
Santos, was appointed.
In October 2001, when the political situation was more stable, and the concessionaire’s 
bargaining tactics were making themselves felt, a contract amendment was signed. The 
amendment introduced new tariff adjustment mechanisms to allow the concessionaires 
to recoup foreign exchange losses through the FCDA (Foreign Currency Differential 
Adjustment) mechanism (to recover losses incurred after the Amendment), and throught 
the temporary Accelerated EPA (Extraordinary Price Adjustment) to recoup past losses 
(MWSS Board of Trustees 2001). Although Manila Water had not participated in the 
negotiations, it nevertheless benefited from the new Amendment.
The Amendment also contained a commitment on the part of Benpres and Suez to 
infuse extra equity in their JV; to resume the payment of concession fees in mid-2002 
and to submit a revised business plan for consideration in the Rate Rebasing. In fact, 
Maynilad never resumed concession fee payments, with the exception of one fee o f PHP 
30m in November 2002 and repayment of the total debt covering the operating budget 
of the RO (Interviews: Sakai, A.Agustin). The agreement left some issues unresolved, 
notably the concerns of the lenders about the revenue position o f the concessionaire, and
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negotiations were meant to continue in the context of the rate rebasing in 2002 
(Interviews: Sangster, Burrell),
The contract provided for a 5-yearly comprehensive review or ‘Rate Rebasing’ to set 
operating targets and tariffs based on a full assessment of financial and operating 
performance. The contract contained a provision allowing the regulator to decide 
whether the first Rate Rebasing would take place in 2002, or in 2007, but the RO had 
agreed in the context of the negotiations with Maynilad that the RRB would take place 
in 2002. A new head of MWSS, Orlando Honrade, was appointed in January 2002 and a 
team of consultants was appointed.
For the East concession, the RRB proceeded in line with the contract (Interviews: 
Rivera, Sakai). The submission and consideration of the concessionaire’s financial and 
operation plans took place within the designated timeframe in 2002. Tariff increases 
were agreed for gradual implementation in 2003-2007 and implemented by the 
concessionaire.62 The RRB adjusted the ADR to 10.4%, bringing it into line with the 
ADR determination for the West concession. This reinforced the favourable financial 
position of the concessionaire. Figure 6.2 shows revenue and profit growth in the East 
concession.
Figure 6.2: Manila East Net Income (actual)
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In the course of the Rate Rebasing, the RO proposed the introduction of new ‘key 
performance indicators’ and ‘business efficiency measures’ not included in the original 
contract. This initiative of the RO was prompted by its perception that the efficiency 
incentives implied in the structure of the contracts for the concessionaires to reduce
62 Manila W ater Co was allowed to raise its rates to Peso 17 in 2003 (Visto 2002)
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non-revenue water and improve customer services were not sufficiently strong. The new 
indicators would also help the RO to improve its own access to information and ability 
to monitor the concessions. These performance indicators have not been formally added 
to the contracts and so they are not legally binding, nor do they form a part of the 
regulator’s official assessment of the company at the rate rebasing (Interviews: Sakai, 
A.Agustin). However, the East concessionaire agreed to provide this extra information 
to the regulator and has used for its own public relations (Manila Water Company Inc. 
2004).
The RRB process was considerably more complicated for the West concession. In 
March 2002, Maynilad submitted its new business plan, which was rejected by the RO 
on the grounds that the tariff increases implied by the investment plan were excessive. 
The concessionaire was asked to revise the business plan to reduce planned capital 
expenditure. While the regulator conducted its deliberations, a new Presidential 
representative, the Government Corporate Counsel, Manuel Teehankee, conducted 
separate discussions with the concessionaire on a further amendment to the contract, 
starting in July 2002 (Interviews: Tirona, Flor). The President requested that tariffs 
remain at current levels until end-2004 in exchange for restructuring CF obligations and 
assistance with performance bond guarantees (Interviews: Sakai, Tirona).
In the context of the ongoing negotiations, Suez submitted a new business plan for 
Maynilad, without the approval of Benpres, in May 2002 (Interview: Esguerra). Suez’s 
plan involved Benpres withdrawing from the venture and Suez taking management 
control and investing further equity (Interview: Sangster). The Suez plan provided for 
lower investment and a lower increase in the tariff. The plan was considered by 
Teehankee, but not by the regulator on the grounds that it had not been submitted 
officially by the concession company. In September 2002, shortly before the regulator 
was due to announce its determination, Maynilad submitted a revised business plan, but 
the regulator argued that it had been submitted too late for consideration, and instead 
reverted to the ‘unacceptable’ March plan to make its determination.
Maynilad’s financial difficulties in this period were not only due to macroeconomic 
shocks. In the initial years of operation, the concessionaire did not exercise financial 
restraint and operating and capital costs were imprudently high, as the Chief Financial 
Officer o f Maynilad himself recognised (Interview: Tirona). This came to the fore in the 
Rate Rebasing, when the firm’s operating efficiency and capital investment
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requirements were critically assessed by the RRB team, who proposed a cost 
disallowance of PHP8.8bn (US$175mn) (MWSS RO 2002).
The RO made its determination in November, on the basis of the March business plan, 
setting the ADR at 10.4% (Interview: Medalla). Table 6.2 below summarises the 
changes to the ADR as a result of the Rate Rebasing. This was very close to the level 
that the concessionaire had used in its own financial plan. However, the controversial 
aspect of the determination was the cost disallowances assumed. The determination 
implied an increase in the average tariff to PHP26, but also implied that the extra 
charges that Maynilad had been allowed to collect as a result of Amendment No 1 
would be phased out. Although the RO had followed the process set out in the contracts, 
and had used reputable consultants to carry out the analysis, political influence may also 
have played a role in the decision to impose the cost disallowances. A Presidential 
spokesman had announced shortly before the determination that the President might 
overrule the MWSS Board if  new rates were “unreasonably high and burdensome to 
Metro residents.” (Manila Standard 20 Nov 2002).
T able 6 .2 A djustm ents to the Appropriate D iscou n t R ate 1997-2002__________________
ADR Maynilad Manila Water
Bid 10.4 5.2
Renegotiated 1998 9.3
RRB -  petition 15.7 10.3
RRB -  award 10.4 10.4
The concessionaire strongly objected to the regulator’s determination, and refused to 
attend the public consultations on the proposed increase (Interviews: Sakai, Sangster). 
The MWSS responded by threatening to defer the increase granted in the RRB. 
Maynilad in turn refused to introduce the new tariffs and continued to charge the old 
tariff with the adjustments granted in the renegotiation o f the previous year in order to 
keep up the pressure on the government to negotiate a full amendment to the contract 
(Interview: Sangster).
At the end of 2002, Maynilad took the dispute a step further, giving notice of 
termination, a ‘major dispute’ under the terms o f the contract (Interview: Sangster). The 
termination would be considered by an international arbitration panel to establish the 
termination payment due to the company. The firm’s case cited “delayed and inadequate 
regulatory relief from unforeseen problems, and force majeure, that undermined the 
concession’s viability from 1997-2001” and cited particular problems since Arroyo 
became President. The firm’s contention was that MWSS has violated terms o f the
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concession agreement through non-implementation of rate adjustments; non cooperation 
and unreasonable demands to resume concession fee payments in its statement. The 
MWSS made a counter accusation, saying that Maynilad had failed to meet its 
contractual obligations, including the non-payment of concession fees; equity due in Oct 
2001 was not infused; NRW targets were not met and certain assets had not been 
adequately maintained. The two parties selected arbitrators for the international panel 
and the proceedings went ahead in 2003.
At this stage, the Executive was keen to distance itself from the problems of the 
concession and did not engage with the concessionaire outside the arbitration process, 
while being broadly supportive of the MWSS. Presidential Spokesman Robert Tiglao 
stated in December 2002 that Maynilad’s failure was “Not a problem of privatisation. 
It’s a problem of Maynilad complying with its own obligation. Our position is that the 
MWSS has been complying with all its obligations under the contract.” (Visto 2002).
The Panel offered its judgement in October 2003 and, to the surprise of all parties, it 
was equivocal (Interviews: Sakai, Sangster). The Panel found that neither side had 
breached the contract seriously enough to warrant termination, and ordered the parties 
to continue their discussions (Appeals Panel for Major Disputes in the Manila Water 
Concession Contracts 2003). In the meantime, the concessionaire was ordered to pay its 
outstanding concession fees, and the MWSS was permitted to draw down the 
performance bond. It did not, and the MWSS BOT moved to draw down the 
performance bond provided for under the contract. By the end of 2003, Maynilad’s 
debts amounted to US$330mn, of which $130mn was owed to the MWSS and a further 
$130mn owed to a consortium of banks. Its net income continued to decline (see Figure 
6.3) The concessionaire then filed for bankruptcy in the local court (Quezon City Court) 
and the judge imposed a temporary restraining order (TRO) on the MWSS BOT to 
prevent it from drawing on the performance bond during the bankruptcy proceedings. 
The MWSS objected to this, arguing that the performance bond was intended for use 
precisely in circumstances of this kind and brought the case before the Supreme Court 
to get the TRO lifted (Interview: Sakai). At this stage, the President intervened to 
prevent the Supreme Court from reviewing the case, and negotiations between the 
government and Maynilad began again to try to agree Amendment Number Two.
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Figure 6.3: Manila West Net Income (actual)
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The interests of Maynilad’s JV partners had by this time clearly diverged. Since 2001, 
the Benpres Group had been involved in a dispute with the government over the 
payment of back taxes. This dispute was decided in late 2003 in favour of the 
government and Benpres went into bankruptcy proceedings itself (AFX Asia 17 Aug 
2003). The company’s priority at this stage was to reduce its debts and it was looking 
for a way to exit the concession. Suez’s management was also trying to reduce the 
company’s debts and to reduce its exposure in developing countries (Interviews: 
Beatrix, Sangster). In the short-term, Suez wanted to avoid having to pay up the 
company’s guarantee or to have the performance bond drawn down. Suez hoped to 
reduce its liabilities by finding a workable amendment to the concession and to continue 
operating to recoup some of the financial losses already incurred (Interviews: Beatrix, 
Sangster).
Concurrently, the courts considered the bankruptcy proceedings while the equity 
holders and MWSS put forward various proposals to Manuel Teehankee, who continued 
as the government negotiator, although he no longer held the position of Government 
Corporate Counsel (Interview: Ortega). The most promising of these proposals included 
the transfer of majority ownership back to the MWSS in a debt for equity swap and it 
was proposed as Amendment Number Two. It included a partial draw down of the 
performance bond amounting to $50mn, conversion of US$96mn in government debts 
and a further $18mn of debts to the private banks into equity. Benpres’ corporate 
guarantee would be written off in exchange for their equity share and a new 
management team would be brought in, nominated by MWSS and the banks.
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The concessionaire understood that the government supported the proposal (Interview 
Tirona). However, some members of the MWSS BOT and RO objected to both the 
process and content o f the renegotiation. They cast doubt on the legitimacy of 
Teehankee to negotiate on behalf o f the government, given that he had no official 
position, and maintained that the performance bond should be drawn down in 
accordance with the contract (Interviews: Ortega, Reyes, Sakai). According to some 
accounts, BOT members were invited to meetings in the Presidential Palace, 
Malacanang, to ‘encourage’ them to support the amendment, and when it came to 
voting on Amendment Number Two, a majority of MWSS BOT did vote in favour. The 
two who voted against publicly disassociated themselves with this decision (Interviews: 
Ortega, Reyes).
In 2004, Arroyo was coming up for election and chose as her running mate Senator Noli 
de Castro, who was a former newscaster with Benpres’ ABS-CBN television channel. 
Commentators in the Filipino media viewed this as ‘sweetheart deal,’ with Arroyo 
rewarding Benpres with a very preferential exit package in return for the support o f the 
group in the Presidential elections. In response to these internal and external doubts 
about the legitimacy of the new amendment, the MWSS BOT insisted that the 
amendment be approved by other government bodies, the Department of Finance, the 
Department of Public Works and Highways and National Economic Development 
Authority (NEDA) before becoming official. As part o f this approval process, public 
consultations were conducted and the strong negative response led the political 
leadership to withdraw its support from the Amendment. At the same time, Maynilad’s 
financial situation deteriorated. By the end of 2004, Maynilad owed approximately 
US$3 lOmn to its creditors. The largest single creditor was the MWSS, which was owed 
PHP8bn (US$160mn) (Financial Times 26 Oct 2004).
By January 2005, with the election six months behind her, but no prospect of a 
satisfactory renegotiation yet available. Arroyo’s political position was shaken by 
accusations o f vote-rigging and corruption in the elections, and legislators attempted to 
impeach her. From this weak position, Arroyo allowed the RO to draw down the full 
$120 million performance bond. This decision was approved by multiple government 
bodies, to ensure that responsibility for the legality of the decision was shared. The draw 
was also authorised by the Supreme Court (Manila Bulletin 17 Jan 2005).
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The drawdown of the performance bond took some o f the political heat out o f the 
amendment. Agreement was finally reached later in 2005 on a debt-for-equity swap in 
which majority ownership of the concession would pass back to the public sector and 
Benpres would withdraw from the concession. After the swap, 84 percent of the equity 
in Maynilad was owned by the government. Suez retained the remaining minority stake 
(Financial Times 3 June 2005). This resolution was favourable for the Benpres Group, 
which moved back in the black by mid-2006. Maynilad, on the other hand, has 
continued to face financial and operational difficulties. As a result of low levels of 
capital investment, the same service problems that existed at privatisation continue. 
Non-revenue water in 2006 stood at 68 percent.
At the beginning of 2006, the President appointed a financial adviser as the first step in 
the process o f rebidding the West concession, and the bidding took place at the end of 
that year. The winning consortium was made up of DMCI Holdings (Philippines), a 
major property development group and partner in the Subic Bay water concession, and 
Metro Pacific (owned by First Pacific Group, Hong Kong), controlled by Anthony 
Salim, and part of one of Indonesia’s biggest business groups. Salim Group also held a 
controversial and short-lived stake in one of Jakarta’s water concessions, as I discuss in 
the next chapter. The consortium acquired an 84% stake in Maynilad for US$447mn, 
winning over Manila Water, which put in a bid for US$400mn (The Manila Times 6 
Dec 2006).
The story has turned out very differently in the East concession, which has been 
extremely successful in raising financing since the 1998 tariff adjustment. Manila Water 
has seen some changes in ownership since the award of the concession, but the 
management team has remained stable (Interview: Rivera). In 2004, the IFC took a 
stake in the company and in 2005 the company staged a successful initial public 
offering (IPO) on the Manila Stock Exchange, raising US$150mn from the issue. After 
the rate rebasing, the original three JV partners in the Manila Water Company reduced 
their equity stakes in Manila Water.63
In the same year, Manila Water was awarded a contract to implement a US$84mn 
project supported by the World Bank for the roll-out of the East zone’s sewerage 
network (World Bank Project ID: P079661). In addition, Manila Water intends to
63 In 2005, the major shareholders in the company were Ayala Corporation, United Utilities, Mitsubishi 
Corporation, the International Finance Corporation and BPI Capital Corporation.
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expand in domestic and international markets. It has been in negotiations with the local 
government in Cebu (Philippines) and submitted an expression of interest for an 
operations and management contract for water services in Delhi (India) (Interview: 
Rivera), as well as putting in an unsuccessful bid to take over the Manila West 
concession.
6.3 Discussion
This section considers, first, the hypotheses developed in Chapter 5, and then discusses 
other issues that emerge from the case study.
HI: If the parties cannot agree a mutually satisfactory renegotiation, but termination 
costs are high, the parties will seek to maximise short-term revenues under the contract 
and will terminate when the costs of doing so have declined.
Evidence from Manila’s West concession fits well with this hypothesis, as the 
concessionaire and the government found it very difficult to agree a mutually 
satisfactory solution, yet the parties continued with the concession for several years, 
before finally moving to arbitration. The severity o f the shock that hit the West 
concession, which undermined its business plan and made it impossible for the 
concessionaire to access long-term financing, meant that a substantial adjustment to the 
contract would be needed to restore the viability of the contract. In the same period, 
political instability, the impeachment of Estrada and the arrival of Arroyo as President 
raised the government’s hurdle rate, demonstrated in the President’s 2002 sanction of 
any amendment that would imply a tariff increase. As a result, the set o f mutually 
acceptable outcomes from the renegotiation became very narrow. The government’s 
hurdle rate finally came down after the election of Arroyo in 2004, opening up an 
agreement space to conclude the renegotiation.
At the same time, termination costs for one of the JV partners were high. Suez’s bank 
guarantees and performance bond were at stake in the event o f a termination with the 
concessionaire at fault, and so it keenly sought compromise solutions. Benpres, for 
whom the cost o f termination was negligible, because o f its bankruptcy proceedings, 
was resistant to compromise solutions and pushed Maynilad its own into bankruptcy 
proceedings when the arbitration case did not generate the desired outcome. On the 
other hand, the loose attitude of Manilad to financial management in the first few years
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seems more likely to have been a negotiating tactic than due to efforts to extract 
revenues from a contract that they ultimately expected to be terminated.
In contrast, the East concession’s bid to negotiate in 1998 came at a time when the 
government’s hurdle rate was low -  Estrada had just won resoundingly in the elections 
-  and the much lower tariff in the East of the city than in the West meant that there was 
a broad negotiating set within which the firm would be better off without a significant 
loss in utility on the public side. No shock had restricted the size o f the negotiating set, 
which made it possible for the firm to secure the contract adjustment relatively easily.
H2: When the probability of enforcement is low, the party with the lower cost of 
termination secures preferential outcomes in both contractually mandated and shock- 
induced renegotiations.
The experience of Manila’s west concession also provides some support for this 
hypothesis. The party that managed to secure the most preferential outcome from the 
renegotiation was the Benpres Group, whose debts to the banks and the MWSS were 
written off in the debt-for-equity swap. Benpres was also the party with the highest 
discount rate at that time, as the group was in bankruptcy proceedings. Suez, on the 
other hand, faced financial and reputational costs from termination, so had less 
bargaining power.
The successful renegotiation by the East concession, both in the opportunistic 
renegotiation of 1998 and the scheduled renegotiation in the RRB in 2003, also provide 
some support for this hypothesis. The first renegotiation came only a year into the 
operation of the concessions, before the private firms had invested significantly in sunk 
assets, so they had little to lose from their brinkmanship. The government, on the other 
hand, may have wanted to keep a positive image with foreign investors, although this 
was a lower policy priority for Estrada than it had been for Ramos.
H3: The involvement o f multiple government principals makes it more likely that 
renegotiation will be triggered, but less likely that renegotiation will be concluded.
The West concession provides ample evidence in support of this third hypothesis. Many 
parties played a part in triggering renegotiations. In the first instance, it was the RO that
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responded positively to the concessionaire’s move to renegotiate, leading the MWSS 
into the renegotiation; subsequently it was the Executive that took the lead. In 2002, the 
Executive engaged the concessionaire in renegotiations but refused to accept a solution 
which implied a tariff increase, while the MWSS and RO were engaged in the 
contractually mandated RRB, which would result in the approval of a substantial tariff 
increase. The President also held the MWSS back from drawing down the performance 
bond at the end of 2003 and reinitiated renegotiations after the arbitration, in direct 
contrast with the MWSS’ approach at this time, which was to implement the letter o f the 
contract.
Furthermore, the involvement of multiple government bodies made it more difficult to 
conclude the renegotiations. The best example o f this is the fate of Amendment Number 
Two which was agreed by the MWSS and the Executive but was never approved by the 
two other government bodies. The members of the MWSS RO and MWSS BOT who 
were opposed to Amendment Number Two were not able to prevent the amendment 
being agreed by the BOT, but opposing interests were able to block the agreement at the 
later stage.
In contrast, the successful conclusion of the East concession’s renegotiation may also be 
due in part to the fact that only the MWSS RO was involved and that the Executive and 
other parties did not intervene in the process, passively approving it.
H4: The existence o f a contract-specific regulatory agency or contract monitoring 
agency will increase the probability o f concluding a renegotiation.
The Manila concessions provide mixed evidence for this hypothesis. The RO managed 
to conclude the contractually mandated renegotiation for the East concession, but for the 
West concession, the RO did not manage to play a constructive role in bringing the 
parties to agreement in the renegotiations. The activist Chief Regulator in the initial 
period of the contract was replaced with a more compliant CR who presided over a 
more restrained RO. He deliberately carried out the RRB without reference to the 
ongoing negotiations that the concessionaires were having with the President. This 
certainly did not facilitate the process of renegotiation and may even have made it more 
difficult for the parties to reach an accommodation.
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Some other important features of the implementation o f the Manila contracts are not 
adequately captured by the discussion of these hypotheses.
Foremost among these is the dramatic and asymmetric impact of the Asian crisis on the 
concessions. The original decision to allocate most of the debt repayment burden to the 
West concession was made with a sensible intention -  to make the contracts equally 
attractive to investors, and so to balance tariffs in the two sections o f the city. The 
reason for the much lower tariffs in the East was not due to a mistake in the structure of 
the contract, but to the highly competitive bids put in by the Manila Water consortium 
for both sides. However, the impact of the currency devaluation was to greatly 
exacerbate the difference between the two zones, to undermine the business model of 
Maynilad and prevent the concessionaire from securing long-term financing. O f course, 
the ability of the concession to recover from the shock was not aided by imprudent 
expenditures by the concessionaire in the early years of the contract. The financial 
model of the East concessionaire was resilient to these events, yet benefited from the 
application of Amendment Number One to both contracts. The implication o f these 
outcomes is not that the contract should have been structured differently in terms o f the 
distribution of debt, but that the contract should have been adjusted more quickly and 
more effectively to cope with such a major shock.
Secondly, the Manila concessions have multiple agents as well as multiple principals. 
The case study shows how the interests of the private parties can also diverge and make 
renegotiations more difficult to conclude. By 2001, the interests of Suez and the 
Benpres Group in the outcomes of the West concession had diverged considerably and 
they They diverged further when Benpres went into bankruptcy proceedings and 
showed no interest in an ongoing role in the concession while Suez sought to negotiate 
an expanded role for itself in the management of Maynilad. A third set of private 
interests -  the consortium of banks -  also added to the mix, with their own distinct 
interests, and at certain points becoming directly engaged in the negotiations with the 
executive. This suggests that the framework could be usefully extended to take into 
account multiple private agents and even to consider the different incentives o f local 
and national firms, to see whether there are any systematic differences in relation to 
contract implementation.
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The overall institutional environment in the Philippines is also very important to 
understanding the events that took place. When the concessions began, the Philippines 
scored reasonably well for regulatory quality, control of corruption, political stability 
etc. in international indices. However, by 2004, its institutional ratings had declined 
considerably, as shown in Figure 6.4. Although corruption increased in this period, 
public sensitivity also increased, perhaps due to the attention given to Estrada’s 
impeachment. This has increased government officials’ concerns about being found in 
breach of anti-graft legislation (1960 Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) and made 
them less likely to support a contract amendment that could be considered preferential 
to a private party.
Figure 6.4 Institutional Indicators in the Philippines 1996-2004
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A third aspect of the Manila concessions which is not well captured in the analytical 
framework is the special role of Benpres in Philippines political economy. As a major 
banking, media and utility group, with close connections to elected officials, the group 
is at the same time highly influential, experienced in the machinations of Filipino 
politics and also the target of close scrutiny and criticism by opposition politicians and 
media. This may help to explain the approach that Benpres took to financial 
management in the early years of the concession, spending imprudently to emphasise its 
financial constraints in order to strengthen its bargaining power. The significance of the 
links between Arroyo and the Benpres Group, and the outcomes of the renegotiations 
for the West concession is not easy to demonstrate, but was inevitably the subject of 
intense speculation that made it more difficult to conclude the negotiations without 
accusations of bias and corruption. The Ayalas’ less political approach to the 
renegotiations, focusing on the regulator and the contractually mandated processes, 
seems to have made their renegotiations more straightforward.
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7 Uncooperative Agreements: The Implementation of the Jakarta Water 
Concessions
7.1 Introduction
The Jakarta concessions are examples of contract-based regulation in a highly unstable 
political and institutional environment. During the lives of the concessions, Indonesia 
has moved from autocracy to nascent democracy, has had five different and experienced 
a severe macroeconomic crisis. The multiple actors involved in the concessions -  the 
central and local governments, the former public utility and the new regulatory body, 
foreign and local firms -  have different and often conflicting interests in the outcome of 
the contracts. Given all this upheaval, perhaps the most surprising thing about the 
Jakarta water contracts is why after 10 years of instability, limited investment and 
protracted renegotiation, the concessions have not been terminated. In this chapter, I 
examine whether the incentives and pay-offs to the government actors and the firms can 
help to explain why this is the case.
The West concessionaire, Suez, is the same French company that has a stake in Manila 
West; in the East, the concessionaire was Thames Water, a UK company owned until 
recently by the German firm, RWE. In contrast to Manila, where the histories of the two 
concessionaires have been markedly different, the experiences of the concessionaires in 
Jakarta have been broadly similar throughout most of the life of the contract. However, 
the West concession has managed to finalise its negotiations more rapidly. Can the 
shifting discount rates of the firms help to explain these developments?
7.2 History
The public water utility in Jakarta in the 1990s was offering poor service at high cost. In 
1996, only 41 percent of the population was served (Lanti 2004) and around a third of 
those connected only received water intermittently. Non-revenue water was more than 
55 percent and demand projections showed that raw water shortages were imminent 
(Nihon Suido Consultants for JICA 1997; Nihon Suido Consultants/JICA 1997). Both 
unit production costs and tariffs were high compared to other Asian cities (ADB 2004). 
Against this background, private sector participation was expected to bring 
improvements in service quality and coverage (Lanti 2004), while generating attractive 
returns for private investors (Interview: Skelcher).
In the early 1990s, local private companies were already providing water meter reading 
and billing services to the Jakarta water utility, Pam Jaya, under service contracts, and
Suez subsidiary Degremont was implementing a BOT contract for a water treatment 
plant. Meanwhile, British water company Thames Water was in discussions with the 
Governor of Jakarta about the construction a water ring main around the city 
(Interviews: Roswita, Rogers). The idea of letting concessions for Jakarta’s water 
services was instigated by Thames and Suez both of which were pursuing aggressive 
strategies of international expansion at the time (Interviews: Rogers, Sangster). The 
companies sought to convince Radinal Moochtar, the powerful Minister of Public 
Works in Suharto’s government, that the problems in water supply were mainly due to 
the poor distribution system and linked to the bad management of Pam Jaya (Interview: 
Rogers). The Minister and Governor were duly convinced (Interview: Lanti).
In some accounts, President Suharto is said to have played a personal role in the 
decision. An apocryphal story recounts that Suharto, in his garden one day, noticed that 
the gardeners suddenly stopped watering the plants. When questioned, the gardeners 
explained that the water had been cut off, as often happened, prompting Suharto to take 
a new interest in the quality of water services in his capital (Interview: Rogers).
Tensions between different parts of the government may also have played a role in the 
decision. At this time, Suharto was increasingly centralising power within the 
government and wanted to undermine the independent power bases of state-owned 
enterprises like Pam Jaya. Suharto may also have held suspicions of corruption in the 
management of Pam Jaya and wanted to increase his control over the utility. Although 
such accusations of corruption are extremely difficult to confirm, the concessionaires 
claim to have found evidence of it when they took over (Interviews: Rogers, Skelcher). 
The World Bank has found evidence in other cities in Indonesia that water utilities 
tacitly agree to the exploitation of illegal connections by small-scale providers in 
exchange for payments off the books, well above the official tariff (World Bank 2003: 
9). The performance of Pam Jaya over time, with consistently low coverage and high 
non-revenue water, despite a positive net income, is consistent with this type of 
corruption.
Perhaps even more important was the tightening grip of Suharto’s family and cronies on 
business in Indonesia. Privatisation opened up a new source o f privilege for the family 
and cronies of Suharto, who moved into the services and infrastructure sectors in 
partnership with the foreign companies. As Robison and Hadiz write, “No Ministry or
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state corporation could resist the demands of the Soeharto family as they moved more 
forcefully into business, and no monopoly or contract was beyond their reach.” (2004: 
76). In keeping with this, most privatisations in this period took the form of negotiated 
sales without transparent divestiture procedures and always involved an Indonesian 
partner linked to the government.
These links were also useful to the foreign investors, who saw them as guarantees of 
political favour in the future (Fisman 2001 and interview: Rogers). They did not 
consider the possibility of the imminent collapse of Suharto’s regime. In keeping with 
this, Thames and Suez established partnerships with Indonesian companies, both 
intimately connected with the Suharto regime. Thames’ Indonesian partner, Kekarpola, 
was a company 40 percent owned by Sigit Harjojudanto, one of Suharto’s sons. The 
other 60 per cent was owned by two businessmen, Harisapto and Fachry Thaib, both 
well connected with the regime (Interview: Anderson, Rogers). Suez’s partner was 
Garuda Dipta Semesta, a company in the Salim Group of Liem Soe Liong, one of 
Indonesia’s wealthiest businessmen at that time and a close associate o f the President 
(Interview: Berthelot).
IFIs and donors played a limited role in the development of the concession. The World 
Bank withdrew its involvement when it became apparent that the contracts would not be 
bid competitively (Interview: Sukarma), and the Japanese government, which was the 
largest donor to the water sector, reviewed the privatisation plan and concluded that it 
was not in the interest of the government to proceed with it (Nihon Suido Consultants 
1997: 3-198). The review emphasised the lower cost of public and donor finance.
Direct negotiations began with Thames and Suez in 1995, with occasional participation 
of their local partners (Interview: Rogers). On the government side, the negotiations 
were technically led by the Governor of Jakarta but were conducted principally by Pam 
Jaya. The Ministry of Public Works (MPW) provided technical support and intervened 
intermittently (Interview: Lanti).
At the suggestion of the firms, Jakarta was divided into two service areas, East and 
West. This also had advantages for Suharto as it allowed the expected benefits from the 
contracts to be shared between two members of his inner circle (Interview: Rogers, 
Lanti). The private firms were given six months and access to Pam Jaya’s operating
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information to conduct due diligence and to develop their business plans, which were 
then considered by the government negotiating team (Interviews: Lanti, Rogers). 
However, the criteria for assessing the plans were not clearly defined and the 
negotiators on the government side did not have a clear conception of how the contract 
should be structured (Interviews: R.Agustin, Lanti), allowing the private companies a 
relatively free hand in shaping the concessions (Interviews: Rogers, R.Agustin, Lanti).
According to managers in the foreign companies involved in the negotiations, the 
private companies discovered that Pam Jaya was systematically under-reporting the 
number of connections and over-reporting the level o f NRW in its annual reports 
(Interview: Skelcher). This would make it possible for the private companies to increase 
coverage and reduce NRW simply by regularising reporting. When this became 
apparent to Pam Jaya, they attempted to redress the situation by reporting thousands of 
new connections in the months before the handover (Interviews: Skelcher, Roswita).64
Pam Jaya was opposed to the privatisation throughout and blocked or stalled 
negotiations when they could (Interviews: Roswita, Rogers, Krieg). When this occurred, 
MPW set a fixed deadline for the finalisation o f the contracts at the end of 1997. Pam 
Jaya resisted to the end. According to one account, the President Director of Pam Jaya, 
Rama Boedi, left Jakarta on the day before the formal signing ceremony, saying that he 
would refuse to sign. “Apparently he must have received a telephone call that evening 
because he was there the next morning.” (Interview: Krieg). The contracts, or 
“Cooperation Agreements,” as they are known, were approved by the Governor of 
Jakarta and subsequently the central government. In addition to its role as contract 
signatory, the role of monitoring the concession was assigned to Pam Jaya, in addition 
to its role as contracting party. No autonomous regulator was created in the original 
contract.
At the suggestion of the firms, the contracts separate the firms’ revenue (a flat-rate for 
each unit of volume of water supplied to consumers, known as the Water Charge) from 
the Water Tariff, which is paid by consumers. The separation of the tariff and the charge 
helped to balance out revenues between the concessionaires, given differences in land
64 In an interview, Roswita explained that there were unusually high numbers o f  new connections in these 
months because new financing arrangements were introduced to help people cover the connection fee, 
and this created strong demand for new connections.
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use and socio-economic balance in the two service areas and it also allowed the 
government greater flexibility in the timing of tariff increases.
The Water Charge is set according to the financial projections of the firms on a cost- 
plus basis, with a fixed ROR for the investors of 22 percent in nominal Rupiah terms 
calculated over the life of the contract. The Charge is different for the two 
concessionaires, to reflect their different cost structures (Interview: Krieg), although 
some external observers have doubts about whether this is justified (Bartlett and Witono 
2006). It is indexed to inflation and foreign exchange rates and is adjusted every 
semester to reflect changes in these indices. The underlying components o f the Charge 
are reviewed at five-year intervals in the Rate Rebasing (RRB). This exercise 
establishes a revised financial plan, and indicates but does not require the appropriate 
tariffs for the subsequent five-year period.
The contract does not specify how tariffs are to be adjusted. The power to set tariffs lies 
with the Governor of Jakarta, who adjusts them on an ad hoc basis (Interview: Anwar). 
The Tariff is volumetric, differentiated by income groups and user types, and has an 
increasing block structure with extensive cross-subsidies from industrial and 
commercial users to households. There is no clearly defined national law or regulation 
governing the calculation of water tariffs; the regulations state only that water tariffs 
bills should not be more than 4 percent of household expenditure and that tariffs should 
allow for utilities to cover costs (Interviews: Anwar, Hilwan).
Tariffs are collected by the private operators and transferred directly to an escrow 
account. The total revenue is then used to pay the operating costs of Pam Jaya, debt 
repayments to the Ministry of Finance (MOF) on historic loans from IFIs, and then the 
operators. The city government does not have a direct financial relationship with the 
concessions. Under public ownership the city government was entitled to a dividend of 
40% of profits and transfers were made in several years (Interview: Tutuko, Figure 7.1 
below). Legally, the city government could still require these payments, but has not so 
far exploited this possibility and there is an informal agreement that it will not before 
coverage has reached a target level of 70% (Bartlett and Witono 2006).
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Figure 7.1: Pre-privatisation Transfers to D K I Jakarta
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The concession contracts set out detailed performance requirements for volume, 
coverage and quality of services. The priority target is the volume of water billed: if the 
volume billed falls below 70% of the target set in the contract, Pam Jaya can trigger the 
termination of the contract (Interview: Anwar). On the other hand, the contract does not 
set out an investment target. The level of investment is jointly agreed by the parties in 
the RRB. The firms are -  in principle -  able to decide how best to allocate spending 
between capital and operating expenditure in order to meet the performance targets, 
which they set out in their financial projections for the planning period. However, in 
practice, Pam Jaya has intervened in decisions on investment (Interviews: Krieg, 
Novari).
Under the contracts, penalties can be imposed on the firms for failure to meet targets but 
no sanctions or penalties are applicable to Pam Jaya or any other governmental agency. 
Under the original contract, the concessionaires were meant to sign additional 
agreements with the autonomous government agencies responsible for water supply to 
Jakarta (POJ, a publicly owned company that manages the dam and pipeline which is 
the source of most of Jakarta’s raw water), and with the Department of Mines, which is 
responsible for regulating the abstraction of groundwater from private wells. These 
agreements have never been signed, as the parties could never come to a mutually 
satisfactory agreement, and no other branch of government intervened (Interviews: 
Krieg, Anwar).
The contract provides for termination either by the government or by the firm. In the 
event that the concessionaire is justified in terminating the contract due to the failure of 
the government side to meet its contractual commitments, the concessionaires are
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entitled to the ‘Early Termination Paym ent.’65 The amount actually due would depend 
heavily on the decisions made by the international arbitration panel provided for in the 
contract and would need to be enforced in Indonesia.
In 1997-8, Indonesia underwent a period o f  extreme economic and political instability. 
Suharto, who had been in power since 1968, was deposed and replaced by former Vice- 
President Habibie am idst mass protests, rioting and looting. Economically, the country 
was the most severely hit o f  all in the Asian crisis o f  1997-8. Figure 7.2 shows the 
trends in GDP, inflation and exchange rates in this period. Like the Philippines, inflation 
in Indonesia spiked but returned to its average level but there was a permanent 
adjustment in the value o f  the currency. This combination o f macroeconomic and 
political shocks had both direct and indirect effects on the concessions.
F igure  7.2 Indonesia  M acro eco n o m ic  In d ica to rs  1995-2005
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The most dramatic impact o f  the crisis on the concessions was Pam Jaya’s move to take 
back m anagement control during the climax o f  the social unrest in M ay 1998. Accounts 
o f the actual events are contested. In the concessionaires’ version, the expatriate 
managers left Indonesia tem porarily in M ay 1998 on the advice o f  their Embassies, 
leaving a skeleton staff behind to continue the business (Interviews: Skelcher, 
Anderson). According to Pam Jaya, however, this left a vacuum in management and 
“anarchy in our office” which needed to be filled if  water services in the capital were to 
continue without disruption (Interview: Tutuko). Amidst rioting and protests by the 
utility’s employees, Pam Jaya took back m anagem ent control o f  the utilities at the end
65 The Early Termination Payment is equivalent to the net present value o f  the concessionaires’ projected 
pre-tax profits for 50% o f  the remaining years o f  the concession based on historical and forecasted profits 
(Cooperation Agreement 2001 Clause 42.6).
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of May with the approval of the Governor of Jakarta (Interview: Roswita). 
Representatives of the concessionaires who were present in the country signed an 
agreement transferring control to Pam Jaya, perhaps under duress. The concessionaires 
argue that these representatives did not have the authority to sign the concessions away 
to Pam Jaya (Interview: Skelcher) and on the return of the senior foreign managers 
shortly afterwards, the companies took a much more aggressive stance, calling Pam 
Jaya’s move a ‘coup d’etat’ (Interview: Lanti). Pam Jaya, for its part, maintained that 
the concessionaires had abandoned the company and that they had been forced to step in 
(Interview: Tutuko).
Soon after Habibie took over as President, he decreed that all existing contracts with the 
private sector would be respected and renegotiated where necessary in an effort to 
control the flight of investors from the country. The central government ensured that 
control of the concessions was transferred back to Thames and Suez. However, the new 
government imposed certain conditions which reflected the new political situation.
Civil unrest at the end of Suharto’s regime had coalesced around the issue of corruption 
and the role of his family and cronies in the economy, under the korupsi, kolusi dan 
nepotisme (KKN) slogan. Protesters called for reprisals against these individuals and 
contracts and licenses for monopolies that had been awarded without public tender 
became a focal point for reformers. Habibie responded to popular pressure in relation to 
the water concessions and required that the Indonesian JV partners leave the JVs, that 
their shares be bought up by the foreign partner and that all management and key 
employees nominated by the Indonesian partners resign (Interview: Skelcher).66 At the 
same time, the Governor of Jakarta announced a freeze on tariffs until 2001, which was 
clearly inconsistent with Pam Jaya’s legal obligations under the concession contracts. 
Declining purchasing power and increases in fuel prices had ignited civil protests in the 
last weeks of Suharto’s Presidency, so tariffs for basic services were high on the 
political agenda (Bird 1999).
These changes to the contracts occurred against a background of wide-ranging political 
reforms. Competitive direct elections were brought in for the President, the legislature
66 The foreign companies increased their share holdings to 95 percent but in order to comply with 
Indonesian law, two Indonesian companies, PT Terra Metta Phora and PR Bangun Cipta Sarana, both 
sub-contractors o f  the multinational companies, took a 5 per cent minority stake in the East and West 
concessions respectively. The Indonesian companies have played a very minor role, were not w ell known 
to the concession managers and did not even receive periodic reports (Interview: Krieg).
146
become a significantly stronger, fully elected body, able to review and constrain the 
actions of the President and substantial powers were transferred from the centre to 
provincial and local governments (Robison and Hadiz 2004: 224). These changes have 
created competing sources of power in the Cabinet, bureaucracy and SOEs. 
Decentralisation allocated significant new powers to local parliaments, including the 
power to approve tariffs for water and other municipal services.
Reforms to the bureaucracy made at this time included small steps to increase 
transparency and to reduce corrupt or arbitrary behaviour within the bureaucracy. The 
Supreme Audit Agency (BPK) and the Government Financial and Development 
Comptroller (BPKP) have become more prominent and conducted far-reaching audits of 
government ministries and agencies together with international accounting firms 
(Robison and Hadiz 2004: 189-190). Some argue that the fragmentation of power has 
effectively multiplied opportunities for corruption (Robison and Hadiz 2004: 214). This 
is borne out by corruption indices, which show a deterioration in the years following the 
regime change, although Indonesia performed marginally better in 2004 (see Figure 
7.3).
Figure 7.3 Indonesia Institutional Indicators 1996-2004
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corruption and that they were afraid of losing business after the privatisation 
(Interviews: Skelcher, Lanti 2004). The concessionaires also engaged in informal 
discussions with Akaindo alongside the legal proceedings and managed to conclude an 
amicable settlement, but the case was widely covered in the media and contributed to a 
perception of illegitimacy surrounding the contracts.
The economic shocks also had a negative impact on the financial viability of the 
concessions through several direct channels. The foreign firms had taken on foreign 
currency debt finance to fund their investment programmes (Interview: Berthelot). In 
theory, they were protected from inflation and exchange rate risk by clauses for 
automatic adjustment of the Water Charge in the concession contracts, but Pam Jaya did 
not have adequate cash flows from tariffs to pay the concessionaires. The difference 
between the contracted amount due to the firms and the amount they received created a 
‘shortfall,’ effectively a debt owed by Pam Jaya to the firms, which would build up until
the G o v ern o r  agreed  to  in cre :,cp* lan£B: a t t a i n  Fim irpc 7 A Q n r l  7 climx/ Finn/ tV»#» cVinrtfcill
From 1998-2001, the parties engaged in renegotiations. Pam Jaya took the lead in these 
renegotiations with little involvement from the federal or city governments (Interviews: 
Skelcher, Weitz). The rapid changes taking place at the Executive level, with the 
President changing from Habibie to Abdurrahman Wahid in 1999, the impeachment of 
Wahid and his replacement by Megawati Sukarnoputri in 2001, did not affect the 
concessions directly as the Governor of Jakarta, Lt. General Sutiyoso, remained in 
power throughout. He had been appointed by Suharto but managed to stay in favour 
with the populace enough to win the first round of local elections in 2002, with support 
from President Megawati (ICG 2003: 15). Sutiyoso sought to shore up his popularity 
with populist policies like the water tariff freeze.
During this period, relations between the firms and Pam Jaya were often extremely 
tense, especially as the provisions of the original agreement had not been willingly 
accepted by Pam Jaya and so the renegotiation became an opportunity to open up these 
difficult issues once again (Interview: Roswita). In the political upheaval, sources of 
political power that had imposed constraints on Pam Jaya had been weakened, and Pam 
Jaya’s influence on the implementation of the concessions increased (Interview: 
Sangster).
During the renegotiations, neither the government nor the firms met their contractual 
commitments. The most obvious breach was the decision by the Governor not to raise 
tariffs, but the concessionaires did not directly contest this (Interviews: Krieg, Lanti). At 
the same time, the firms failed to meet their performance targets for volume o f water 
supplied, number of new connections, UFW etc. Figure 7.6 shows how performance 
under the private contracts continued on the same trend as under public management. 
The expected increases that had been included in the original contract did not 
materialise.
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Figure 7.6: Num ber o f  C onnections 1993-2003
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Much time was devoted in the negotiations to discussing the validity of the data on 
which the re-calibration of the tariffs, charges, operating and capital expenditures would 
be based. The failure to agree on a common set of figures meant that the negotiations 
proceeded very slowly throughout (Interviews: Lanti, Krieg). The treatment of the 
‘shortfall’ was also a major concern as the parties found it extremely difficult to agree a 
mutually satisfactory schedule for repayments (Interviews: Roswita, Skelcher).
Several times during the renegotiations, the firms threatened to terminate the contracts 
and sought to raise the issue at the political level, with one of Jakarta’s Vice-Governors. 
However, the firms were aware that they could not play this hand too often, and that 
threats of termination would be decreasingly effective (Interview: Skelcher).
By 2001, the Indonesian political and economic situation was much more stable. 
Inflation was under control, the economy was growing again. Politically, the 
impeachment of Wahid and his replacement with Megawati had passed off with the new 
institutions in tact. Despite the fact that the Governor was due to come up for election in 
2002, he had secured the support of Megawati and water tariffs were not a high profile 
issue in the election, so he was able to consider implementing a tariff increase. The 
conclusion of the renegotiations had also become more urgent for Pam Jaya, which was 
faced with difficulties in repaying loans to the Ministry of Finance (Interview: Roswita). 
Figure 7.7 shows how the profile of debt repayments faced by Pam Jaya. At the same 
time, Pam Jaya was building up huge liabilities to the concessionaires, as shown in 
Figures 7.4 & 7.5 above.
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Figure 7.7: Pam Jaya Debts to MOF 1998-2018
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These factors pushed the parties towards finalisation of the Restated Cooperation 
Agreements (RCA) in 2001 and the first of several planned tariff increases in April of 
that year. The RCAs provided a schedule of repayment for the shortfall. Suez had been 
able to secure earlier repayment of the shortfall than Thames (Bartlett and Witono 
2006). This was due to Suez’s more favourable financial position, which meant that the 
same tariff increase translated into a greater surplus that could go towards repaying the 
shortfall (Interview: Bouvier).
The RCA also provided for the creation of the Regulatory Body, charged with limited 
mediating and monitoring functions (Cooperation Agreement, Pam Jaya and Palyja 
2001). The RB was created at the request of the firms who wanted to reduce the role of 
Pam Jaya in the concession, although they have not been consistently supportive of its 
efforts (Interview: Weitz). The legal status of the RB is backed by a regulation issued by 
the Governor in 2001. The RB is not financially independent, as Pam Jaya has to agree 
any increase in its budget over inflation (Bartlett and Witono 2006).
2002 was designated as a transition period, during which special regulatory conditions 
were applied, and the concessions were due to begin normal operations after agreement 
of new financial plans for the second 5-year period in 2003. During this 12-month 
period, Pam Jaya was allowed open book access to the accounts of the concessionaires 
(before the next RRB) in order to assist in this process and to ‘re-establish trust’
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between the parties (Interview: Roswita). The interim period was successful in neither 
and the information collected by Pam Jaya served, if anything, to fuel further disputes 
(Interview: Krieg). Pam Jaya and the concessionaires were unable to agree a common 
set o f figures before the RRB and these issues were carried over into the RRB process. 
The RCA specifies reporting requirements o f 112 tables monthly but the operators are 
not required to specify their assumptions for demand forecasts, price elasticity, UFW etc 
or to disclose their financial models (Bartlett and Witono 2006). Pam Jaya’s financial 
model is also not in the public domain, leading to protracted disagreements which could 
be resolved with a common financial model.
Key points of contention were the concessionaires’ management fees, set at 5 percent of 
revenues, costs of advisors, legal fees, expatriate salaries and other ‘unnecessary’ 
expenses like security for personnel and training (Interviews: Roswita, Bouvier). The 
practice of taking management fees is common amongst the French water companies 
(Sirtaine, Pinglo et al. 2004) and Thames followed the same practice in the Jakarta 
concessions. Pam Jaya argued that these payments were too high. Another area of 
controversy was the use of subsidiary companies for construction and procurement. The 
contract required competitive bidding for contracts above US$500,000, but the fall in 
the value of the Indonesian Rupiah and inflation meant that the proportion of contracts 
not subject to bidding was higher than had originally be intended (Interview: Sikar). 
Pam Jaya argued that the concessionaires were not investing efficiently, highlighting a 
few prominent examples, like Thames’ investment in a large pipeline across the city that 
was not being used (Interview: Novari).
Another change in the RCA was that the concessionaires were allowed to reduce their 
capital expenditure without prior agreement from Pam Jaya, if  tariffs were not raised in 
line with the agreement, or if  raw water availability was too low or insufficient quality. 
Capital expenditure reductions would in theory restore the concessionaire’s financial 
returns to the level specified in the contract. However, the contract provides no specific 
guidance on how these adjustments should be made, leading to further scope for dispute 
between the parties. In practice, this has led to long periods during which the 
contracting parties have held meetings with no clear direction (Interviews: Krieg, 
Skelcher, Lanti). These clauses have also undermined Pam Jaya’s power to impose 
penalties on the firms which are only applicable where failure to meet a target is due
67 Cooperation Agreement 2001 Clause 11.1
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exclusively to the fault o f the concessionaire (Pam Jaya and Palyja 2001). Pam Jaya has 
demanded payment of fines by the firms on numerous occasions, but the firms have 
contested these demands and penalties have not been enforced (Interview: Krieg). Other 
penalties specified in the contract are so low that they do not constitute an incentive for 
the firms to meet the targets (Interview: Tutuko).
Once the RCA had been signed and pressure from the firms decreased, the Governor 
once again reneged on his commitment to raise tariffs and the firms switched back to a 
coping strategy of minimal investment (Interview: Krieg) The tariff increases that were 
scheduled for January 2002 and January 2003 eventually took place in April 2003 and 
January 2004 after further negotiations.
By 2003, the deadline for the rate-rebasing, agreement was nowhere in sight. Pam 
Jaya’s priority was to reduce the concessionaires’ operating and capital expenditures 
and to focus on providing more water to high tariff customers through existing 
connections (Interview: Novari). At the same time, the international strategies of the 
companies were changing. Both were refocusing on core European markets and on 
reducing their financial exposure, so were reluctant to engage in further capital 
investment. Thames began to withdraw rapidly from its Asian projects at this time 
(Interviews: Anderson, Weitz). Suez, meanwhile, was in the process o f arbitration 
proceedings for its Manila contract and had taken a hit to its profitability from its 
Buenos Aires contract (Interview: Sangster). By mid-2003, the parties had effectively 
given up on the negotiations (Interview: Krieg).
At this point, the Regulatory Body intervened to restart discussions by engaging 
international consultants, the Independent Combined Experts team (ICE-team), with the 
support of the central government.68 None o f the parties had sought the involvement of 
the RB in the Rate Rebasing (Interviews: Lanti) and they agreed to the process on the 
condition that recommendations made by the ICE team would not be binding on the 
parties (Interview: Krieg). However, during this period, Suez began to engage seriously 
with the RB (Interview: Bouvier). Thames, on the other hand, refused to cooperate with 
the team by not providing financial data requested to back up the model that they were 
using, and refused to participate in meetings (Interviews: Bouvier, Weitz). The
68 The consultancy was supported by the ADB, through a technical assistance contract with the Ministry 
o f  Human Settlements & Regional Infrastructure.
153
consultants therefore produced their report without adequate information, and the final 
report was rejected by all parties including the Regulatory Body.69 Pam Jaya offered to 
accept the report in its entirety if the concessionaires also did so, confident in the 
knowledge that the firms would not accept it (Interview: Lanti). In the meantime, the 
concessionaires demanded a ‘goodwill’ gesture from the Governor to demonstrate that 
he was still serious about making the concessions financially viable. The Governor 
implemented a further 30% increase in the average tariff in January 2004. Altogether, 
tariffs were raised by 75% in the 2003-4, with little public protest or media attention 
devoted to the increases, yet no mechanism for adjusting tariffs was put in place 
(Interviews: Lanti, Anwar).
After the failed ICE Team Report, the parties resumed discussions, which again 
involved lengthy discussions on individual expenditure lines. The Regulatory Body 
continued to play the role of mediator, chairing meetings between the parties 
(Interviews: Lanti, Bouvier). The central government also intervened to put pressure on 
Pam Jaya after the firms threatened once again to terminate the concessions (Interviews: 
Krieg, Lanti). Again, Palyja was at an advantage because of its different debt structure. 
The Finance Director of Palyja estimated that Palyja required a 16% tariff increase in 
the RRB, where as Thames would require a 40% increase in order to meet their debt 
repayments (Interview: Bouvier). Clearly, it was easier for Palyja to conclude its 
negotiations, and they reached agreement in November 2004. Agreement was reached 
for TPJ in July 2005.
The disjuncture between the Water Tariff and the Water Charge remains a key concern 
for Pam Jaya as well as for the firms. Figure 7.8 shows the relationship between the 
tariff and charge over time. This issue was addressed in new regulations in 2004, when 
the Governor and local Assembly approved a proposal for automatic tariff increases to 
take place each semester so that the Water Tariff would stay above the Water Charge 
(Decrees 2459/2004, 138/2005). The formula for the adjustment needs to be approved 
by the local parliament once every five years. The ‘Automatic Tariff Adjustment’ 
(ATA) allows for the Water Tariff to be reset each semester according to inflation and 
other conditions (TPJ and Palyja Letters, July 2004). Under the ATA, tariff adjustments 
do not require a separate decree from the Governor or the approval of the local
69 Pam Jaya offered to accept the report in its entirety only i f  the concessionaires also did so, but the 
concessionaires had already announced their rejection o f  the report’s recommendations.
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assembly. The ATA mechanism was implemented in 2006, but agreement on the half- 
yearly adjustments was already taking longer than planned in the first year of 
implementation (Bartlett and Witono 2006).
Figure 7.8 Relationship Between the Tariff & Charge 1997-2005
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In 2005, the Governor strengthened the RB through a new decree No 54/2005 which 
replaces the 2001 decree and provides for the RB to be “an independent and 
professional body” and extends the role of the RB to taking decisions on the adjustment 
of financial projection, technical targets and service standard of cooperation proposed 
by the Parties and advising the Governor on tariff adjustments. However, Pam Jaya and 
the concessionaires continue to insist on bilateral discussions between the contract 
signatories to decide the Water Charge. Legally, the RB should make recommendations 
to the Governor on ATA adjustments but the contractual data on charges and shortfall 
payments available to the RB is limited to hard copies of data given in the RCA
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Palyja has since improved further as Suez closed a local bond issue to cover its 
remaining foreign debt obligations. Subsequently, the company agreed the sale o f 45% 
o f  its shares to a local company (Interview: Marc Beatrix). The failure o f the M anila 
arbitration may also have made the company more willing to adopt a gradual risk- 
reduction strategy for the Jakarta concession over a termination, while extracting 
revenues from the contract where possible. Despite its less favourable financial position, 
Thames has also sought to divest its stake in TPJ and was finally able to find a buyer in 
2006. The company is now majority owned by an Indonesian investment firm, 
Recapital.
Figure 7.9 Operator Use o f  Net Income (2005-7)
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Given the profile o f  dividends up to 2007, the projected profile o f  returns has become 
even more concentrated in later years in order to achieve an average rate o f  return o f  22 
percent over the life o f the concession. A 2001 projection for TPJ projects dividends 
rising towards the end o f  the concession term, as Figure 7.10 shows, up to 48%  o f 
revenues in 2022 (Schedules Pam Jaya and TPJ 2001). If  this profile was maintained, 
this would make it possible for the firms still to meet the contractually targeted ROR. 
However, very high dividends in later years could also stimulate a public backlash, and 
possible intervention by the government (Interviews: Bouvier, Krieg). Pam Jaya has 
signalled its desire to renegotiate the concession ROR but has not taken any action in 
this regard: “We would like to raise that issue but we have not brought it up so far.” 
(Interview: Roswita).
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Figure 7.10: Equity Injections and Projected Dividend Pay-Outs to East concession 1998-2023
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7.3 Discussion
As in the previous chapter, this section considers the hypotheses and then other issues 
emerging from case study.
H I: If  the parties cannot agree a m utually satisfactory renegotiation, but termination 
costs are high, the parties will seek to maxim ise short-term revenues under the contract 
and will terminate when the costs o f  doing so have declined.
The political and economic shocks in Jakarta were dramatic and utterly unexpected. As 
in Manila, the severity o f  the shocks greatly restricted the set o f  m utually acceptable 
contract amendments. This is demonstrated most clearly by the G overnor’s refusal to 
consider a tariff increase between 1998 and 2001. Unsurprisingly, the parties were not 
able to conclude the renegotiations until 2001, when the political hurdle rate had 
declined.
The concessionaires’ hurdle rates have fluctuated over time, given shifts in corporate 
strategy o f both the foreign investors away from risk exposure in em erging markets. 
However, the parties did not threaten to term inate the concession in the period up to 
2001, suggesting that the status quo pay-offs were still within their acceptable pay-off 
set. In the later period, the behaviour o f  the concessions is consistent with the 
hypothesis, as the cost o f  termination was high, and the concessionaires were 
successfully channelling revenues out o f  the concessions, while planning their partial or
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complete withdrawal from the contracts. There are signs of divergence in the attitudes 
of the two parties which reflect the different financial structures of the two concessions, 
which mean that the same tariff increase implies that the hurdle rate of one of the 
concessions is met, but not the other, for This has made it much more difficult for 
Thames to conclude its RRB negotiations than for Suez.
H2: When the probability of enforcement is low, the party with the lower cost of 
termination secures preferential outcomes in both contractually mandated and shock- 
induced renegotiations.
This case study provides only limited support for this hypothesis. During the critical 
events o f 1998, the national government had a high cost of termination and exerted 
pressure on the other government actors to return the concession to the private 
companies. However, the government imposed constraints on the companies, notably 
the tariff freeze and the exit o f the Indonesian partners from the concession. The 
companies do not seem to have been able to use the government’s reluctance to 
terminate to their advantage and acquiesced in the Governor’s refusal to raise tariffs, 
allowing the shortfall to build up. This suggests that the concessionaires were able to 
extract adequate revenues in the status quo, while reducing their future exposure by 
cutting back capital expenditure.
In the subsequent years of the concession, the concessionaires used the threat of 
termination to secure tariff increases, but have not used this negotiating tactic often, nor 
have they shown any signs o f following through on their threats. Instead, the parent 
companies have sought to reduce their exposure by selling their equity in the 
concessions.
In the renegotiation of 2001, Suez managed to negotiate a more rapid repayment 
schedule of its shortfall than Thames, but this does not seem to have been due to a lower 
termination cost giving Suez more bargaining power. Instead, the explanation probably 
lies in the lower tariff increase (and thus larger negotiation set) that Suez was able to 
offer because of its different financing structure. This also allowed Suez to come to 
earlier agreement on tariffs in the RRB, while Thames struggled to secure agreement.
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H3: The involvement of multiple government principals makes it more likely that 
renegotiation will be triggered, but less likely that renegotiation will be concluded.
The competing interests of different government actors certainly contributed to the 
extended periods of renegotiation for the Jakarta contracts. The different interests were 
exacerbated by the structure of the contract, with the delinking of water tariff and water 
charge which creates an obvious tension between Pam Jaya’s interest in reducing its 
indebtedness, both to the concessionaires and the MOF, and the Governor’s interest in 
limiting tariff increases. The separation between the water tariff and charge in the 
contract may allow for some flexibility in timing between increases, but ultimately Pam 
Jaya cannot achieve a satisfactory conclusion to a renegotiation without the agreement 
of the Governor to tariff increases. Pam Jaya, meanwhile, has an interest in tariff 
increases, in order to pay off the shortfall, and as a way of discrediting the 
concessionaire. Other government agencies, POJ and the Department o f Mines, have 
also played a role in holding up agreement on the renegotiation by failing to meet their 
obligations under the contract.
Both the local government and Pam Jaya have played a role in initiating renegotiations, 
Pam Jaya through its takeover of management in 1998, and the Governor in his refusal 
to raise tariffs. As we would expect, it has proved easier to initiate renegotiations, which 
can be done unilaterally, than to conclude them, which must be done unanimously. 
During the tariff freeze, the Governor effectively imposed a veto on any agreement. 
During the transition period and rate rebasing, it was Pam Jaya that managed to put an 
effective break on agreement through its delaying tactics.
H4: The existence of a contract-specific regulatory agency or contract monitoring 
agency will increase the probability o f concluding a renegotiation.
The RB has played a very interesting, albeit limited, role in the Jakarta concessions, 
very much in line with this hypothesis, even though it is a relatively weak body 
established as a result o f the first round of contract renegotiation. The RB does not have 
either a discretionary power to make decisions on the water tariff, charge or business 
plans; nor does it have power to negotiate amendments to the contract. However, during 
the RRB process, the RB played a proactive role in bringing the parties back into 
negotiations when these had stalled and in mediating between them, although it cannot
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force a conclusion to disputes. The RB has also increased transparency, using external 
consultants to review the data provided by the concessionaires and by Pam Jaya.
Despites its limitations, the RB has been able slowly to build itself a function in the 
concessions. The RB’s legal role and status has changed as a result of the Governor’s 
decrees and it is likely to become increasingly powerful as a result of its new obligation 
to advise the Governor on tariff adjustments. The increasing professionalism of the RB 
will also help to strengthen its position.
As in Manila, there are additional considerations that help to understand the behaviour 
of the parties.
In particular, it is important to take into account the dramatic political and economic 
changes of 1998 and the weak institutional environment in which these events unfolded. 
Under Suharto, power was highly centralised, with few if  any ‘checks and balances’ on 
the President’s power. Indicators for corruption, bureaucratic quality and rule o f law 
show a weak institutional environment, but these indicators worsened in the years after 
the end of his regime as power fragmented. Six months into the concessions, the private 
firms faced a new and even more challenging institutional environment.
The link between the local companies, international companies and the political 
leadership is again an important thread. Corruption played a role from the start, when 
the concessions were awarded without public tender to consortia connected directly 
with the President. This in turn caused a political backlash against the concessions when 
Suharto was overthrown and popular opinion demanded the departure o f Suharto’s 
family and cronies friends from the concession companies. Corruption may also explain 
the resistance of Pam Jaya to the award of the contracts, as its managers would lose 
access to flows of illicit payments, and in the legal case brought against the 
concessionaires by the subcontractors association, which also lost its close relationship 
with the utility.
A further element that is central to understanding the events in Jakarta is the 
incompleteness o f the contract, in particular with regard to principles and processes for 
adjusting the contract. Although the contract provided for period rate rebasing, there 
was no underlying agreement between the parties about how financial and operating
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would be shared and verified, the need for transparency about the financial models used 
to establish adjustments to the charge, the principles for judging the efficiency of 
expenditure, and so on. Agreement on these matters is fundamental to the smooth- 
running of public-private contracts, and its absence in Jakarta has made both shock- 
induced and contractually mandated negotiations extremely time-consuming and 
contentious. Negotiations have become bogged focused on the details of expenditure, 
rather than on establishing a method to agree these. Future RRB may not be as difficult 
and bitter as the first round has been if the set of mutually acceptable outcomes is 
sufficiently large, but further wrangling between the parties is inevitable.
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Annex 7-A: Jakarta Concession Contracts : Provisions, Dates and Key Actors
Jakarta Concession Contract Water Charge Provisions
The Water Charge is set separately from the Water Tariff, according to the formula:
Cn = [Co x (Fn x Gn + Hn x On)] +Kxn + Kin 
Where: C is the water charge for period n
Co is the water charge set out in the contract for the current period 
Fn is the weight allocated for capital expenditure in period n
Gn is the coefficient o f  adjustment o f  the capital expenditure o f  the second party for period n 
Hn is the weight allocated to operational expenditure in period n
On is the coefficient o f  adjustment o f  the operating expenditure o f  the second party for period n 
Fn and Hn are defined so that Fn +  Hn = 1 
Kxn is the compensation for exchange rate variation in period n 
Kin is the compensation for interest rate variation in period n 
Source: Restated Cooperation Agreement 2001
Table 7.1: Jakarta Concession Key DatesKey Dates
1989 Water sector opened to foreign direct investment
1993 First discussions on private sector involvement in Jakarta water take place
1997 Negotiations for the water supply Cooperation Agreements concluded
1998 -  February Concessions become operational
1998 -  May President Suharto leaves office, replaced by former Vice-President Habibie
Management control o f  water supply taken overby Pam Jaya 
Governor o f  DKI Jakarta announces there will be no tariff increase before 2000  
Management control returned to concessionaires with conditions 
International investors buy out the equity stakes o f  their Indonesian partners 
Renegotiations begin between Pam Jaya and the concessionaires
2001 Restated Cooperation Agreements signed
Regulatory Body created
2001 (Oct) -  2002 (Sept) Transition Period during which special contractual provisions apply
Preliminary discussions about the periodic review (Rate Rebasing) take place
2003 -  Jan Contractual deadline for completion o f  Rate Rebasing
Discussions between Pam Jaya and concessionaires stalled
2003 -  Sept External consultants contracted to advise on Rate Rebasing
2004 Recommendations o f  the consultants rejected
Negotiations between the parties continue
2005 -  Oct Rate Rebasing concluded 
Source: Compiled from field interviews
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Table 7.2: Jakarta Concession Key Actors
Institution
Perusahaan Air Limbah 
Jakarta Raya 
(Pam Jaya)
(Jakarta water supply 
enterprise)
Thames Pam Jaya (TPJ)
Pam Lyonnaise Jaya 
(Palyja)
Jakarta Water Regulatory 
Body (RB)
Independent Combined 
Experts Team 
(ICE Team)
Daerah Khusus Ibukota 
Jakarta (DKI Jakarta)
(iSpecial capital region of  
Jakarta)
Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat 
Daerah Jakarta (DPRD) 
{Jakarta provincial 
assembly)
Kimpraswil
{Ministry o f Settlements 
and Regional 
Infrastructure, formerly 
Ministry of Public Works) 
Dinas Pendapatan 
{Mines Department)
Perum Otorita Jatiluhur 
(POJ)
Tanggerang, Bogor and 
West Java regional 
governments 
Ministry o f  Finance 
(MOF)
Source: Lanti 2004 and
Function
Party to the contract, owner o f  the concession assets and liabilities incurred pre- 
privatisation. Legally responsible for treatment, distribution and supply o f  water to 
Jakarta (but not for wastewater) through a decree issued by the Governor o f  
Jakarta. Monitors the firm with regards to technical targets and performance 
indicators, operating and capital expenditures; negotiates financial and technical 
parameters in the Rate Rebasing for each 5-year planning period.
Concessionaire for the East zone o f  Jakarta
Initially, majority-owned by Thames with a stake held by Kekarpola Airindo 
(Indonesia) a special purpose company 40 per cent owned by Sigit Haijojudanto, 
one o f  Suharto’s sons, 60 per cent owned by two Indonesian businessmen, 
Harisapto and Fachry Thaib.
Currently 95% owned by Thames Water International. 5% stake held by a local 
company, PT Terra Metta Phora 
Concessionaire for the West zone o f  Jakarta
Initially 40% owned by Suez (formerly Lyonnaise des Eaux, later Ondeo) and 
60% owned by Garuda Dipta Semesta, a company in the Salim Group (Indonesia) 
Currently 95% owned by Ondeo, 5% owned by a local company, Bangun Cipta 
Sarana
Created in 2001. Responsible for monitoring the contract, mediating disputes and 
proposing tariff adjustments to the Governor
Consultants who advised on the first periodic review (Rate Rebasing)
Government o f  Jakarta, which has the status o f  a province in the Indonesian 
political structure. Headed by the Governor, an elected official who has the power 
to approve tariffs (with the agreement o f  the Assembly).
The city legislature, increased in importance since decentralisation laws o f  1999. 
Must approve any tariff increase.
(Central Government)
Within the Ministry, the Directorate General o f  Urban and Rural Settlements is 
responsible for urban development programmes. It implements programmes to 
provide water to poor communities; provides technical guidance to local water 
companies and administers loans from development agencies 
Department o f  the Central Government. Regulates and supervises drilling and 
abstraction o f  groundwater in Jakarta in accordance with provincial regulations; 
recommends charges for groundwater extraction.
Company that manages the Jatiluhur dam and canal which is the main source o f  
raw water for the city
Neighbouring provinces to Jakarta, responsible for delivering local water services. 
Sell treated water to the concessionaires.
Responsible for loans from development agencies; distributes these to the relevant 
implementing authorities 
other sources
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Annex 7-B: Jakarta Concessions Hurdle Rate Analysis
In this section, we consider whether the contractually defined 22 per cent IRR, if  it is 
actually achieved by the end of the concession, constitutes a reasonable, inadequate or 
excessive return for the shareholders, given the risks associated with the investment. It 
may seem to be a high rate of return for an investment in the water sector. However, the 
Shareholder IRR measure for the Jakarta concessions need to be seen in a comparative 
context of returns on investments of a similar nature in countries with a similar risk 
profile.
Following the methodology of Estache and Pinglo (2004) and Sirtaine, Pinglo, Guasch 
and Foster (2004), comparative rates of return are calculated that reflect a level of return 
to the shareholder commensurate with the level o f risk being taken, known as a ‘hurdle 
rate.’ The methodology is based on the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) and the 
key insight of this model, that investors prefer less risky projects to more risky ones and 
will require a higher rate of return on higher risk projects. If  a project is more risky, 
investors will need to have a higher expected return if they are to invest in the project. 
There is no single ‘appropriate’ return across a sector or across a country. The 
appropriate return will be determined by project-specific risks. However, as information 
on project-specific risks is not available, it is necessary to estimate the risks of this 
project with information on risks associated in particular with the sector and with the 
country.
Any investment has two types of risk associated with it: unique risks, which can be 
reduced through appropriate portfolio diversification, and market risks, which affect all 
investments in an economy. According to the CAPM, the return on the project should be 
equal to the return that the company can earn on a risk-free investment plus a premium 
reflecting non-diversifiable risk.
The investor is interested in how sensitive a particular investment to fluctuations in the 
overall market. The measure of sensitivity is known as the beta. According to CAPM, 
the risk premium that investors demand over the return to a risk-free asset varies in 
direct proportion to the asset beta. Although the accuracy of the CAPM as a method for 
calculating the cost of capital is contested by some recent work which has found that 
returns are not (very) closely correlated with the beta. However, the CAPM is still used
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as the primary model in many regulatory systems, including the UK, and is therefore 
used here to calculate hurdle rates for the Jakarta concessions.
The formula below is used to calculate the hurdle rate:
Ra = R f + p* (Rm -  Rf) + Rc
Where:
Ra = hurdle rate (minimum required return for investment to take place)
Rf = rate o f return on a risk-free investment
P = beta of the asset (the asset’s sensitivity to market fluctuations)
Rm = return on the market as a whole (i.e. a fully diversified portfolio)
Rm -  R f = market risk premium 
Rc = country risk
The risk-free rate of interest is a theoretical interest rate associated with an asset that 
was entirely free of risk. Government bonds are considered to be low risk investments, 
but some countries clearly have risks associated with them. The US government has a 
track record of no default and is therefore considered to be an approximation for a risk­
free entity. Thus the rate for the US 3-month Treasury Bill can be used as an 
approximation of the risk-free rate. In May 2004, this was 0.98.
The beta is a measure of the volatility of a stock against the market as a whole (unique 
risk as opposed to market risk). A beta above 1 means that the stock is more volatile 
than the market as a whole, while a beta below 1 means the stock is less volatile than 
the market. The unique betas for the projects in question are not available and so it is 
necessary to use a proxy. Following Sirtaine et al (2004), average predicted betas for 
American companies in the same sector is used. These betas are adjusted according to 
the average level of leverage (debt: equity) in the sector and to the nominal corporate 
tax rate. The resulting leveraged beta for the water sector in Indonesia is 0.71.
The market risk premium represents the additional return that investors require to hold 
the extra risk associated with shares over risk-free bonds. Using data for the period 
1960-2004, the market risk premium is estimated at 5 per cent.
The risk associated with investment in a particular country is assessed by credit ratings 
agencies. The level of risk is associated with a country risk premium, the extra return 
investors would expect to earn given the level of risk. Moody’s ratings agency gives a
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rating of B2 for Indonesia (February 2005). A rating of B2 is associated with a country 
risk premium of 10.9 per cent.
Summary of Parameters 
Rf: 0.98
B: 0.71
Rm: 5.0
Rc: 10.9
Using the formula above for the hurdle rate generates a result of 14.73.
The Jakarta contract specifies the Rate of Return on nominal Rupiah. We therefore 
adjust the hurdle rate above for inflation. Inflation stood at 6 percent in 1997. Table 7.10 
shows fluctuations in inflation in the 1990-2005 period for Indonesia.
Figure 7.11: CPI Indonesia 1990-2005
Year CPI index %
hurdle rate
Average 1990-1997 8.32 23.05
Average 2000-2005 8.39 23.12
Source: EIU Country Data
In the period 1990-1997, average inflation was 8.32 percent, giving a nominal hurdle 
rate of ROR of 23.05, below, but close to the 22 percent specified for the firms in the 
contract. This implies that the Jakarta concessions were only an attractive investment 
option for private sector players if inflation was reduced.
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8 Conclusion
8.1 Motivation
This thesis is motivated by an underlying concern about the inadequate coverage and 
low quality of water and sanitation services available to households in developing 
countries. The low quality of these services is not just an inconvenience -  it is 
associated with ill health and higher mortality rates. Starting in earnest in the 1990s, 
governments, donors and firms pushed the case for large-scale private sector 
involvement in the water sector, which, it was hoped, would address the inadequate 
performance of public utilities. Private firms were expected to bring management 
expertise, efficiency improvements and access to finance for much needed capital 
investments. Yet, the experience of PSP in the water sector has been beset with 
problems. High profile cancellations, a high rate of contract renegotiation, disappointing 
profits, and a perception that low income households have suffered from tariff increases 
have led to a backlash against PSP in the water sector.
O f course, private firms will only deliver the sought-after benefits if  they have the 
incentives to do so, and the natural monopoly characteristics of the water sector mean 
that this cannot be achieved without economic regulation. Our understanding of how to 
design economic regulation has advanced considerably in recent decades, but in the 
incomplete, sometimes turbulent, institutional environments of developing countries, it 
can be very difficult to establish an effective regulatory structure. Replacing “regulation 
by agency” with “regulation by contract” is certainly not the easy resolution to 
incomplete institutions that some claim. While a well drafted contract can help to offset 
some aspects of the incomplete institutional environment, contracts themselves are 
incomplete. When the contract needs to be adjusted to take account of new information, 
the institutional environment will inevitably play a central role in supporting — or 
undermining -  the parties’ ability to find a mutually satisfactory solution.
The findings of this research suggest that even in complex, difficult cases, we do not 
need to abandon PSP. Instead, we can draw on our experience and knowledge of 
economic regulation and its relationship with institutions to tailor regulatory models to 
be more robust and effective in the institutional environment o f developing countries.
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8.2 Contribution
Research on PSP in the water sector has been held back by the paucity of reliable 
comparative data on many aspects of the sector, from an accurate record of the number 
and size of PSP contracts, to data on financial and operating performance for water 
utilities, and institutional attributes, such as the existence and nature of a regulatory 
agency. I noted early in the thesis that the water sector poses particular problems for 
data collection because of its localised nature, with municipal governments responsible 
for water supply and sanitation often without oversight at the national level. This thesis 
takes a first step to addressing this gap in the data with a new database of water sector 
PSP projects. This allows me to test the relationship between PSP and institutions 
quantitatively, and thus to demonstrate the significance of this relationship for emerging 
markets. This is supplemented in the latter part o f the thesis with the rich qualitative 
material of the case studies.
The theoretical literature has addressed many facets o f PSP in network industries. 
However, the limitation of the existing models is that they do not capture all the 
elements that are likely to be important in large, complex PSP arrangements in 
developing countries. An encompassing framework would need to include the following 
elements:
- Both contractually mandated renegotiations and contract renegotiations induced 
by shocks, in addition to renegotiations resulting from opportunism;
- Multiple time periods to allow for exogenous shocks and changes in the parties’ 
discount rates;
- Multiple principals with distinct sets of interests;
- Hybrid regulatory structures that include both contracts and agencies.
The analytical framework that I apply in this thesis allows us to understand these 
arrangements and their context more deeply than has been possible before. In the future, 
it may also serve as a base for the development of a formal model.
8.3 Key Findings
The importance of institutions for economic regulation is confirmed throughout the 
thesis. Chapter 4 ’s count regression model o f determinants of frequency o f PSP projects 
found that institutions are a significant determinant o f the number o f projects by 
country. The institutional indicators that emerged as most significant in the regression 
were the quality of the bureaucracy and investor protection against expropriation. 
However, the institutional indicators provide only indirect measures o f underlying
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institutional attributes, making it difficult to isolate the effects of the attributes 
themselves. In the regression analysis, measures of the size o f the market, the 
availability of public funds, macroeconomic risk and the involvement of the World 
Bank all emerged as significant.
The analysis of Chapters 6 and 7 complimented the quantitative analysis, looking at the 
detail of the evolution of two concessions in large cities in developing countries -  
Manila and Jakarta. The Manila concessions were originally held up as an example of 
good contract design and award, but one of the two quickly became known as an 
equally high profile example of the ‘failure’ of privatisation. A striking aspect of this 
case is just how differently the two concessionaires have fared. This cannot be 
explained just by the impact of external shocks as we are still left asking why the parties 
were unable to renegotiate the contract in a mutually satisfactory way. Here, the answer 
lies partly in the timing of shifts in the discount rates of the parties involved, which 
allowed the East concessionaire to negotiate its concession contract without difficulty in 
the first year of the concessions, but made renegotiated deals too politically sensitive 
just a few years later.
The Jakarta concessions present a different puzzle: why have the private companies 
stayed on for so long in contracts that seem to offer such limited returns? Here, the 
explanation lies in the high termination costs that the companies were faced with and 
the relatively effective strategies of the firms to extract short-term rents from the 
concessions. The weakness of the institutional environment has made it easier for them 
to do so and has failed to provide them with adequate incentives to invest and improve 
service.
Both case studies experienced severe political and macroeconomic shocks, as well as 
periodic reviews, which allowed us to examine the impact of shifts in discount rates. 
The scale of the shocks in the Philippines and Indonesia was such that the set of 
mutually satisfactory renegotiated outcomes for the public and private parties became 
very narrow. In the end, the parties were only able to agree amended contracts when the 
discount rate of the government had declined again and compromise became possible. 
In the interim period, the firms proved unwilling to terminate the contracts, consistent 
with the high-cost of termination. However, as the first hypothesis suggested, the failure 
to find an accommodation led to short-term behaviour by the parties, at the expense of
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service quality and coverage. The firms cut back dramatically on their capital 
expenditure, in order to reduce their exposure, but took a lax approach to operating 
efficiency, and sought to extract rents through management fees, in the expectation that 
low or negative operating income would strengthen their negotiating hand with the 
government.
Contracts like these are often structured deliberately to make termination costly, in 
order to improve the commitment incentives of the parties. However, the negative 
effects of short-term rent extraction need to be weighed up against the more positive 
incentive properties of termination penalties. In some cases, a shock may be so severe 
that no renegotiated outcome will be satisfactory to both parties. In these cases, the 
termination of the contract should not be considered a failure; instead, it may be 
possible to rebid the contract to a party with a lower discount rate and achieve a more 
satisfactory outcome.
Shifts in the hurdle rates of the parties caused by exogenous events will inevitably 
create challenges for the implementation of concession contracts. Firms should be aware 
that government hurdle rates tend to vary with stages in the political cycle. O f course, 
political crises and regime changes may occur at any time, shown by the overthrow of 
Suharto in 1998 and the impeachment o f Joseph Estrada in 2001. And while a country is 
likely to recover from a macroeconomic shock over the course of a few years, the effect 
o f political crises may be longer lived, as in the case studies, where institutional quality 
continued to deteriorate after the economic crisis was over. The more closely the 
contract is connected to a particular political leadership, the more susceptible it will be 
to these discount rate fluctuations.
Turning to firms, changes in discount rates may well be driven by events far outside the 
concession in question. As we saw in the case studies, some of the world’s largest water 
companies went through a major shift in strategy in the last five years, switching from a 
strategy of aggressive international expansion, implying a low hurdle rate, to rapid 
withdrawal from emerging markets and liability reduction. Under these conditions, 
contracts that were previously acceptable, even attractive, to international companies 
became financial burdens. This does not mean that the companies will terminate their 
role in the concessions immediately, but it changes their approach. Instead, they have
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sought to maximise short-term gains while seeking ways to reduce their equity 
exposure.
Clearly, the involvement of international firms can make contracts more vulnerable to 
shifts in firm strategy. However, the role of Benpres in the Manila West concession 
shows how the same can apply to large local firms. There, the bankruptcy proceedings 
of the group caused a jump in the firm’s discount rate, which made it extremely difficult 
to find a satisfactory compromise.
The impact of shocks on these contracts was dramatic because of the dimensions o f the 
crises that hit Indonesia and the Philippines in the period under study. But these shocks 
are not as exceptional as they might seem at first. Since the late 1990s, the period in 
which water privatisation spread through emerging markets, Argentina, Mexico, Russia 
and South East Asia all experienced macroeconomic crises. Volatility therefore cannot 
be considered a peripheral concern for contract implementation; it is necessary to 
consider how contracts perform in crises and how they can be tailored to deliver better 
outcomes even in these circumstances.
The evidence from the case studies in support o f the second hypothesis, which posited 
that the cost of termination determined the relative bargaining power of the parties, was 
limited. In Manila, the party which had the least interest in continuing the contract did 
manage to secure the most preferential outcomes but the case studies suggest that other 
factors, such as negotiating skills, or the ability to disguise opportunism effectively, 
may also be relevant to the outcomes o f negotiation. Further investigation of the 
determinants of renegotiation outcomes is warranted.
The experience of Manila and Jakarta provided strong support for the hypothesis that 
multiple principals will lead to more renegotiations being initiated and fewer 
satisfactorily concluded. This is important because several government actors will 
inevitably be involved in the implementation of a concession contract. Even in the 
highly centralised structure o f Suharto’s Indonesia, the contract signatory was the public 
utility, so there were two key government actors with different pay-off structures 
involved from the beginning of the contract. The number o f players multiplied with the 
end of Suharto’s New Order, giving a role to the Governor, the local Parliament and the 
Regulatory Board. In the Philippines, there were similar tensions between the interests
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of the different parties within the public sector, especially between the President and the 
Manila public utility.
The separation of powers undoubtedly serves a vital purpose in reducing the scope for 
any of the parties to act arbitrarily. However, it also opens up a responsibility gap -  lots 
of actors can block agreement on a contract adjustment but no one actor is responsible 
for ensuring that these disparate views are brought together to make contractual 
adjustments when necessary. The problems caused by this multiple veto power do not 
imply that a single government entity should take all decisions relating to a concession 
contract. However, it would be useful to clarify in the contract which party is 
responsible for negotiating adjustments to the contract, which party is responsible for 
approving the adjustments and which for implementing them. The contract could also 
contain provisions specifying a process for shock-induced renegotiations, echoing the 
principles that are used for contractually-mandated renegotiations. While this would by 
no means guarantee the swift resolution of major contractual changes, it would allow 
the parties to move ahead with a common understanding of the nature and timeframe for 
the process.
The case studies also brought to light the tensions between multiple private parties, 
although these were not explicitly covered in the analytical framework. JV 
arrangements between foreign and local companies should offer mutual benefits, but the 
case studies demonstrate that this relationship can be extremely difficult to manage, 
especially when shocks occur to the parent companies.
The case studies provided some justification for the relevance of the regulator in 
contract-based regulation. They showed that these regulators are often weak and in 
practice, political leaders may intervene in regulatory decision-making, no matter what 
is specified in the provisions of the contract. In particular, regulatory agencies are side­
lined by politicians and firms when it comes to contract renegotiation. During 
renegotiations, the authority of the regulatory agency to take decisions is further 
undermined by the ambiguous status o f the legitimacy of the contract.
At the same time, the case studies showed that even a regulatory agency with limited 
powers can play a useful role by supporting cooperation between the parties and 
increasing transparency. The regulatory agency can raise the costs of opportunism to the
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parties by monitoring and publicising non-compliance by both parties, and imposing 
fines or penalties in accordance with the contract. If the regulator has a statutory or 
contractual responsibility to enforce the contract, and its reputation is linked to fulfilling 
its responsibility, then it will have an incentive to enforce the contract against both 
parties. The case studies showed how renegotiations can drag on if any of the parties is 
benefiting from the status quo. In these cases, a regulatory agency would have an 
incentive to encourage the parties to conclude the renegotiation.
Firms are understandably concerned about the creation of a new regulatory agency with 
discretionary powers. Like all new institutions, a regulatory agency will take time to 
develop the expertise needed to implement the contract. In both the case studies, the 
regulators have become stronger over time, and the private companies have begun to 
trust the regulators more. However, while there are good reasons to give the regulators 
more responsibility, it should be accompanied by oversight and a channel for the parties 
to contest the regulator’s decisions.
Over time, the regulators have also learnt how to work with their concessionaires. Here, 
there is a balance to be struck between the idealism and energy that a new agency with a 
public service mission may be imbued with, and the time is takes for a new institutional 
arrangement, like that implied by a regulated private concession, to become embedded 
in the overall institutional environment. Too comfortable a relationship between the 
regulator and firms would suggest regulatory capture. Due to the recent vintage of most 
PPP projects in the water sector, there is a focus on problems associated with regulatory 
weakness of the early years o f the contract, but this will change as the institutions 
mature.
A strong theme in the case studies is the damaging impact of corruption on long-term 
contracts. Its effects play out in a number of ways. Corruption in the original award 
process can lead to a backlash from the public or from a new leadership, as we saw in 
Jakarta. Perceptions of corruption, whether proven or not, can also be damaging, 
demonstrated by Benpres in Manila’s West concession. Influential business groups will 
be in the media spotlight and can be easy targets for politicians looking to demonstrate 
their anti-corruption credentials. This may also make it more difficult to strike a deal in 
a contract adjustment that would be acceptable to the public. Corruption plays yet 
another role in the Philippines where broad-ranging anti-graft laws make government
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officials risk averse in all decisions involving private business interests. Finally, 
corruption in public utilities pre-privatisation leaves a large constituency opposed to 
private involvement. Giving former public utilities a role in contract implementation, as 
was the case in both Jakarta and Manila, clearly poses significant risks.
Both contracts and institutions, then, play a part in ensuring that contracts are adjusted 
over time to changing conditions. Putting all the emphasis on “getting the contract 
right” in a weak institutional environment, is unlikely to lead to a successful and 
sustainable PSP arrangement.
8.4 Policy Implications
The findings of this thesis are, to a large extent, consistent with the current mainstream 
of views of good practice in economic regulation:
- Specify the principles and procedures for rate rebasing clearly in the contract;
- Improve the flow of reliable information between the firm and the regulator, 
through standardised accounting procedures, external auditing etc.;
- Target corruption. Demonstrations of transparency during contract award 
enhance the credibility of the contract with future political leaders and with the 
public.
In other respects, the research gives rise to distinctive policy recommendations.
We saw that though shocks are not inevitable, they are very likely. O f course, shocks 
cannot be planned for, but the contracting parties can explicitly recognise the possibility 
that a major adjustment may be needed that would not be addressed by planned periodic 
adjustments, and put in place a jointly agreed process and lines of responsibility.
Monitoring and supervision by multiple government bodies may be effective in 
constraining the discretion of any one actor, but the involvement of multiple parties 
makes renegotiation more likely to be triggered and more difficult to conclude. 
Specifying the government body responsible for conducting renegotiations, the body 
responsible for approving any amendment and the procedures to be followed within the 
original contract should help to streamline the process o f renegotiation.
Termination penalties can serve a useful purpose in providing incentives for the parties 
to stick with a contract even if  it is experiencing short-term difficulties. However, after a 
shock or a shift in the parties’ discount rates, there may be no mutually satisfactory
agreement. In this case, termination may be preferable to short-term rent extraction by 
the parties, allowing the contract potentially to be rebid to a party with a lower discount 
rate.
The findings do not imply that developing countries should create discretionary 
regulatory agencies, but they do suggest that even contract-specific regulatory agencies 
with heavily circumscribed powers can contribute to the effectiveness of the regulatory 
regime. The following considerations in the design of regulatory agencies could 
enhance their role in supporting cooperative behaviour under contracts:
- Give the regulatory agency statutory responsibility for the implementation of the 
contract. If the regulator has a responsibility for implementing the contract, then 
it will have an incentive to monitor and (where it has the power) to enforce the 
implementation of the contract on both sides. The regulator’s reputation can be 
linked to its ability to expose and punish violations of the contract. However its 
role, powers and accountability must be clearly defined and its power to 
interpret the contract should be strictly circumscribed.
- Give the regulatory agency incentives to increase transparency. Often, the 
contracting parties will have an incentive to disguise information about their 
performance as asymmetric information may allow them to extract rents from 
the contract. A regulatory agency may be able to use information as a way to 
increase its own influence in relation to the contracting parties. For example, the 
regulator can act as a conduit bringing customers’ views to the attention of the 
contracting parties, and informing public opinion by publicising information 
about the behaviour o f the contracting parties.
8.5 Directions for Future Research
The WATSUP database developed for this thesis improves significantly on existing data 
on PSP in the water sector. The analysis presented here shows a clear relationship 
between contract frequency and institutional indicators, but it is only the first step in 
using this data. Further research can be done taking into account the size dimension of 
the contracts and the origin of the companies involved. Ideally, the dataset would be 
supplemented with information on performance and sector-specific institutional data, 
which would allow for the investigation of many more interesting questions.
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The analytical approach brings together important features of long-term PSP contracts 
into a coherent framework that comes closer than previous models to actual PSP 
experience in developing countries by capturing institutional incompleteness as well as 
contractual incompleteness. The next step would be to formalise the model, and to 
refine the hypotheses to allow for further empirical tests.
The case studies of Manila and Jakarta provide rich qualitative material and they have 
generated some valuable findings. Now, several avenues suggest themselves for further 
research: the first would be to compare these outcomes with how governments and 
firms behave in more complete institutional environments, both in response to shocks 
and in periodic contract reviews. Another interesting extension would be to examine 
how fluctuations in the discount rate of a single party, like an international firm, or a 
government, affect their behaviour in several different contracts.
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ANNEX A: DATA SOURCES
N am e Com pany Source Dates
M anila
Audited financial 
statements
Metropolitan Waterworks 
and Sewerage System  
(M W SS)
MWSS 1992-1996
Audited financial 
statements
Maynilad Water Services Inc MWSS Regulatory Office 1998-2003
Audited financial 
statements
Manila Water Company Inc MWSS Regulatory Office 1998-2003
Annual Report MWSS Regulatory Office MWSS Regulatory Office 2002
Annual Report MWSS MWSS 1990
Performance Data Maynilad Water Services Inc Maynilad Water Services Inc 1998-2003
Key Performance 
Indicators
Manila Water Company Inc Manila Water Company Inc 2004
Jakarta
Financial Statements 
(Unaudited)
PT Pam Lyonnaise Jaya Jakarta Water Supply 
Regulatory Board (JWSRB)
1997-2003
Financial Statements 
(Unaudited)
PT Thames Pam Jaya JWSRB 1997-2003
Audited accounts PT Pam Lyonnaise Jaya JWSRB 1997-2003
Form o f  Outstanding 
M onies
PT Pam Lyonnaise Jaya PT Pam Lyonnaise Jaya 2003 (Dec)
Laporan Evaluasi Kinerja 
Tahunan 2003
Pam Jaya Pam Jaya 2004
Pelanggan Pemakaian Air 
Januari Tahun
Pam Jaya Pam Jaya 2004
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ANNEX B: ALPHABETICAL LIST OF INTERVIEWS
Nam e Location Position Organisation Date
Abidin, Zainal Shah Alam, 
Malaysia
Director Selangor Water Monitoring 
Dept (JKAS)
3 March 2004
Adam bin Abdul 
Hamid
Johor Bahru, 
Malaysia
Councillor, Public works and 
Utilities
State o f  Johor Executive 
Council (EXCO)
10 Feb 2004
Agustin, Angel Manila,
Philippines
Regulator Customer Services Metropolitan Waterworks and 
Sanitation Services Regulatory 
Office
2 June 2004
Agustin, Rina Jakarta, 
Indonesia
Kimpraswil (Department o f  
Settlements and Regional 
Infrastructure)
10 Sept 2004
Alikpala, Ramon Manila,
Philippines
Executive Director National Water Resources 
Board, Philippines
3 June 2004
Anderson, Carey Hong Kong Chairman, Former Asia 
Business Director o f  Thames 
Water
China Water Company 7 April 2004
Andrews,
Charles
Manila,
Philippines
Principal Water and 
Sanitation Specialist
Asian Development Bank 26 May 2004
Anwar, Alizar Jakarta,
Indonesia
Consultant Jakarta Water Regulatory 
Body
6 August 2004
Arriens, Wouter Manila,
Philippines
Lead Water Resources 
Specialist
Asian Development Bank 26 May 2004
Beatrix, Marc Hong Kong Development Director Suez Environnement Asia 13 May 2004
14 May 2004
Bernardo, Nonito Manila,
Philippines
V ice President Finance Power Sector Assets & 
Liabilities Management 
Corporation (PSALM)
17 June 2004
Bernardo,
Romeo
Manila,
Philippines
Partner Bernardo Associates 5 June 2004
Berthelot, Jean Hong Kong North East Asia Regional 
Manager
Natexis Banques Populaires 20 April 2004
Bouvier,
Christian
Jakarta,
Indonesia
Finance Director Pam Lyonnaise Jaya (Palyja) 10 Sept 2004
Brenner, Werner Jakarta,
Indonesia
Management and Financial 
Advisor
PERPAMSI Association o f  
Indonesian Water Utility 
Companies
25 August 
2004
Burrell, A lix Singapore Director Project Finance Asia BNP Paribas, Singapore 16 March 2004
Cases, Philip Manila,
Philippines
SAVP, Regulatory Affairs 
Group
Maynilad Water Services Inc 2 June 2004
Chan Ngai Wen Correspondence Director Water Watch Penang 1 February 
2004
Chatib, Benny Jakarta,
Indonesia
Finance Officer Jakarta Water Regulatory 
Body
9 Sept 2004
Chen, David Beijing, PRC Country Manager, China EarthTech 02 July 2004
Cheng, Eric Beijing, PRC Senior Manager PricewaterhouseCoopers 22 June 2004
Clarke, Steve Hong Kong Country Manager, China 
Executive Director
Suez Environnement Asia  
Sino-French Holdings
19 April 2004
Cruz, Macra Manila,
Philippines
Deputy Administrator Metropolitan Waterworks and 
Sanitation Services Corporate 
Office
27 May 2006
de Guzman, 
Elaine
Manila,
Philippines
Chief Power Market 
Development Div.
Department o f  Energy, 
Government o f  the Philippines
17 June 2004
de Vera, Antonio Manila,
Philippines
Chairman Subic Bay Water Regulatory 
Board
16 June 2004
Delgado, Guido Manila,
Philippines
Former President National Power Corporation 14 June 2004
Esguerra, Jude Manila, Researcher Institute for Popular 24 May 2004
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Philippines Democracy
Fabella, Raul Manila,
Philippines
Dean, School o f Economics University o f  the Philippines 25 May 2004
Fairclough,
Graham
Manila,
Philippines
Executive Subicwater 12 June 2004
Fernandez, Jun Manila,
Philippines
Director Leighton Contractors 8 June 2004
Flor, Mai Manila,
Philippines
Director Business 
Development
Ondeo Philippines 8 June 2004
Frauendorfer,
Rudolph
Manila,
Philippines
Urban Development 
Specialist
Asian Development Bank 2 June 2004
Fu Tao Beijing, PRC Director Water Policy Centre, Tsinghua 
University
5 July 2004
Gaza, Jomar Telephone Legal Counsel Subic Bay Metropolitan 
Authority
15 June 2004
Hartley, John Hong Kong Partner Lovells 12 July 2004
He Jun Heng Beijing, PRC Assistant General Manager Beijing Capital Company 30 June 2004
Hilwan Jakarta,
Indonesia
Department o f  Construction 
and Investment
Kimpraswil, (Department o f  
Settlements and Regional 
Infrastructure)
31 August 
2004
Johnson, Richard Johor Bahru, 
Malaysia
Consultant to SAJH, Head o f  
Operations
Thames Water (Malaysia) 4  February 
2004
Krieg, Thierry Jakarta,
Indonesia
President Director Pam Lyonnaise Jaya (Palyja) 24 August 
2004
Lamacq, Sophie Hong Kong Regional Manager, South 
China
Veolia Water Asia 19 April 2004
Lanti, Achmad Jakarta,
Indonesia
Chairman Jakarta Water Regulatory 
Body
11 August 
2004
23 August 
2004
Lazaro III, Angel Manila,
Philippines
Former C hief Regulator Metropolitan Waterworks and 
Sanitation Services Regulatory 
Office
16 June 2004
Lee Hock Guan Singapore Fellow Institute o f  S.E.Asian Studies, 
Singapore
13 February 
2004
Lee Koon Yew Kuala Lumpur, 
Malaysia
Deputy Director Water supply branch, Public 
Works Dept, Government o f  
Malaysia
4  March 2004
Leow Chi Pa Kuala Lumpur, 
Malaysia
Director Water supply branch, Public 
Works Dept, Government o f  
Malaysia
4 March 2004
Leung, Amy Beijing, PRC Head, Social Sector Unit Asian Development Bank 29 June 2004
Lewis, Robert Beijing, PRC Partner Lovells 24 June 2004
Liu, Kathy Beijing, PRC Editor H20-China.com 5 July 2004
Madinsa, Jaseni Telephone C hief Engineer PBA Holdings (Penang) 15 March 2004
Mahmood bin 
Haji Ismail
Johor Bahru, 
Malaysia
Branch Manager Federation o f  Malaysian 
Manufacturers, Johor branch
6 February 
2004
McCormack,
William
Singapore Partner Shearman & Sterling 
Singapore
11 March 2004
McIntosh, Arthur Manila,
Philippines
Consultant Former consultant to the Asian 
Development Bank
27 May 2004
Medalla, Felipe Manila,
Philippines
School o f  Economics University o f  the Philippines 11 June 2004
Mohammad bin 
Alwi
Johor Bahru, 
Malaysia
C hief Financial Officer Syarikat Air Johor Holdings 
(SAJH)
19 February 
2004
Mohd.Idris
Kaparawi
Johor Bahru, 
Malaysia
Director Badan Kawal Selia Air Johor 
(Johor water regulator)
11 February 
2004,
30 N ov 2006
N g Ching Hai Johor Bahru, 
Malaysia
Director Planning and 
Technical
Syarikat Air Johor Holdings 
(SAJH)
19 February 
2004
Novari Lis Jakarta, Head Planning Division Perusahaan Daerah Air 26  August
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Indonesia Minum Jakarta (Pam Jaya) 2004
Ortega, Homer Manila,
Philippines
Member Metropolitan Waterworks and 
Sanitation Services Board o f  
Trustees
5 June 2004
Polloso,
Estrellito
Manila,
Philippines
Finance Director Metropolitan Waterworks and 
Sanitation Services Corporate 
Office
5 June 2004
Poltak,
Situmorang
Jakarta,
Indonesia
Director Association o f  Indonesian 
Water Works contractors o f  
DKI Jakarta Province 
(AKAINDO)
18 August 
2004
Razali bin Abdul 
A ziz
Johor Bahru, 
Malaysia
Chief Operating Officer Equiventures 12 February 
2004
Redman, Carl Macau Director Customer Relations Macao Water Company 08 April 2004
R eyes, Alfredo Manila,
Philippines
Member Metropolitan Waterworks and 
Sanitation Services Board o f  
Trustees
8 June 2004
Rivera, Perry Manila,
Philippines
Group Director Regulation 
and Planning
Manila Water Company Inc. 28 May 2004
Rogers, Terry Singapore Retired (former Director Asia) Thames Water International 16 August 
2004
Roswita Jakarta,
Indonesia
Consultant Pam Jaya (retired) 1 Sept 2004
Sa’ari Mohd. 
Nooh
Johor Bahru, 
Malaysia
Deputy Director Economic Planning Unit, State 
Government o f  Johor
7 February 
2004
Safwan, Achmad 
Djiddan
Jakarta,
Indonesia
KOMPARTA 18 August 
2004
Sakai, Randolph Manila,
Philippines
Acting Regulator Finance Metropolitan Waterworks and 
Sanitation Services Regulatory 
Office
2 June 2004
Samonte, Edgar Manila,
Philippines
Director, Market Operations 
Service
Energy Regulatory 
Commission
10 June 2004
Sangster, Colin Hong Kong C hief Financial Controller Suez Environnement Asia 13 May 2004
14 May 2004
Santos, Eduardo Telephone Chief Regulator Metropolitan Waterworks and 
Sanitation Services Regulatory 
Office
9 June 2004
Santos,
Nathaniel
Manila,
Philippines
Member Subic Bay Water Regulatory 
Board
10 June 2004
Schmidbauer,
Stephan
Hong Kong Bayerische Landesbank 20 April 2004
Sikar, Sjahrun Jakarta,
Indonesia
Thames Water Country 
Representative, Indonesia
Thames Water International 25 August 
2004
Siregar, Kumala Jakarta,
Indonesia
Customer Relations Dir. Pam Lyonnaise Jaya (former 
Director, Perpamsi, Director, 
Medan Water Company)
24 August 
2004
Skelcher, Gary Singapore Asia Director (former TPJ) Thames Water International 16 August 
2004
Subram aniam Kuala Lumpur, 
Malaysia
General Manager PUAS (Selangor water 
distribution company)
4  March 2004
Sukarma,
Risyana
Jakarta,
Indonesia
Water and Sanitation 
Specialist
World Bank Water and 
Sanitation Program, SE Asia
10 Sept 2004
Suksmaningsih,
Indah
Jakarta,
Indonesia
Chairperson YLKI (Indonesia Consumers’ 
Association)
04 August 
2004
Tang Jianguo Shanghai, PRC V ice Chief, Senior Engineer Shanghai Water Authority 28 Sept 2006
Tirana, Salvador Manila,
Philippines
CFO Maynilad Water Services Inc 02 June 2004
Truchot, Stephan Hong Kong Project Finance Director Veolia Water Asia 25 July 2004
Tutuko, Kris Jakarta,
Indonesia
Technical Director Perusahaan Daerah Air 
Minum Jakarta (Pam Jaya)
12 August 
2004
Valahu, Philippe Singapore Regional Manager Asia Multilateral Investment 16 March 2004
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Guarantee Agency
van Aardt, 
Marius
Telephone Executive Director Aditya Tirta Batam 2 Sept 2004
Vemay,
Stephane
Beijing, PRC Partner Gide Loyrette Nouel 29 June 2004
Vix, Nicolas Hong Kong Head o f  Project & Structured 
Finance
Calyon 13 July 2004
Wang Qiang Shanghai, PRC Research Supervisor Shanghai Chengtou Corp 30 Sept 2006
Weitz, Almud Manila,
Philippines
Urban Economist Asian Development Bank 27 May 2004
Wermert,
Stephen
Manila,
Philippines
Senior Structured Finance 
Specialist
Asian Development Bank 26 May 2004
Widya, Salusra Jakarta,
Indonesia
DG o f  Human Settlement and 
Housing
Badan Perencanaan 
Pembangunan Nasional 
(Indonesian National 
Development Planning 
Agency)
7 Sept 2004
Wind, Philippe Macau C hief Executive Officer Macao Water Company 8 April 2004
W oodcock, Jim Jakarta,
Indonesia
Water and Sanitation 
Specialist
World Bank Water and 
Sanitation Program, SE Asia
6 Sept 2004
Yamamura,
Shigeru
Jakarta,
Indonesia
Japan Bank for International 
Cooperation
3 Sept 2004
Yniguez, Cesar Manila,
Philippines
Consultant Consultant to the Asian 
Development Bank
17 June 2004
Yoong Jih Ping Johor Bahru, 
Malaysia
President Johor Consumers Association 10 March 2004
Zahdi, Ahmad 
Jamil
Johor Bahru, 
Malaysia
C hief Executive Officer Syarikat Air Johor Holdings 
(SAJH)
19 February 
2004
Zainuddin bin 
Mohd. Ghazali
Johor Bahru, 
Malaysia
Director Operations Syarikat Air Johor Holdings 
(SAJH)
15 March 2004
Zhang Ming Manila,
Philippines
Infrastructure Sector 
Coordinator
World Bank, Country Office, 
Philippines
3 June 2004
Zhang Xiaolian Beijing, PRC Partner King & W ood Partners 20 Sept 2006
Zhu George He Beijing, PRC Partner Jun He Law Offices 19 Sept 2006
Zulkifli bin 
Ibrahim
Telephone Asst Director Operations and 
Maintenance Unit
Water Supply Department, 
State o f  Negeri Sembilan
2 March 2004
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ANNEX C: LIST OF INTERVIEWS BY CASE STUDY
Nam e Location Position O rganisation Date
M anila  
(C hapter 6)
Agustin, Angel Manila,
Philippines
Regulator Customer Services Metropolitan Waterworks and 
Sanitation Services Regulatory 
Office
2 June 2004
Alikpala, Ramon Manila,
Philippines
Executive Director National Water Resources 
Board, Philippines
3 June 2004
Andrews,
Charles
Manila,
Philippines
Principal Water and 
Sanitation Specialist
Asian Development Bank 26 May 2004
Arriens, Wouter Manila,
Philippines
Lead Water Resources 
Specialist
Asian Development Bank 26 May 2004
Bernardo, Nonito Manila,
Philippines
V ice President Finance Power Sector A ssets & 
Liabilities Management 
Corporation (PSALM)
17 June 2004
Bernardo,
Romeo
Manila,
Philippines
Partner Bernardo Associates 5 June 2004
Cases, Philip Manila,
Philippines
SAVP, Regulatory Affairs 
Group
Maynilad Water Services Inc 2 June 2004
Beatrix, Marc Hong Kong Development Director Suez Environnement Asia 13 May 2004
14 May 2004
Burrell, A lix Singapore Director Project Finance Asia BNP Paribas, Singapore 16 March 2004
Cruz, Macra Manila,
Philippines
Deputy Administrator Metropolitan Waterworks and 
Sanitation Services Corporate 
Office
27 May 2006
De Guzman, 
Elaine
Manila,
Philippines
C hief Power Market 
Development Div.
Department o f  Energy, 
Government o f  the Philippines
17 June 2004
Delgado, Guido Manila,
Philippines
Former President National Power Corporation 14 June 2004
Esguerra, Jude Manila,
Philippines
Researcher Institute for Popular 
Democracy
24 May 2004
Fabella, Raul Manila,
Philippines
Dean, School o f  Economics University o f  the Philippines 25 May 2004
Fernandez, Jun Manila,
Philippines
Director Leighton Contractors 8 June 2004
Flor, Mai Manila,
Philippines
Director Business 
Development
Ondeo Philippines 8 June 2004
Frauendorfer,
Rudolph
Manila,
Philippines
Urban Development 
Specialist
Asian Development Bank 2 June 2004
Lazaro III, Angel Manila,
Philippines
Former C hief Regulator Metropolitan Waterworks and 
Sanitation Services Regulatory 
Office
16 June 2004
McIntosh, Arthur Manila,
Philippines
Consultant Former consultant to the Asian 
Development Bank
27 May 2004
Medalla, Felipe Manila,
Philippines
School o f  Economics University o f  the Philippines 11 June 2004
Ortega, Homer Manila,
Philippines
Member Metropolitan Waterworks and 
Sanitation Services Board o f  
Trustees
5 June 2004
Polloso,
Estrellito
Manila,
Philippines
Finance Director Metropolitan Waterworks and 
Sanitation Services Corporate 
Office
5 June 2004
Reyes, Alfredo Manila,
Philippines
Member Metropolitan Waterworks and 
Sanitation Services Board o f  
Trustees
8 June 2004
Rivera, Perry Manila,
Philippines
Group Director Regulation 
and Planning
Manila Water Company Inc. 28 May 2004
Sakai, Randolph Manila, Acting Regulator Finance Metropolitan Waterworks and 2 June 2004
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Philippines Sanitation Services Regulatory 
Office
Samonte, Edgar Manila,
Philippines
Director, Market Operations 
Service
Energy Regulatory 
Commission
10 June 2004
Sangster, Colin Hong Kong C hief Financial Controller Suez Environnement Asia 13 May 2004
14 May 2004
Santos, Eduardo Telephone C hief Regulator Metropolitan Waterworks and 
Sanitation Services Regulatory 
Office
9 June 2004
Tirana, Salvador Manila,
Philippines
CFO Maynilad Water Services Inc 02 June 2004
Weitz, Almud Manila,
Philippines
Urban Economist Asian Development Bank 27 May 2004
Wermert,
Stephen
Manila,
Philippines
Senior Structured Finance 
Specialist
Asian Development Bank 26 May 2004
Yniguez, Cesar Manila,
Philippines
Consultant Consultant to the Asian 
Development Bank
17 June 2004
Zhang Ming Manila,
Philippines
Infrastructure Sector 
Coordinator
World Bank, Country Office, 
Philippines
3 June 2004
Indonesia 
(Chapter 7)
Agustin, Rina Jakarta, 
Indonesia
Kimpraswil (Department o f  
Settlements and Regional 
Infrastructure)
10 Sept 2004
Anwar, Alizar Jakarta,
Indonesia
Consultant Jakarta Water Regulatory 
Body
6 August 2004
Bouvier,
Christian
Jakarta,
Indonesia
Finance Director Pam Lyonnaise Jaya (Palyja) 10 Sept 2004
Brenner, Werner Jakarta,
Indonesia
Management and Financial 
Advisor
PERPAMSI Association o f  
Indonesian Water Utility 
Companies
25 August 
2004
Anderson, Carey Hong Kong Chairman, Former Asia 
Business Director o f  Thames 
Water
China Water Company 7 April 2004
Beatrix, Marc Hong Kong Development Director Suez Environnement Asia 13 May 2004
14 May 2004
Berthelot, Jean Hong Kong North East Asia Regional 
Manager
Natexis Banques Populaires 20 April 2004
Chatib, Benny Jakarta,
Indonesia
Finance Officer Jakarta Water Regulatory 
Body
9 Sept 2004
Hilwan Jakarta,
Indonesia
Department o f  Construction 
and Investment
Kimpraswil, (Department o f  
Settlements and Regional 
Infrastructure)
31 August 
2004
Krieg, Thierry Jakarta,
Indonesia
President Director Pam Lyonnaise Jaya (Palyja) 24 August 
2004
Lanti, Achmad Jakarta,
Indonesia
Chairman Jakarta Water Regulatory 
Body
11 August 
2004
23 August 
2004
McCormack,
William
Singapore Partner Shearman & Sterling 
Singapore
11 March 2004
Novari Lis Jakarta,
Indonesia
Head Planning Division Perusahaan Daerah Air 
Minum Jakarta (Pam Jaya)
26 August 
2004
Poltak,
Situmorang
Jakarta,
Indonesia
Director Association o f  Indonesian 
Water Works contractors o f  
DKI Jakarta Province 
(AKAINDO)
18 August 
2004
Sikar, Sjahrun Jakarta,
Indonesia
Thames Water Country 
Representative, Indonesia
Thames Water International 25 August 
2004
Siregar, Kumala Jakarta,
Indonesia
Customer Relations Dir. Pam Lyonnaise Jaya (former 
Director, Perpamsi, Director, 
Medan Water Company)
24 August 
2004
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Rogers, Terry Singapore Retired (former Director Asia) Thames Water International 16 August 
2004
Roswita Jakarta,
Indonesia
Consultant Pam Jaya (retired) 1 Sept 2004
Safwan, Achmad 
Djiddan
Jakarta,
Indonesia
KOMPARTA 18 August 
2004
Skelcher, Gary Singapore Asia Director (former TPJ) Thames Water International 16 August 
2004
Sukarma,
Risyana
Jakarta,
Indonesia
Water and Sanitation 
Specialist
World Bank Water and 
Sanitation Program, SE Asia
10 Sept 2004
Suksmaningsih,
Indah
Jakarta,
Indonesia
Chairperson YLK1 (Indonesia Consumers’ 
Association)
04 August 
2004
Tutuko, Kris Jakarta,
Indonesia
Technical Director Perusahaan Daerah Air 
Minum Jakarta (Pam Jaya)
12 August 
2004
Widya, Salusra Jakarta,
Indonesia
DG o f  Human Settlement and 
Housing
Badan Perencanaan 
Pembangunan Nasional 
(Indonesian National 
Development Planning 
Agency)
7 Sept 2004
Woodcock, Jim Jakarta,
Indonesia
Water and Sanitation 
Specialist
World Bank Water and 
Sanitation Program, SE Asia
6 Sept 2004
Y amamura, 
Shigeru
Jakarta,
Indonesia
Japan Bank for International 
Cooperation
3 Sept 2004
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